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 1 
Executive summary 
1. Introduction 
Agricultural producers face a series of risks affecting the income and welfare 
of their households. These are mainly production risks related to weather conditions, 
pests and diseases, market conditions, etc. Consequently, the income stability of 
agricultural stakeholders can be also affected. In recent years the European Union 
has been considering a possible integration of risk management in the common 
agricultural policy and is analysing risk and crisis management strategies to provide 
an improved response to crises in the agricultural sector. 
This report reviews the agricultural risk management systems in the EU (candidate 
countries Turkey and Croatia are also analysed) with a special focus on types of 
agricultural insurance, although no data could be collected for Malta. The most 
descriptive part of the study contains a collection of data on the realities and 
modalities of agricultural insurance in Europe. This information mainly comes from 
fact sheets filled in by experts or consultants from the different European countries 
and data from the European Committee of Insurers (CEA). Many of these data were 
unpublished because there is no obligation for the insurance companies to report to 
the EU institutions.  
 
2. Description of the current situation of agricultural 
insurance in the EU 
The EU has mostly classic insurance schemes (mainly single-risk and 
combined insurance, but also yield insurance), generally private except in Greece 
and Cyprus where insurance is public and compulsory. In many countries the market 
is in the hands of no more than two or three insurance companies. The level of 
development of agricultural insurance in each country is mainly linked to two decisive 
factors: 
— the needs faced in each country (risk level); 
— the economical support given by each Member State to the insurance 
systems. 
The role of governments is analysed for each country. Some do offer or subsidise 
insurances while others provide aid ex post given on an ad hoc basis through 
compensation schemes, calamity funds or futures markets existing in Europe, which 
can be partially financed by the agricultural stakeholders on a voluntary or 
compulsory basis. The different existing risk management tools are presented, 
analysed and compared in the report. This helps to understand better the evolution of 
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the insurance systems in Europe, since the development of the insurance system 
depends very strongly on the presence of other risk management tools and on the 
role of the public sector, in particular ad hoc aid measures.  
 
3. Understanding and measuring the level of 
development of insurance 
The report gives an analysis of the volume of insurance and the market 
penetration or participation rates (in relative terms). Several comparisons are studied 
and shown through maps to conclude that the percentage of insured area does not 
give a sufficient measure to understand the importance or development of insurance 
in a country: it needs to be combined with the cover offered by the insurance 
schemes and with the market penetration in terms of insured value.  
Finally, we can point out that in Europe there is no comprehensive yield insurance 
without public support. For non-systemic risks, like hail, the private sector offers 
suitable insurances, but for insurance products offering a wide cover in yield 
reduction risk, there is a direct relationship between development of the system and 
public support. The amount of support provided by EU Member States to subsidise 
insurance premiums varies depending on the country’s policy to promote some 
particular type of cover. 
Some technicalities, like reinsurance, triggers and deductibles, are described. 
Reinsurance is usually done in the international reinsurance market, mainly in the 
modalities of stop-loss and quota-share reinsurance. 
 
4. Regulations, policies, State aid: towards a 
homogeneous system 
The definitions of crisis and disaster eligible for public aid in EU Member 
States are examined and compared with the ‘Community guidelines for State aid in 
the agriculture sector (2000–06)’ (EC, 2000). New Commission guidelines (EC, 
2006b) and a new regulation (EC, 2006a) on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of 
the Treaty were adopted in December 2006. The definitions assumed are strongly 
shaped by WTO agreements. National experts provided information on the Member 
States’ definitions for disasters and crises which are eligible for aid, as well as the 
definitions of insurable risks, when they exist. Some countries forbid State aid in the 
case of crisis or disaster if the risk could have been insured. This is the case for 
Austria, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Turkey for subsidised insurable 
risks and for France if insurance has reached a significant diffusion level. The 
regulation will partially condition State aid to buying some type of insurance from 
2010 on.  
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Most EU Member States follow the Community guidelines for State aid (EC, 2000) to 
decide when aid can be bestowed aid. We have classified the Member States in four 
groups according to their observance of the guidelines: some of them incorporate or 
explicitly mention the guideline definitions in their legislation; others just assume it 
without explicit mention; a third group have more restrictive definitions than those 
established in the guidelines, as it is the case for the calamity fund system in France. 
Lastly, some States have less restrictive definitions than those in the guidelines. 
These different attitudes of the Member States existed while the guidelines were only 
‘advisory’. A few examples of definitions for disaster are shown below. 
(a) EU States with a more restrictive definition: France: crop losses above a 
higher threshold: 42 % of the production value of the damaged crop and 14 % of the 
whole farm gross revenue; also requires that no efficient preventive technique be 
available. Austria: disaster is defined by the public authorities related to the occasion; 
no aid for insurable risks. Portugal: damage on crop production of at least 50 % (…) 
of the yields usually obtained in the region. The Netherlands, Sweden and the UK: no 
aid is given for climatic risks on crops, only for livestock diseases.  
(b) EU States with a less restrictive definition: The Czech Republic: more detailed 
specification of defined risks called as ‘natural disasters’. Hungary: more risks 
defined as ‘natural disasters’; lower triggers, 15 % or 20 %, applying for some kind of 
support, like preferential credit or tax and lease reduction and cancellation. 
With the coming into force of the 2006 regulation this situation should change 
towards more homogeneous rules. 
5. Risk level: geographical analysis 
The variability of production and income is far from uniform across the EU: in 
some regions and sectors they are relatively stable, while in other regions or sectors 
they are highly unstable. Mapping the variability level has a twofold interest for the 
assessment of agricultural insurance: better understanding as for which geographical 
areas and sectors stabilisation is more important, and tuning the extrapolation of the 
premium rates in a hypothetical EU-wide system. The data required for analysing the 
variability of climatic risks, yield and income come from several sources: 
— meteorological databases and agrometeorological parameters computed by 
CGMS (crop growth monitoring system), which is the kernel of the JRC yield 
forecasting system for the EU; CGMS allows an analysis to be made at pan-
European level of the status of the crops and on the harvest prospective and in 
this report it was used to develop climatic risk maps; 
— vegetation indexes computed on satellite images; 
— Eurostat’s REGIO database on yield of main crops;  
— the farm accountancy data network (FADN).  
 4 
6. Agricultural insurance systems in other countries 
The agricultural insurance systems existing in the world are reviewed. In 
Canada, the USA and other non-EU countries, some insurance instruments, such as 
index insurance, area insurance, whole farm insurance or revenue insurance, have 
been developed which are not developed in EU. In the United Kingdom there was a 
private revenue insurance product but it was soon removed from the market. 
In Canada and the USA there is yield insurance. In both countries, there is a basic 
cover for yield insurance which covers only for losses above the 50 % of the average 
yield (it is called catastrophic cover). It is highly subsidised by the government 
(almost entirely in the USA — where farmers pay only an administrative fee — and 
50 % in Canada).  
The USA is currently the only country where revenue and income insurance exists; 
the report presents it in depth. In Canada there was an income insurance named 
Gross Revenue Insurance Plan which failed and now there is an income stabilisation 
programme, which is described in the report.  
The Canadian system is mainly led by public insurance agencies, from the provincial 
governments. It profits from subsidies, both from the federal and the provincial 
governments, which total EUR 425.5 million and which amount to 66 % of the 
premiums. Besides yield insurance products similar to those in the USA, it has an 
important income programme, Canadian agricultural income stabilisation (CAIS), 
which consists of stabilisation accounts. The stabilisation accounts are individual 
accounts where farmers put an amount of money every year, which they can 
withdraw in a year of big losses. They can be based on yields, revenues or other 
indices. 
 
7. Livestock sanitary and risk crises 
The report also reviews several studies made in the past few years to analyse 
the costs and impact of recent epidemic livestock outbreaks in Europe. We discuss 
the potential of livestock insurance to cover animal diseases and more general 
animal risks. Livestock epidemics can result in substantial losses for governments, 
farmers and all the other partakers involved in the livestock production chain. 
National governments and European institutions generally support the largest part of 
the direct losses, such as the value of destroyed animals and organisational costs. 
Consequential losses, such as losses resulting from empty buildings and movement 
standstills, are almost always completely borne by the farmers themselves if not 
insured privately. Few private insurance systems exist in Europe to cover the 
consequential losses due to livestock epidemics (e.g. they exist in Germany, Italy, 
Sweden, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). Most general livestock insurance 
schemes cover death and emergency slaughter because of illness. 
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The main reason for public concern is that certain diseases can be a large potential 
hazard for the economy and the health of the population; therefore public reaction is 
normally covered by legislation and there is less room for private insurance. Besides, 
forecasting high risks events is very difficult and insurers are reluctant to insure 
against ‘any disease’. Strategies of the public sector are rather focused on efficient 
risk-reducing behaviour, in particular through preventive measures. It seems possible 
to build a cost-sharing scheme only for covering losses caused by diseases with low 
or no externalities (1).  
 
8. Main figures of crop insurances at country level  
Approximately 23 % of crop value was insured in 2004 in the EU-27. 
Premiums amounted to EUR 1 583 million, i.e. 4 % of the insured value. Spain is 
generally considered as the country with the most developed systems and accounted 
for EUR 564 million although only 5.86 million ha were insured, showing relatively low 
market penetration (26 % of the cultivated area). In Germany, market penetration is 
higher (7.26 million ha, i.e. 43 % of the cultivated area), and the average amount of 
premiums accounted for EUR 129 million. This fact can be explained by considering 
that in Germany the insurance usually covers only a single risk (hail). On the other 
hand, the high value for Spain can be explained by the higher number of perils 
covered and the potentially higher risks there.  
Total subsidies amounted to EUR 497 million or 32 % of the premiums. Between 
countries, the amounts of subsidies to the premium are very different. We find the 
highest subsidy rates in Europe are in Italy and Portugal, for example the 80 % 
subsidy in Italy for yield insurance. In other countries, as in the UK, there is no 
subsidy at all.  
Average loss ratios — total claims paid by insurance companies during a certain 
number of years, divided by the total premiums of the same period — range from 
60 % to 70 %. 
 
9. Feasibility of an EU-wide system of agricultural 
insurance 
We assess the feasibility of several scenarios with different types of 
insurances: single-risk insurance, yield insurance, index insurance, revenue/income 
insurance, etc. We consider socioeconomic criteria (related to decisions of the private 
sector: insurers, reinsurers and farmers) and technical criteria (cost/affordability, 
                                            
(1) Externalities are defined as economic consequences for third parties. 
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asymmetric information, easiness to control). Political criteria are essential, but 
beyond the scope of this report.  
The rough costs estimation of some of them indicates that a 50 % subsidy to the 
national premiums of all the countries, assuming an insurance demand of 40 %, 
would be approximately of the order of magnitude of EUR 1 billion for income 
insurance, EUR 0.5 billion to EUR 0.6 billion for yield insurance on arable crops, 
EUR 0.23 billion to EUR 0.37 billion for area index insurance for cereals and of 
EUR 0.20 billion to EUR 0.40 billion for fruits. The calculations were made assuming 
that the average premium rates would remain in a more developed system equal to 
current rates. However, these estimations require more in-depth analysis, because 
this assumption may be too strong.  
In the current situation, with very heterogeneous positions of Member States and 
very different levels of risk, it seems difficult to propose a common homogeneous 
insurance system, but some types could be of some interest:  
— revenue insurance: more expensive, but more efficient as income stabiliser;  
— indirect index insurance: cheaper and easier to manage and control, but usually 
less correlated with farmers’ income.  
 
10. Alternatives to a common agriculture insurance 
system 
A series of alternatives to a common system have been proposed and 
analysed; these should be simple to manage by the EU administration and easy to 
control.  
An alternative to a proper EU-wide insurance scheme could be a set of actions to 
foster national systems by:  
— facilitating/subsidising the composition of databases, preferably at farm level, in 
order to limit to the minimum any malfunctioning due to asymmetric information 
that leads to adverse selection and, to some extent, moral hazard; 
— reinsuring (many agricultural risks are considered non-insurable in most countries 
because they are too systemic); insurers and reinsurers are not willing to take this 
type of risk — the situation could change if there is strong public participation in 
the reinsurance scheme (USA and Spain); 
— clarifying the framework (in order to achieve a greater homogeneity of the national 
systems); this has been partly achieved with the new regulation (EC, 2006a); 
— partially subsidising national systems which are within the framework (this could 
be either insurance models, funds or other risk management tools — in any case, 
they should be within a common legal framework, establishing some control 
criteria and a common financing scheme). 
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1. Motivation for the study 
The economic stability of an entire rural area can be jeopardised by crises caused by 
different types of natural disasters, from climatic events to livestock or plant diseases. 
Weather is an important production factor in agriculture, which, unfortunately, can 
hardly be controlled. In fact, weather risks are a major source of uncertainty for 
farms. Drought and excess rainfall are responsible for bad harvests all over the 
world. Besides, it seems that the volatility of temperature and precipitation and the 
occurrence of extreme weather events have increased in the last decade and are 
likely to continue increasing due to global climate changes. This leads to 
destabilisation of farm incomes in particular in countries with strong yield variability. 
Perhaps the most obvious impact of weather risk is on crop yields, but its relevance 
is not limited to crop production. The performance of livestock farms, the turnover of 
processors, the use of chemicals and fertilisers and the demand for many food 
products also depend on the weather. Hence, large parts of the agribusiness are 
affected by weather risks. In the European Union (EU) the problem of production risk 
is even more relevant since price volatility is expected to increase due to recent 
policy reforms. Governments are not unaware of the importance of these risks. So, 
besides the private tools producers can use to manage risks, many countries have 
decided to help the stabilisation of their agriculture by supporting different agricultural 
risk management schemes. In the EU, there is an ongoing discussion on the role 
European policy should have regarding agricultural risk management. The European 
Parliament (EP) amendment is a response to the Commission communication on 
risks and crisis management in agriculture (COM(2005) 74 final) and the Council 
conclusions of 17 December 2003 on risk management in agriculture. This study is 
framed within the context of the ongoing discussion. It was commissioned to the JRC 
by the Commission’s Directorate-General for Agriculture and Rural Development, at 
the suggestion of the European Parliament. The 2005 communication examined 
possible options for using modulation funds for risk and crisis management 
measures. In time they could complete or partially replace Community and Member 
States’ ad hoc emergency measures. The options considered were supporting 
mutual funds, providing basic cover against income crises and co-financing farmers’ 
insurance premiums against natural disasters. The following text was adopted by the 
European Parliament (EP): ‘Systemic farming risks make it necessary to introduce 
regulatory mechanisms within the common agricultural policy which can cope with 
the impact of climatic or biological disasters on farm incomes. Agricultural insurance 
may be a useful tool for doing so.’ The study will be used by the Agriculture and Rural 
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Development DG to further assess the potential of insurance systems as a tool for 
risk and crisis management in agriculture. 
The aim of the study is to improve the knowledge about climatic and sanitary risks in 
EU agriculture and to examine the role and the functioning of agricultural insurance 
as a risk management tool. Weather risk is a major challenge in agricultural policy, 
and it is important to have a new look at providing suitable information to analyse a 
possible integration of it in the common agricultural policy (CAP). Price and income 
risks are also to be considered. Sanitary crises and economic crises caused by the 
changes of market conditions may also endanger farms’ viability. The CAP should 
enhance appropriate risk and crisis management strategies, providing an improved 
response to crises in the agricultural sector. 
 
1.2. Content of the study 
The report starts with the description of main risks and risk management tools in 
agriculture, followed by a literature review of studies on agricultural insurance 
systems in Europe. The next chapter looks at the risks, analysing and mapping 
climatic and income risks in Europe. Moreover, policies and legal frameworks of 
agricultural risk management are introduced, namely the definitions of crisis and 
disaster, and the conditions under which public support is allowed for risk mitigation. 
Then we come to the risk management tools, mainly insurance schemes. First, non-
European insurance systems are reviewed; secondly, the core of this study, the main 
agricultural insurance systems in EU-27 countries plus Turkey and Croatia are 
presented. After the insurance systems, other relevant risk management tools such 
as stabilisation funds or types of ad hoc aid are analysed in Chapter 6, and the 
particularities of livestock sanitary risk management are mentioned in Chapter 7. 
Finally, the feasibility of an EU-wide insurance system is discussed in Chapter 8. 
General conclusions and considerations close the report. 
 
1.3. Sources and methodology used 
The report uses different information sources for its different parts. The analysis and 
the mapping of risks (Chapter 3) are based mainly on meteorological and 
agrometeorological data from the crop growth monitoring system (CGMS), which is 
an important working tool of the MARS-Stat group in the JRC. Other sources of data 
(yields, income) are Eurostat and the farm accounting data network (FADN). 
The information for the report, used in Chapters 4, 5 and 6, is sourced from national 
experts from all EU-27 countries, except Malta. Information from Croatia and Turkey 
was added in some cases, as it seemed to have interesting added value to complete 
the overview of the EU with candidate countries. A fact sheet to fill in was sent to all 
 9 
national experts, requiring a description of the risk management systems in their 
countries, of the insurance products available, their technicalities, reinsurance 
systems and some data on insurance demand or market penetration. The fact sheet 
sent to the national experts is shown in Figure 1. 
This study represents a step forward in the insurance literature because of its 
novelty: such a compilation of information of insurance systems, both public and 
private, from all the countries in Europe, has never been carried out before. This 
uniqueness at the same time has a disadvantage: the difficulty to check the quality of 
the data provided. These data are also extremely complex to evaluate, because of 
the diversity of cover of the insurance products, because of their natural complexity 
and because of the differences in their insertion in the political schemes and their 
consequent impact on subsidies. Besides, in some cases, the data provided were 
clearly incomplete and lacking information; in most cases (France, the Netherlands, 
etc.) the missing information is in the hands of private companies that have no 
motivation or obligation to provide the data.  
However, the study was able to profit from some additional information from the 
insurance companies, made available by the European Committee of Insurers 
(Comité Européen des Assurances — CEA). This information is used in Chapter 5. 
As will be ascertained in that chapter, the matching of both sources is not always 
straightforward.  
Regarding the development of the work, it has to be mentioned that it has benefited 
from the follow up, not only by the Agriculture and Rural Development DG, but also 
by a small support group, who have had regular meetings with the authors for 
advisory purposes. This support group is composed of a few experts from different 
countries and backgrounds (insurance companies, reinsurance companies, 
consultants, officials for government insurance policy, and farmers unions). However, 
all inaccuracies and mistakes that may be found are entirely due to the authors. 
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Country:  
1. Generalities 
Some history of the agricultural risk and crisis management policies, programmes and tools.  
 
2. General framework 
• Definitions of disaster (for the application of Article 92.2 of the Treaty of Rome (2)) 
• General law framework 
• Objectives of the existing policies/programmes  
• Law barriers: Does the law forbid ad hoc measures or disaster funds to compensate damages that 
could have been insured?  
 
3. Market conditions 
• Competition on prices or on quality of services. Is there an independent body that fixes tariffs?  
• Competition on quality of services 
• Market players: Is there a dominant company?  
 
4. General features  
Indications of most frequent characteristics: To be detailed in the next paragraph and the technical 
form of products  
• Compulsoriness for the farmer 
• Public subsidies (%) and cost for the farmers 
• Franchise (%): Is it computed on the total of the farm or per crop?  
• Existence and importance of index-based insurances  
• Most usual method for determination of losses 
• Delay in paying indemnity after event or harvest 
• Is there a bonus/malus system?  
• Is there insurance for income?  
• Is there a (significant) market of MPCI (multi-peril crop insurances)? 
• Are there any types of insurance available for prices?  
 
5. Insurance products available  
Description of all the available programmes per crop, per group of crops (as probably defined by the 
insurance) and per type of animal, including information on: 
• number of farms covered  
• covered areas (crops, livestock and revenue) and type of risk covered 
• cover in value of production 
The information in this paragraph is extended in the technical form in annex. It will refer to the most 
recent year available.  
 
6. Cover in the most recent years 
This paragraph summarises the information given in the tables by type of product and describes the 
evolution in the most recent years. The information is partly redundant because of paragraph 5, but 
this paragraph focuses on the time trend. If possible, figures should be given year by year over a 
                                            
(2) ‘The following shall be compatible with the common market:  
(a) . . . 
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or other exceptional occurrences; 
. . .’  
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period of five years or alternatively data can be given for one date around five years before the most 
recent available.  
• Number and percentage of farms covered 
• Total area insured by group of crops and percentage  
• Total number of animals covered by type of animal and percentage 
• Production value covered and percentage  
• Total amount of premiums  
• Compensation payments to farmers (indemnities)  
• Subsidies 
 
7. Reinsurance 
• Private or public? 
• Main reinsurers 
• Reinsurance rates 
 
8. Alternative risk management tools 
• Ad hoc measures (extraordinary disasters): average expenditure in the last 10 years, delay to pay. 
• Calamity funds regularly fed. Average expenditure in the last 10 years, delay to pay. 
• Mutual funds  
• Non-monetary tools 
 
9. Changes undergoing the system 
 
 
Annex: Technical form (detail of paragraph 5) 
 
One table per product or group of similar products 
Product covered (crop type, livestock, income):  
Peril/damage covered (or multi-peril): Is it insurance on yield? Is there a list of specific perils covered? 
Technicalities:  
Index-based? (Computed on meteorological data, satellite images, etc.)  
Can a farmer insure only part of the fields?  Yes  No 
Loss estimation per field or per farm? 
Triggers: What is the minimum loss above which the farmer is compensated?  
Method to calculate the reimbursement 
Compulsory for the farmer?      Yes      No  
Is there a bonus/malus system?      Yes      No  
Time from the harvest/damage until payment of indemnity (specify if it is maximum or average)  
Geographic detail used by companies to determine tariffs 
Franchise (%): Does it coincide with the trigger?  
Public involvement (subsidies to premiums, reinsurance, regulations)  
Cover in area, number of farms or value (specify and give all values if possible)  
Sources 
 
Source: Prepared by a working team composed of members of the Agriculture and Rural Development DG and 
the JRC. 
Figure 1. Model of the fact sheet sent to national experts 
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2. Literature review of risks and risk management 
tools in agriculture 
 
2.1. Chapter synthesis 
The agriculture sector is characterised by high exposure to risk, often but not only, 
coming from climatic events. Next, we summarise the different types of risk that 
agriculture faces, which evidence the risk exposure in European agriculture. In the 
following section, we review the tools available to manage these agricultural risks. 
 
2.2. Types of risk  
Risks in agriculture fall into two main groups:  
1. price risks — because of agriculture trade liberalisation. 
2. production risks — because of adverse meteorology or other reasons (rising 
quality requirements on animals and plants, diseases across borders, etc.). 
Climate change represents a long-term issue that deserves specific in-depth 
analysis.  
Some risks affecting farmers are common to most businesses, others are unique to 
farming. The most important risks can be classified as follows (Hardaker et al., 1997). 
— Human or personal risks: The farm operator can get health problems or even die.  
— Asset risks: For risks such as theft, fire and other damage or loss, losses are 
generally covered by insurance or, in the case of calamity, the public disaster aid 
may help to reduce the outcomes of the losses.  
— Production or yield risk: Most of the time the weather is responsible, but this also 
includes risks like plant and animal diseases. Yield risk is measured by yield 
variability. In turn, yield variability for a given crop differs from region to region, 
and is determined by the soil type, the climate and the production method. 
Regarding the livestock sector, the risk is less considerable because weather has 
less influence. 
— Price risk: The risk of falling or rising prices after a production modification has 
been done. 
— Institutional risk: This is associated with policy changes which intervene with 
agricultural issues and can have a negative impact on farm revenue. 
— Financial risk: This depends on the possible increase of interest of a mortgage, 
insufficient liquidity and loss of equity. 
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The abovementioned risks can often be interrelated, so one event can create several 
impacts on other realities. All the categories of risk have an effect on the income of 
the stakeholder. 
Understanding the origin and nature of risk is necessary for developing risk 
management strategies. As explained in Hardaker et al. (1997), there is a need for 
information on risk, its cause, its characteristics (distribution, frequency and 
correlation with one another), its consequences on farm income, and on the capacity 
of various strategies to reduce income risk. There has been much theoretical 
research attempting to explain price variability on commodity markets or the use of 
futures markets and insurance systems. 
Researchers are also concerned with understanding producers’ behaviour when 
confronted with risk and developing modelling tools to help farmers make decisions 
under risk (Barnett, 1999). However, it has been found that farmers’ behaviour does 
not always conform to theory and that there is a need to better understand farmers’ 
attitudes toward risk and the way they adjust their farm operations. Risk perception 
can vary from farmer to farmer, from sector to sector and from product to product; it 
depends on the farmer’s experience and on his degree of risk aversion. 
For instance, in 1997 a survey was carried out in the Dutch livestock sector. It 
showed that price risk was identified as the highest source of risks, followed by 
institutional or personal risk. On the other hand, a similar survey was carried out in 
the USA on other production programmes such as wheat, maize and soybean. In this 
case producers were more concerned about yield and price risk, while livestock 
farmers worried mainly over institutional risks (Mewissen, Huirne and Hardaker, 
1999a). 
 
2.3. Tools for risk management in agriculture 
Once the risk has been identified and assessed, various strategies can be used to 
reduce income risk at the farm household level. Two types of risk management 
strategies are normally distinguished (EC, 2001): 
(a) strategies concerning on-farm measures: selection of products with low risk 
exposure (e.g. benefiting from public intervention), selection of products with short 
production cycles, diversification of production programmes, vertical integration 
self-insurance or individual stabilisation accounts; 
(b) risk-sharing strategies: marketing contracts, production contracts, hedging on 
futures markets, participation in mutual funds and insurance. 
Beside these, there are other alternatives, such as relying on public assistance 
(disaster or emergency aid) or increasing the share of income from sources outside 
agriculture. 
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2.3.1. Diversification 
Diversification of crops and/or livestock production implies that a favourable result in 
one enterprise may help to cope with a loss in another. Diversification thus reduces 
the overall risk. However, it is usually associated with a lower average income, 
because it is not only the most profitable enterprises that are undertaken and also 
because higher costs are often associated (additional equipment, forgone economies 
of scale, lack of managerial expertise, etc.). 
The diversification of the business activities reflects the reduced dependence of 
farmers on agriculture as a source of income. Diversification also implies some kind 
of entrepreneurial activity on behalf of the farmer. There are some activities that are 
included as diversification within the above definition, such as processing, agro-
tourism, sport, recreation (open days of the farms, training, children’s birthday 
parties, social conventions with institutions for voluntary work on the farm). 
Diversification also includes off-farm strategies. Off-farm employment reduces 
dependency on agricultural income; it can be considered as a strategy but also as a 
need when agricultural incomes can easily be too small to support a whole family. 
Off-farm employment can also increase the probability of stopping the farming 
activity.  
Another strategy can be to specialise the farm and to start working together with 
other specialised neighbouring farms, with the aim of building up a cooperative in 
which the total production cost, the yield and price risk can be shared. The degree of 
risk exposure can also decrease thanks to the variety of crops. This strategy is not 
always compatible with the dominant mentality of farmers. 
 
2.3.2. Vertical integration 
A vertically integrated firm retains ownership control of a commodity across two or 
more levels of activity. Risk reduction is one of the reasons to vertically integrate 
them. It helps to reduce risks associated with a variation in quantity and quality of 
inputs (backward integration) or outputs (forward integration). Vertical integration is 
more common in the livestock sector (integration backward into feed manufacturing) 
or in the fresh vegetables sector (integration forward into sorting, assembling and 
packaging) (EC, 2001). 
 
2.3.3. Stabilisation accounts 
Stabilisation accounts are a form of self-insurance. They consist of individual 
accounts where farmers put an amount of money every year which they can withdraw 
in a year of big losses. Stabilisation accounts can be based on yield, revenue or 
other indices. 
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2.3.4. Marketing and production contracts  
A marketing contract is an agreement between a farmer and a buyer to sell a 
commodity at a certain price before the commodity is ready to be marketed. The 
farmer retains full responsibility for all production management decisions. The 
contract can be based on a fixed price, or alternatively depend on the development of 
the commodity’s futures price. The latter type of contract does not eliminate price risk 
completely. The cost for the farmer results from forgoing the opportunity of achieving 
a higher price on the open market. Contracting provides the farmer with an 
opportunity to differentiate his products from mass production and to draw an 
economic rent from this. Another advantage of these types of contract in the crop 
sector is related to time management. In fact during the busy harvesting season, 
farmers do not have enough time to sell the products. 
Production contracts typically give the contractor (the buyer of the commodity) 
considerable control over the production process. These contracts normally specify 
the production inputs to be used, the quality and quantity of the product and the price 
to be paid to the producer. This kind of contract partially shifts price risk to the 
processor. On the downside, the farmer depends to a large extent on only one buyer, 
thus incurring a risk of losing his only outlet following contract termination. 
 
2.3.5. Derivatives contracts 
On-spot or cash-market (3) prices are set for goods that are immediately available. 
Production and marketing contracts, as well as futures contracts, add the time 
dimension to these markets. They allow users to cover their price risk by locking in 
the price of a commodity they wish to purchase or sell at a future date. Futures 
market contracts are in this way similar to marketing contracts, but differ from them in 
three important issues: they are standardised in terms of contract terms and thus 
they can be more easily traded; they are traded in organised exchanges under rules 
and regulations; they do not always involve physical delivery of goods at maturity 
(Larson et al., 1998). 
Futures contracts, option contracts and others are called derivatives. Derivatives 
contracts can also be used for risk management in agriculture. Even though in the 
USA some derivatives contracts have appeared based on weather indices and even 
derivatives on yields have been proposed (Canter et al., 1996; Jaffee and Russell 
1997; Stoppa and Hess, 2003; Turvey, 2001; Skees, 1999) derivatives markets are 
essentially and often used for the purpose of managing price risks.  
Market agents, confronted with price risk which arises mainly from supply and 
demand imbalance in the market, can use derivatives instruments to control price 
                                            
(3) See ‘spot market’ in the glossary. 
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(and perhaps yield) risk by transferring it to other individuals who are willing to bear it. 
The activity of trading derivatives contracts with the objective of reducing or 
controlling future spot price risk and revenue is called ‘hedging’. Hedging essentially 
involves taking a position in the derivatives market which can offset any gains or 
losses made in the physical market, by locking into a fixed price or buying a price 
floor or price ceiling. 
The most popular derivatives contracts are futures, options and swaps. A futures 
contract is an agreement to trade at a specified future time and price a specified 
commodity or other asset. The principal idea behind futures contracts is to protect the 
holder against adverse price movements prior to a cash sale or purchase of 
commodity in the future. Hedging with futures is effective in eliminating price risk, but 
leads to other risks including basis risk. An option contract gives its holder the right, 
but not the obligation, to buy (call option) or sell (put option) an underlying asset (e.g. 
wheat) at certain price, known as the strike price, and at a certain point in time, 
known as the expiration date or the maturity. Finally, a swap contract is an 
agreement whereby a floating price for a commodity is exchanged for a fixed price for 
the same commodity over a specified period for a defined volume. The floating price 
is normally the prevailing market (spot) price for the asset and the fixed price is the 
price which is negotiated and agreed before the initiation of the swap contract (FOA, 
2005). 
However, derivatives have a number of limitations. They only deal with short- to 
medium-term risks of market downturns and their use requires considerable 
investment in know-how and infrastructure. 
 
2.3.6. Insurance 
Insurance schemes (private, public or mutual insurance) are another tool used to 
pool risk. The idea behind insurance is that of risk pooling. Risk pooling involves 
combining the risks faced by a large number of individuals who contribute through 
premiums to a common fund which is used to cover the losses incurred by any 
individual in the pool. 
There are examples of totally private insurance in agriculture, covering for example 
hail damage to crops, fire and theft of farm assets, death and disability of farmers or 
farm workers. Most other insurance schemes are provided under subsidised 
governmental schemes because the risks being covered are, in fact, not insurable in 
the sense that a market determined premium would be too high. 
Risks are insurable if certain conditions are fulfilled (Skees, 1997; Skees and Barnett, 
1999).  
1. The insurer and the insured have the same information as regards the probability 
of a bad outcome (symmetric information). This is normally not the case; the 
main problems are moral hazard and adverse selection.  
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2. Risks should be independent across insured individuals. If risks are systemic 
(dependent), special measures have to be taken in order to make insurance 
solutions viable. 
3. Risks must be calculable. In order to fix the premium rates, the insurance 
company must be able to calculate the chance of loss, the average frequency and 
the average severity of loss. Actual losses occurring must be determinable and 
measurable.  
4. Premiums must be affordable. 
As has been mentioned, insurance systems are difficult to apply because asymmetry 
in information leads to behaviour that undermines the system. There is adverse 
selection (4) when the level of risk in the insured population is higher than the 
average (i.e. only people with the highest risks will buy insurance). 
Moral hazard occurs when the insured has the ability to increase his or her expected 
indemnity by actions taken after buying the insurance. It means that farmers covered 
by insurance might adopt riskier practices than otherwise (excessive specialisation, 
production in risky conditions like inappropriate climate or fragile land). However, 
there are techniques, well known to insurance companies, which limit such behaviour 
(OECD, 2001). A few examples of these techniques are: 
— deductibles or co-payments (the insured has to bear part of the loss: a fixed 
amount or a percentage of the total loss);  
— no-claim bonuses (see bonus/malus);  
— to agree or to specify in the contract precautionary measures to prevent losses, 
and perform checks to verify whether the insured takes these measures;  
— indemnification based on an objective index which cannot be influenced by the 
insured. 
Natural disasters or epidemic diseases cause special problems for insurance. The 
reasons are as follows. Natural disaster risk within a certain region is a highly 
correlated risk between the farmers of that region (so it is a systemic risk), and it has 
a low probability of very high losses. There are several reasons why it is difficult to 
develop insurance products to cover such risks (Skees, 1997). If reinsurance or State 
guarantees are not available, the nature of the systemic risks makes it necessary for 
an insurance company to charge high premiums (which can be unaffordable for many 
farmers) and to build up substantial capital reserves. Another aspect which makes 
this specific reality difficult to manage is the scarcity of relevant historical data that 
could be used to calculate a premium, because of the infrequency of such events. 
Moreover, if governments provide ad hoc disaster payments, this stifles the 
development of insurance products.  
                                            
(4) See the glossary. 
 19 
As with natural disasters, epidemic diseases have a systemic character and the data 
concerning outbreaks are normally rare. In the case of animal diseases, farmers can 
reduce the chance of an outbreak of a disease by taking appropriate precautionary 
measures (vaccination, veterinary screening of the herd, etc.). Furthermore, State 
involvement is important with respect to both legislation and covering direct losses 
(5) resulting from outbreaks of animal diseases. As governments normally cover 
direct losses, other losses which need to be covered are those called consequential 
or indirect losses (6), resulting from business interruption (empty buildings) and 
supply and delivery problems (because of movement restrictions) or repopulation 
(Meuwissen et al., 1999a; Meuwissen et al., 2001).  
Whether private insurance products against epidemic diseases can be developed 
depends on — as in the case of natural disasters — whether sufficient data is 
available for calculating premiums and whether sufficient reinsurance capacity or 
State guarantees are available. 
Price risk is an example that is a very systemic, so it is difficult to insure. 
Reinsurance is important for insurance companies which cover correlated risks and 
are thus running the risk of having to cover big losses. Without reinsurance, 
premiums would have to be set at a very high level to build up enough reserves in 
order to cover potentially high losses. 
Two basic schemes for reinsurance dominate. 
— Proportional reinsurance (quota share (7)): 
Insurer and reinsurer share premiums and risk. The reinsurer assumes, by mutual 
consent, a fixed percentage of all the insurance policies written by a direct insurer.  
The quota determines how premiums and losses are distributed between direct 
insurer and reinsurer.  
— Non-proportional reinsurance:  
(a) Excess of loss: the reinsurer covers up to a certain amount any part of a loss 
resulting from a single catastrophic event that exceeds an agreed 
deductible (8).  
(b) Stop-loss: the reinsurer covers up to a certain amount any part of a total 
annual loss that exceeds an agreed deductible. 
Mutual insurance schemes are a special case. Mutual insurance companies, also 
called insurance mutuals, are insurance companies totally or at least partially owned 
by the participants. Currently, insurance mutuals, as non-profit companies, have no 
                                            
(5) This specific aspect of direct losses in the livestock sector is described in detail in Chapter 7, Section 7.2.1. 
(6) Consequential losses are specifically presented in Chapter 7, Section 7.2.2. 
(7) Quota-share provisions specify what percentage of premiums and loss exposure the private company will 
retain, with the residue being passed on to the reinsurer (see the glossary). 
(8) See the glossary. 
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shares or shareholders, so they are not on the stock market. Also, differently from 
insurance share or stock companies, besides the supervisory board they have a 
delegate committee representing member farmers.  
Similar to insurance share companies, insurance mutuals also have to follow 
insurance legislation (controlled by national insurance/finance supervisory boards, 
etc.), the insured has a legal title of compensation because of the insurance contract, 
premiums are calculated on an actuarially basis, while provisions to a mutual fund 
are often a fixed amount independent of the risk. Reinsurance would be associated 
to mutual insurance and the existence of supplementations from the participants 
would be always associated to mutual funds. 
Insurance mutuals, as well as mutual funds, share the underlying principles of 
mutuals: non-profit, cooperation and self-help. This theme has endured for well over 
100 years and continues to this day. To understand the origin of insurance mutuals, 
we shall look at an example in Ontario (Canada) (9), although it has been very similar 
in many European countries. ‘In the beginning, the mutual policyholder was required 
to sign a premium note agreeing to assume certain liabilities of the company directly 
proportionate to the policyholder’s limit of protection. The general idea was to get a 
number of neighbours together for the purpose of sharing fire risk. Typically, buildings 
and chattels in those buildings were insured. When fire occurred, an assessment of 
whatever percentage was needed was levied, collected in due course, and paid over 
to the unfortunate one who had suffered the loss. 
As the time passed, mutual companies were urged by regulators to adopt uniform 
methods to ensure safety of the company and justice to the individual policyholders. 
This gave rise to the adoption of a plan whereby companies would estimate future 
losses and cost of operation as a basis for rates. Under this system, levy on the 
premium note was only made when expenses exceeded the estimated cost for the 
year. 
The premium note was the financial backing of the mutual companies and served as 
a vital factor in their establishment and development. However, gradually, mutual 
companies moved away from the assessment system in favour of collecting 
actuarially calculated premiums in advance, and the premium note was replaced by 
the creation of mutual guarantee funds and/or access to reinsurance or even 
coinsurance.’ From this example we can see that the threshold between the small 
regional mutual scheme and the big mutuals which work in a similar way to the big 
insurance companies can be controversial. 
In the Netherlands, for instance, mutual insurance schemes have been developed for 
contagious disease outbreaks both in crops (horticulture and potatoes) and livestock 
(poultry) (Meuwissen et al., 2001). 
 
                                            
(9) http://www.mutualconnect.com/about_guaranteeFund.asp 
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2.3.7. Mutual funds (10) 
Mutual funds (or mutual stabilisation funds) is a term used by the European 
Commission communication (EC, 2005a). According to the Commission 
communication (EC, 2005a) and the staff working document (EC,2005b), mutual 
funds represent a way of sharing risk among groups of producers who want to take 
their own responsibility for risk management. Mutual funds, established on private 
initiative, are set up mainly at a sector-specific level, where producers share 
comparable risks, or take place at regional level. They can be regarded as a specific 
compensation scheme, although with a limited financial capacity. In the event of a 
member suffering damage, the loss will be mitigated or even fully offset from the 
money available in the fund, according to predefined rules. Mutual stabilisation funds 
are often faced with the problem of limited resources, especially in the fund’s early 
years. In some Member States the capital collected from the participants is 
supplemented by a public financial contribution.  
The advantage of regionally organised mutual funds is that farmers know each other, 
thus reducing the problems related with moral hazard and adverse selection. The 
disadvantage of regionally organised mutual funds is the danger that many or even 
all farmers incur losses at the same time. This could mean for a farmer that he incurs 
losses and has to contribute to the fund to cover other farmers’ losses at the same 
time. Solutions for this problem are reinsurance or cooperation with mutual schemes 
in other regions which would cover a share of the loss.  
According to the working document on risk management tools (EC, 2001), in the 
case of a member incurring a loss, the loss will be fully or partially compensated 
through the collected money already available in the fund and an additional collection 
among participants. Premiums also have to cover administrative costs and, 
potentially, reinsurance. 
However, as the CEA’s position paper (CEA, 2005b) states, in the EC, definition of 
the legal nature of these institutions is not clear. They could refer to guarantee funds, 
solidarity funds, or even to insurance mutuals. In fact, the working document (EC, 
2001) identifies mutual funds with mutual insurance schemes, and many mutual 
insurance companies had similar characteristics to those of the mutual funds 
described above. 
However, we will assume for this study that there is a difference between mutual 
funds and mutual insurance: mutual funds are a private agreement between the 
parties in which there is no legal title of compensation. Instead, when there is a legal 
title of compensation offered by some entity, then we can speak about mutual 
insurance and this entity has to comply with the legal requirements of insurance.  
                                            
(10) See the glossary. 
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The Commission, in the case of livestock insurance, has recently proposed the 
setting up of similar funds in Member States, intended to stabilise income in the pig 
sector. These regulatory funds would be financed by producers and would enable 
them to stabilise revenue through a system of levies to be collected during periods 
when their economic situation is satisfactory. In exchange, payments would be made 
during periods of a difficult market situation (EC, 2001). 
 
2.3.8. Public funds 
In public funds, mostly called calamity funds, all aid is given by the national and/or provincial 
governments under the declaration of catastrophes. The funds are provided every year by 
the government and are regulated in the case of a yearly reserved budget. The main 
advantage of the funds over the ad hoc aids is that they avoid big distortions of the 
government budget. Funds sometimes also receive contributions from the private sector, 
usually compulsory, in the form of levies to production, levies to premiums, etc.  
 
2.4. Definitions of agricultural insurance schemes 
Let us list the types of insurance in the agriculture sector from the point of view of the 
risks covered. 
 
Single-risk insurance 
Single-risk insurance covers against one peril or risk, or even two but of a non-
systemic nature (most often hail, or hail and fire). 
  
Combined (peril) insurance 
Combined insurance means a combination of several risks covered (two or more 
risks, mostly with hail as basic cover). In some countries this type of insurance is also 
referred to as multi-risk insurance. 
 
Yield insurance 
Yield insurance guarantees the main risks affecting production. So, in the case of 
crops, the main risks comprise those affecting the yield (e.g. drought). Premiums can 
be calculated from individual historic yield or from regional average yield when 
individual yield records are not available. Losses (and premiums) can be calculated 
either by quantifying the losses due to each individual risk separately, or as the 
difference between the guaranteed yield and the insured yield. In some countries 
(e.g. the USA) this type is also called combined or multi-peril insurance.  
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Price insurance 
This covers an insured amount of production against price decreases below a certain 
threshold. Price should be transparent and, to avoid moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems, loss assessment should be based on a price that cannot be 
influenced by the insured (futures price, spot market price). If losses resulting from a 
loss of quality are excluded from cover, price insurance provides less protection for 
the farmer. However, including loss of quality may involve significant moral hazard 
problems, as quality depends to a certain extent on management decisions 
(Meuwissen et al., 1999b). 
 
Revenue insurance 
Revenue insurance combines yield and price risks cover in a single insurance 
product. It can be product specific or whole farm. It has the potential advantage of 
being cheaper than insuring price and yield independently, as the risk of a bad 
outcome is smaller (low yields may be compensated by high prices and the contrary). 
In order to offer revenue insurance, an insurance company must be able to determine 
the joint probability distribution of price and yield risks. 
 
Whole-farm insurance 
This type consists of a combination of guarantees for the different agricultural 
products on a farm. Depending on the cover of the guarantees, it can be whole-farm 
yield insurance or whole-farm revenue insurance.  
 
Income insurance 
Income insurance covers the income, so it covers yield and price risks, as well as the 
costs of production. Usually this type of insurance is not product specific but covers 
whole-farm income. 
Income insurance is potentially more attractive to farmers than other forms of 
insurance (e.g. yield, price), because it deals with losses affecting farmers’ welfare 
more directly (Meuwissen 2000). It could be based for instance on net farm income of 
family workers (farm revenue, including subsidies, minus variable costs, taxes, 
depreciation, rent, interest and compensation of employees).  
Insurance of individual income risks poses considerable problems of moral hazard 
and adverse selection. Potential losses occur not only by accident but depend to a 
large extent on how well a farmer manages his business. A farmer in fact can easily 
manipulate certain elements influencing his income (e.g. compensation of 
employees, operating costs and inventories). Due to these two factors it is quite hard 
for an insurance company to have access to trustworthy data to calculate the right 
premium. 
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Index insurance 
Index-based insurance products are an alternative form of insurance that make 
payments based not on measures of farm yields, but rather on indexes measured by 
government agencies or other third parties. Unlike most insurance where 
independent risk is a precondition, the precondition for index insurance to work best 
for the individual farmer is correlated risk.  
— Area yield index insurance: Indemnities are computed from the decrease of the 
average yield in an area, where the area is some unit of geographical aggregation 
larger than the farm. 
— Area revenue index insurance: Indemnities are computed from the decrease on 
the product of the average yields and prices in an area. 
— Indirect index insurance: Indirect index insurance reports to those indices of 
yields or vegetation computed from weather-based indices, satellite images and 
others.  
Index insurance products have several advantages. From one side, given that the 
indemnities and the premiums do not depend on the individual risk of the insured 
group, they do not present adverse selection problems. As the single farmer cannot 
influence the outcome that results in payments, there are no moral hazard problems. 
So, index insurance can sometimes offer superior risk protection when compared to 
traditional yield insurance because deductibles (11) are not needed. Additionally, it 
has low administrative costs (it does not require inspections of individual farms). 
From another point of view, it has a standardised and transparent structure, so that 
policies can be sold in various denominations as simple certificates with a structure 
that is uniform across essential indices. Their availability and negotiability allows 
them to be easily traded in derivatives markets. The risk can thus be spread among a 
wider variety of parties. In this context, it can have a reinsurance function as a 
mechanism to reinsure insurance company portfolios of farm-level insurance policies. 
Also, banking entities could use such contracts to manage farmers’ correlated risk. 
Consecutively, the bank should be able to work with the individual to help manage 
the residual risk or basis risk (e.g. loans).  
The main disadvantage of index insurance is probably the basis risk (11): When the 
correlation between the insured losses and the index is not enough, ‘basis risk’ 
becomes too severe, and index insurance is not an effective risk management tool. A 
careful design of the index insurance policy (cover period, trigger, measurement site, 
etc.) can help to reduce basis risk. Selling the index insurance for example to a 
collective group can pass the issue of basis risk to a local group that can cover it 
through mutual insurance. Another disadvantage is the need for the index to be 
precisely modelled (with the consequent need of sufficient historical data), to have 
                                            
(11) See the glossary. 
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good statistical properties, being objectively and accurately measured, and then to be 
made broadly available in a well-timed way. The last disadvantage is the absolute 
need of a strong reinsurance given that, in most cases, insurance companies do not 
have the financial resources to offer index insurance without adequate and affordable 
reinsurance (Skees, 1997; Black et al., 1999, mentioned by Stoppa 2004).  
 
2.5. Literature survey: studies on agricultural insurance in 
Europe 
This chapter offers a list of the main documents dealing with agricultural risk 
insurance systems in European countries. Some information from these documents 
has been used in the elaboration of this study, together with information from the 
countries’ experts. 
 
Cost-sharing schemes for epidemic livestock diseases (Civic Consulting, 2006) 
(see also Chapter 7.3) 
This is a working paper for the expert workshop on options for harmonised cost-
sharing schemes for epidemic livestock diseases, held in Brussels on 17 March 2006, 
analysing four alternatives for cost-sharing schemes:  
— continuation of the current system of expenditure in the veterinary field; 
— financing costs of disease control through ad hoc measures in the case of a 
disease outbreak; 
— setting up a unified cost-sharing scheme at the European level; and 
— defining a unified Community framework for national or regional cost-sharing 
schemes.  
The paper supports the last option on the basis of the following set of criteria:  
— categorisation of animal diseases (impact on public health, animal health or 
economic impact); 
— incentive compatibility: the effort should be mainly focused on prevention; 
— balancing costs and responsibilities; 
— prevention of competition distortion; 
— compatibility with EU financial instruments and ongoing initiatives; and  
— harmonisation and flexibility of implementation.  
Some of the main characteristics of the proposed harmonised framework would be:  
— the obligation of Member States to introduce a cost-sharing scheme;  
— the objective of transferring animal health risk from farmers to a cost-sharing 
scheme; 
— that the responsibility should cover only certain diseases. 
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Risks and crisis management in agriculture, University of Naples (2005) 
This study (Cafiero et al., 2005), carried out for the European Parliament in 2005, 
provides comments on the three options considered by the communication of the 
Commission to the Council (EC, 2005a). The report is very critical with the first option 
(public participation on the insurance premium paid by farms and on the reinsurance 
scheme), obviously in contrast with the position of insurance companies. When 
commenting on the possibility of a common agricultural policy that would subsidise 
agricultural insurances, one of the points criticised in this report is that a substantial 
amount of the subsidies would be given in fact to the insurance companies, instead 
of finishing in the farmers’ pockets. This statement deserves further analysis by 
comparing countries where such subsidies exist and countries where alternative tools 
are dominant (e.g. calamity funds or ad hoc help for catastrophic events).  
Information is given about insurance in the following countries: 
— countries with public intervention: Greece, Spain, France and Italy; 
— countries with private insurance systems: Germany and the United Kingdom; 
— non-EU countries: Australia, Canada and the United States of America. 
 
FOA agricultural report (2005) 
This study, carried out by Alizadeh and Nomikos (2005), was commissioned by the 
Futures and Options Association. Even if it focuses on the potential of the futures 
markets to help farmers manage increasing price risks, it considers and reviews all 
kinds of risk management strategies used by farmers, including crop insurance.  
Its superficial comparison of the use of insurance across the EU Member States is 
based on the risk management report (EC 2001) and Meuwissen et al. (2003). It 
raises the question of the efficiency, equity and WTO consistency of the insurance 
programmes, according to Bascou (2003). 
 
Communication from the Commission to the Council (EC, 2005a) and 
Commission staff working document (EC, 2005b) 
This communication considers what additional measures the CAP could introduce to 
support farmers, in respect of risk and crisis management, but in such a way that 
they entail no additional expenditure (a small percentage of the modulation funds can 
be used for this purpose under some restrictions). The main novelties of the 
communication to the Council could be summarised as follows. 
(a) It encourages the inclusion of risk management training to farmers in rural 
development programmes. 
(b) It suggests that the potential of three options be assessed: 
— the possibility of public contribution to the cost of the premiums, under some 
conditions, although this support would come from the funds assigned to the 
second pillar within the CAP; as an alternative to supporting the premiums, it 
mentions that in addition to the formula of co-insurance arrangements 
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between insurance companies, governments could participate in co-
reinsurance schemes; 
— temporary and digressive support for the administrative operations necessary 
for developing mutual funds; 
— income stabilisation payments or liquidity support payments against income 
crises. 
The communication is accompanied by a Commission staff working document which 
makes a synthesis of the risks and crises in agriculture and the instruments available 
to EU agriculture to manage them (but it does not enter into the details of each 
country’s system).  
 
Analysis of the farm risk management tools in the Walloon Region (2005) 
This study was carried out by Harmignie et al. (2005) from the université catholique 
de Louvain. It contains the European communication from the Commission in March 
2005 and the conclusions from the European Economic and Social Committee 
(2005). It reviews the insurance and calamities systems in Belgium, France, 
Luxembourg, Spain and, to a lesser extent, Germany.  
Its objective was to propose adequate agricultural risk management instruments for 
the Walloon Region. The main proposals are: price risk management systems, such 
as price information systems and others; mutual funds and a fund for the sanitary 
livestock crises; and lastly, even though a greater cooperation between the public 
sector and the insurance companies is proposed, the climatic risks of the main crops 
in Belgium do not seem to require combined or yield insurance development (even 
though crop risks should be the subject of further research).  
 
Informe final del Proyecto ‘Gestión del Riesgo Agropecuario en América Latina 
y el Caribe’ (ENESA-BID, 2004) 
This is the final report of the ‘Management of agricultural and livestock risk in Latin-
America and the Caribbean area’ project. The project explores the possibilities for the 
development of agricultural insurance systems in Latin-American and Caribbean 
countries. It reviews the experiences in agricultural insurance in Europe and North 
America. There are data from: 
— EU Member States: Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Sweden (the insurance 
data source is Forteza del Rey, V., 2002); 
— North-American countries: Canada and the United States of America;  
— Latin-American and Caribbean countries: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Venezuela. 
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‘La Gestione del Rischio in Agricoltura: Strumenti e Politiche’ (A. Stoppa, 2004) 
‘La Gestione del Rischio in Agricoltura: Strumenti e Politiche’, is a collection of 
articles made by the Forum Internazionale dell’Agricoltura e dell’Alimentazione (12), 
directed by Andrea Stoppa. It forms a scientific review on risk management in 
agriculture. 
A paper by C. Moreddu (13) (also OECD, 2001 (14)) describes risk characteristics and 
the instruments to manage risk and discusses the role of economic policies at a 
European level in the OECD countries. It examines the opportunity to drive public 
resources towards the support of risk management activity; and it describes the 
various income risk strategies used by farm households.  
Another interesting contribution to this literature survey is by Skees and Hartell (2004; 
mentioned by Stoppa, 2004). Their paper analyses some interesting innovations 
based on the development of index insurance contracts. 
Next, this review brings into focus the existent realities in some countries like 
Canada, France, Spain and the USA. All over Europe there is a strong interest to 
study the growing importance of political instruments to face out this systemic risk 
reality. 
Then, special focus is put on Italian agricultural risk management. This main and last 
part of the book is dedicated to the outcomes of a congress organised by 
Coldiretti (15) in March 2004 on the topic ‘Risk management in the agricultural sector: 
new regulations and opportunities for farmers’. The attention in this chapter is 
especially dedicated to the Italian situation, trying to compare it with the most 
developed international experiences; this inspires a discussion forum on the future 
insurance market in the Italian agricultural scene in which actors of the demanding 
and offering sides discuss and confront on the new legal regulations. 
                                            
(12) The Forum Internazionale dell’Agricoltura e dell’Alimentazione is promoted by the Coldiretti National 
Confederation. The forum includes many different initiatives run by experts, researchers and institutional 
representatives of the sector. They focus their work on topics like economics and agricultural policy, 
environment and territory protection, and food quality and security. 
(13) Catherine Moreddu is Senior Economist at the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, 
Direction for Nutrition, Agriculture and Fisheries, Paris. 
(14) The paper constitutes part of the material of the ‘Income risk management in agriculture’ workshop, 
‘Approaches to income risk management in OECD countries’ (Part I, pp. 17–63), organised by the OECD, 
Paris (2001). 
(15) Coldiretti is an Italian organisation well established in the country. It is constituted of 18 regional federations 
and 98 provincial federations, and 765 offices are spread throughout the territory. Its strong presence makes 
Coldiretti the main agricultural organisation at a national level, and one of the most important on the 
European scene.  
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Agricultural policies in OECD countries — Monitoring and evaluation (OECD, 
2003) 
This is the 16th edition in a series on agricultural and related policies in OECD 
countries, following the request by the OECD Council at ministry level to monitor 
annually the implementation of the principles for agricultural policy reform adopted in 
1987. Part II of the report presents detailed information on policy developments in 
individual member countries (and for the Member States of the European Union). 
There is some information about insurance in the following countries: 
— EU Member States: Spain, France, Hungary, the Netherlands and Slovakia; 
— non-EU countries: Canada, the United States of America and South Korea.  
 
Risk management tools for EU agriculture — with a special focus on insurance 
(EC, 2001) 
The conclusions of this study do not look at a direct involvement of the EU in risk 
management systems, but rather propose that the EU has an accompanying or 
framing role.  
— Regarding price risks, it shows potential interest in promoting the development 
of futures and options markets. 
— Regarding production risks, it is considered that insurance systems are to be 
developed by the Member States on a bottom-up approach. Co-insurance and 
reinsurance can be developed at the European level by private companies, 
under a common legal framework, but reinsurance could also be provided by 
the EU; 
— Anti-cyclical income support would be interesting to apply but it has some 
caveats or cons.  
There is information about the following countries: 
— EU countries: Spain, Germany, Greece, France, Italy and Austria, as well as 
Portugal (in the synopsis table only) and ; 
— non-EU countries: Canada, Japan and the United States of America.  
 
Risk management in agriculture: a discussion document prepared by the 
Economics and Statistics Group of the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food (MAFF, 2001) 
An overview of risks and risk management instruments in agriculture 
There is a little information on the agricultural systems in the following countries: 
— EU Member States: Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom; 
— non-EU country: the United States of America. 
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OECD workshop book Income risk management in agriculture, Paris (OECD, 
2001) 
Various risks affect the income and the welfare of farm households. A large number 
of strategies are available to deal specifically with income risk. They exist against a 
general background of widespread government intervention that modifies the risks 
faced by farmers. In the context of agricultural policy reform, a challenge for 
policymakers is to better define the role of public policy versus market-based 
mechanisms to deal with income risk in agriculture. The OECD workshop examined 
the various strategies used by farm households, in particular those attracting 
renewed interest such as diversification of income sources, vertical coordination, 
hedging on futures markets, insurance cover and public safety nets. It allowed 
participants from member countries’ governments and private industries to share 
their experience.  
One of the main conclusions was that farmers, as managers, have primary 
responsibility for risk management and that the optimal mix of tools and instruments 
depends on specific conditions. Government intervention in risk management, 
coming as a response to an identified market failure, should be in line with general 
reform principles shared by OECD ministers for agriculture; these include increasing 
the market orientation of agriculture and addressing legitimate domestic interests in 
ways that do not distort production and trade. 
 
Income insurance in European agriculture (Meuwissen et al., 1999b) 
The central questions studied by this report are whether there might be a case for 
farm income insurance in Europe in the future, and under what conditions and in 
what form might such an income insurance scheme be feasible. The report explores 
a number of issues such as insurance cover, loss assessment, multi-year versus 
single-year insurance contracts, mandatory versus voluntary participation, etc. 
Feasibility is tested with a Monte Carlo simulation using panel data from six Member 
States. The investigation also includes a description of the agricultural sector in 
Europe and a review of current experiences on income insurance in other countries. 
There is information about insurance in the following countries: 
— EU Member States: Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Sweden; 
— non-EU countries: Australia, Canada and the United States of America. 
Some of the main conclusions are that, if a form of income insurance is introduced in 
Europe, the following recommendations should apply. 
— Gross revenue insurance should only be considered for crop, and not for 
livestock, commodities. 
— Insurance should start with true market commodities, i.e. commodities for 
which no price support is available. 
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— If governments provide reinsurance (at zero costs, at fully commercial rates, or 
as a combination of these two options), they should only reinsure part of the 
risks underwritten by insurers. 
— Before wide introduction, first some pilot tests should be carried out, to test the 
interest of farmers in insurance schemes that cover systemic risks such as 
floods, droughts and epidemic diseases, as well as the interest of insurance 
companies in setting up (mutual insurance funds for) such schemes. In setting 
up such pilot tests it is crucial, for later implementation, that governments are 
involved to no more than the necessary minimum extent, using transparent 
rules for such aspects as stop losses, i.e. from the beginning there should be 
no asymmetric information between insurers and governments. 
 
Régimen comunitario de seguro agrícola (CES, 1993) 
This study contains wide information, both on calamities/disaster aid and on 
insurance, for Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal and the United Kingdom. 
From this study, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) issued a 
series of proposals to the Commission. 
— There should be a common definition of agricultural calamity, but it should be 
left to the individual States to fix the parameters to characterise it. Also, the 
funding of ad hoc forms of aid should be shared among the individual 
countries and the Community. 
— National insurance plans should be maintained as they are, and the 
governments should be allowed to subsidise them. 
— There should be a common insurance plan, which would be additional to the 
national plans and would be applied by the insurance companies in each 
country. Insurance would be subscribed to on a voluntary basis, and there 
should be a public institution in each country to take care of the plan’s 
application in that country. This plan would have subsidies, shared on a 50:50 
basis by the national government and by the EC. 
— Active prevention measures should be carried out within the framework of the 
schemes for ‘improving the efficiency of agricultural structures’ (Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 2328/91).  
 
Income stabilisation  
This is an FP6 (Research DG) STRIP (specifically targeted research or innovation 
project), whose full title is ‘Design and economic impact of risk management tools for 
European agriculture’. This project started in mid-2005 under the short title ‘Income 
stabilisation’ and has several potential overlaps with and complementary aspects to 
the Agriculture and Rural Development DG–JRC administrative arrangement for the 
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same project. Contacts have been established and several meetings scheduled to 
ensure synergy between both projects.  
The income stabilisation project, with seven partners from five countries, is 
coordinated by the University of Wageningen. It is articulated in seven work 
packages (additional to WP 1, management). Work Package 4, led by the 
Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, is particularly close to the Agriculture and Rural 
Development DG–JRC administrative arrangement, although there are major 
differences: the Agriculture and Rural Development DG–JRC administrative 
arrangement is more specifically focused on the EU-25+ and on insurance schemes, 
rather than generic risk management strategies.  
Another target of this project is exploring methods to map the variability of yield that 
can endanger a suitable farm income. Some preliminary maps are included in this 
report.  
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3. Production and income variability of EU 
agriculture  
 
3.1. Chapter synthesis 
Agricultural producers face a series of risks affecting the income and welfare of their 
households. These are mainly production risks related to weather conditions, climate 
change, pests and diseases, technological change and income variability due to 
decreases of production or price variability, etc. This chapter focuses on time 
variability of crop yield, production, or farmers’ incomes from the point of view of 
insurance. Heterogeneity across regions is not addressed, but a coarse picture of the 
spatial behaviour of variability along time is given. Variability due to trend is 
eliminated as much as possible to concentrate on the difference between the actual 
yield (or production or income) in each year and the yield expected considering only 
the trend. This difference can be positive or negative (higher or lower yield than the 
trend). We only study the negative differences (yield reduction) that are of interest for 
insurance purposes, and more specifically the negative differences of a certain 
magnitude. For the frequent case of insurances with straight deductible, we are only 
interested in yield reductions higher than the deductible (e.g. 10 %, 20 % and 30 %). 
We also consider the negative time variability of some meteorological parameters or 
agrometeorological indicators strongly linked with yield reduction, such as drought, 
frost, or excessive rain at harvest time.  
All the analyses made in this chapter should be considered as preliminary studies. 
The variability of yield or income is quantified for average values in large regions or 
major types of farm; while the parameter of interest is the average value of the 
variability at farm level (the variability of the average is very different to the average 
of the variability). The link between agrometeorological indicators and observed yield 
reduction still needs to be quantified.   
 
3.2. Concepts and scale 
Climatic events and epizootic outbreaks introduce variability both in the agricultural 
production and in the income of farmers. This variability is far from uniform across the 
EU: in some regions and sectors, production and income are relatively stable, while 
in other regions or sectors they are highly unstable. Mapping the variability level has 
a twofold interest for the assessment of agricultural insurance: better understanding 
of which are the areas and sectors for which stabilisation is more important and for 
tuning the extrapolation of the premium rates in a hypothetical EU-wide system. The 
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data required to analyse these phenomena come in part from statistical sources, 
mainly from Eurostat, but other sources are also important, in particular the farm 
accountancy data network (FADN). Meteorological databases and 
agrometeorological models also provide tools to improve analysis of the variability. 
The variability of the farm situation can be analysed from different points of view. 
— Specific risks: We consider here some meteorological risks: risk of drought, 
excessive rainfall at harvest time and frost. Drought is quantified as a function of 
the relative soil moisture estimated by the model growth crop monitoring system 
(CGMS) (Micale and Genovese, 2004; Lazar and Genovese, 2004). Excessive 
rainfall is quantified using interpolated meteo data (CGMS level 1), but the period 
of reference for each crop is computed on CGMS. Risk of frost is computed at this 
stage on interpolated meteo data with a rather coarse criterion.  
— Variability of yield: The risk is computed as the expected value of 
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titi,0max  where tiZ is the yield in year t, ( )tiZg  is the trend 
(expected yield in average meteorological conditions), and d is a straight 
insurance deductible. 
— Variability of farm income (e.g. by farm type, size) is defined in a similar way.  
In the previous definition of yield reduction risk we did not define the sub-index i . 
This sub-index can refer to a single farm, a field, a region, a class of farms, or a 
geographic unit such as a cell of 50 × 50 km or a polygon of a soil map. Depending 
on the meaning of i  we will be considering a different scale for the indicators. Scale 
of risk indicators is a delicate issue for the quantification and mapping of variability. It 
can be considered at two different stages: for the assessment of risk or for the 
presentation of results. An example can illustrate the difference. Consider the 
probability that the yield of wheat is more than 20 % below the normal yield (long-
term trend). The concept can be applied at a farm scale if we consider a farm 
(selected at random for example); we estimate somehow the probability of the yield 
reduction for that farm and we average this probability for a given set of farms, for 
example all the farms in a region. In this case we compute the indicator at the farm 
level and map the results at the scale of the region. Results are different if we first 
consider the average yield of the region and then we estimate the probability of a 
yield reduction of more than 20 %. In this case the concept is applied at regional 
level.  
For the purpose of insurance, risk indicators should be computed at the scale of the 
farm, but at this stage we do not have suitable data for this purpose. Therefore we 
will apply the concepts at a coarser scale: regions, farm types, size categories or 
physical geographic units. The question of downscaling data for the computation of 
risk indicators at farm scale can be tackled, but is beyond the scope of this study.  
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For the following maps and comparisons, indices have been computed at a coarse 
level. It is expected that the geographic comparison of a risk index computed at a 
coarse scale corresponds approximately to the comparison at a farm scale. For 
example if the probability of a yield reduction above 20 % is higher in region A than in 
region B, it can be expected that the average probability of such a reduction for the 
farms will be higher in region A than in region B, although this is not mathematically 
sure. Data aggregation in time series usually has a smoothing effect. The result is 
that risk indicators computed from aggregated data, as they are in the following 
maps, generally underestimate the level of risk.  
 
3.3. Specific risks  
For all the maps in this section we use the crop growth monitoring system (CGMS). 
CGMS is the kernel of the EC agrometeorological system (MARS crop yield 
forecasting system), that finds its legal basis in Decision No 1445/2000/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council for the period 1999–2003. This co-decision 
was recently renewed to cover the period 2004–07 (Ref. PE/CONS 3661/1/03, OJ L 
309, 26.11.2003) and again in the FP6/JRC multiannual working programme (Action 
1121: MARS-Stat period 2002–06) for the related R & D activities. The mission of the 
‘system’ is to provide timely, consistent and reliable analysis at pan-European level 
on the status of the crops and on the harvest prospective. The information and the 
derived forecasts are used at CAP decision-maker level especially to fill crop balance 
sheet estimates. For instance, in 2003 the system contributed to assessing the effect 
of the severe summer drought on European crop production. The system started 
R & D in the late 1980s (Genovese, 1998) and became fully operational in 1999. 
Today the system is organised around three internal ‘infrastructures’, namely a 
meteorological monitoring infrastructure (the main database covers the observed 
interpolated meteorological data since 1975), a vegetation monitoring infrastructure 
(the main database covers the vegetation indicators based on low resolution satellite 
data since 1989), agrometeorological infrastructure (the main databases cover crop 
parameters, crop calendars and phenology). The databases are exploited to run a 
main crop growth simulation model (CGMS-Wofost) and a pasture model (CGMS-
Lingra). The analyses consist of the integration of all of the information gathered in 
order to deduce on the short-term climate effects on crop behaviour. Crop indicators 
are generated and used as predictors in statistical analyses to forecast crop yields.  
The parameters simulated are aggregated at different NUTS levels and sometimes a 
re-calibration is needed, based on observed data. This can be explained by the fact 
that the model assumes as constant or as not influencing biotic and a-biotic limiting 
factors, such as pests and diseases, and micronutrient deficiencies. This explains 
why for instance a simulated storage organ cannot be used as it is, to explain plant 
yield. The quality of the re-calibration versus observed time series of yields is, of 
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course, dependent as well on the quality of the reference data. Besides this, a time 
series analysis is often necessary because of the presence of trend factors in inter-
annual yield variations. This can be linked mainly to technological factors (more 
efficient agriculture, best variety selection).  
Further than model improvement linked to the enlargement to new EU Member 
States, the main directions of R & D are the creation of an agro-phenology network at 
European level, the setting up of a complete pasture monitoring system, the 
introduction of ensembles weather forecasts into the system (Ensemble FP6-IP (16)); 
the creation of a model–modular approach and the integration with other ecological 
modelling and DBs at European level for CAP scenarios creation and analysis 
(Seamless FP6-IP (17)). A recent independent study showed that the system in terms 
of crop yield predictions is performing well and that the evolution of the system in 
recent years has resulted in fewer prediction errors. 
 
3.3.1. Drought  
The parameter selected to map the risk of drought is the relative soil moisture (RSM) 
estimated by CGMS using meteorological data interpolated in a 50 km grid focusing 
the estimation on the lowest altitude quartile in the cell, in which the highest share of 
agriculture is supposed to be concentrated. RSM integrates the information on 
rainfall, soil water capacity and needs of the plant, taking into account the 
phonological calendar, the temperature and the global radiation.  
If CGMS estimates for a given crop a value of 0 for the RSM, this indicates a 
considerable water stress for that crop; if this happens during the development 
stages of growth, flowering or grain filling, this corresponds to a serious drought 
situation. The impact of a drought situation is not the same in all the development 
stages of the crop. We have made a first rough split before/after flowering starts. 
After the start of flowering (until shortly before maturity), a drought event is 
considered to be twice as serious as before flowering. When the grains (or other 
storage organs) have been filled and the plant is close to maturity, dry soil is no 
longer considered a source of damage.  
The severe drought index in Figure 2 reports the proportion of situations (decades) of 
serious drought for wheat on the total decades in the period 1975–2006. Few areas 
have a significant risk of severe drought measured with this parameter and those that 
do are generally concentrated in southern Europe. Some spots also appear in central 
and northern Europe, mainly in coastal areas; they might be due to computational 
artefacts in the meteorological data interpolation. Since the drought indices refer to 
non-irrigated agriculture, for some crops like sugar beet and potatoes, threshold 
                                            
(16) http://ensembles-eu.metoffice.com/meetings/CoP13_Bali07/flyer.pdf 
(17) http://www.seamless-ip.org/ 
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parameters have been introduced to exclude areas where these crops are cultivated 
only under irrigation. A certain number of anomalies in these maps show that fine-
tuning of parameters still needs to be improved. 
An alternative drought indicator has been defined considering an intermediate 
drought situation when the RSM < 10 % or the RSM < ½ min. (40 %, the long-term 
average RSM for that time of the year). This means for example that a RSM of 15 % 
in an area where the long-term average is more than 30 % will be considered an 
intermediate drought situation, but a RSM of 25 % in an area where the long-term 
average is more than 50 % will not be considered drought at all. This indicator seems 
better modulated and shows again most serious risks, but significant wheat growing 
areas appear to have drought problems in the area of northern Poland, eastern 
Germany, the Baltic countries and Scandinavia, probably due to soils with relatively 
low water retention potential (post-glacial soils, consisting of gravel, loose sands and 
loamy sands). 
For spring barley, the geographic patterns of risk indicators are similar but slightly 
shifted northwards (Figure 3). 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 2. Common winter wheat: percentage of dekades in crop development 
period of serious drought (left) and index combining severe and intermediate 
drought situation (right); RMS estimated with CGMS meteorological data 1975–
2006 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 3. Drought risk indexes for spring barley and field beans 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 4. Drought risk indexes for potatoes and rapeseed 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 5. Drought risk indexes for sunflower and sugar beet 
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3.3.2. Excessive rain at harvest time  
We use meteorological data interpolated in the CGMS 50 km grid. Meteorological 
data are estimated for the lowest altitude quartile in the cell, in which the highest 
share of agriculture is supposed to be. For each cell c and each year t, we consider 
for each crop the rainfall in the decade of maturity ctr ,,1 , the decade before ctr ,,0  and 
the decade after ctr ,,2 .  
ctctctct rrrr ,,2,,1,,0, ++=   
We consider that rainfall is harmful if it is higher than the local long-term average cr  
by more than 40 mm. In any case only 80, >ctr  mm are considered potentially 
harmful. The following pages represent maps of an indicator of damage per year due 
to excessive rain at harvest time computed through:  
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The long-term risk indicator will be cry . This indicator still needs to be validated. It is 
based on agrometeorologist expert knowledge and we use it at this stage to get a 
general view of the risk. The following figures depict the regional distribution of the 
risk index based on excessive rain events during harvest time. 
 
  
Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 6. Risk index based on excessive rain events at harvest time; computed for 
winter wheat and spring barley 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 7. Risk index based on excessive rain events at harvest time; computed for 
potatoes, field beans, sugar beet and sunflower 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 8. Risk index based on excessive rain events during flowering and harvest; 
time computed for winter rapeseed 
 
3.3.3. Frost 
Extreme cold in winter can substantially damage crops. The level of damage 
obviously depends on the minimum temperatures, but should not be assessed by a 
straight mapping of minimum temperatures as reported by meteorological 
observatories (temperature of the air at 2 m above the ground). It requires some 
elaboration taking into account the recent thermal history (last days) and the 
protective effect of snow. A progressive lowering of temperatures is less harmful than 
an abrupt frost, because the plant has the time to protect itself by a physiologic 
process knows as hardening. The following maps give an idea of the potential 
damage by low temperatures, but they still need some elaboration and validation for 
a more synthetic risk index.  
A temperature of 0 ºC at 3 cm soil depth (crown level) does not represent menace for 
the main winter crops but implies the stop of the growth; temperatures between –
 6 ºC and  
– 9 ºC at 3 cm soil depth (crown level) may affect the unhardened sensitive winter 
cereals (like winter barley or durum wheat). Temperatures between – 9 ºC and –
 12 ºC at 3 cm soil depth may affect medium hardened sensitive winter cereals (like 
winter barley or durum wheat) or unhardened winter wheat crops. Temperatures 
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between – 12 ºC and – 15 ºC at 3 cm soil depth may reduce drastically the plant 
population of sensitive winter cereals (like winter barley or durum wheat) or even 
affect medium-hardened winter wheat crops. At temperatures between – 15 ºC and –
 18 ºC at 3 cm soil depth, winter crops like winter barley or durum wheat have a very 
low chance of survival and serious damage is expected for winter wheat (depending 
on the cultivar and the hardening index). Below – 18 ºC at 3 cm soil depth, winter 
wheat crops are subject to severe to lethal damage (spring re-sowing may be 
necessary in most cases) although some cultivars of rye are able to resist to – 21 ºC.  
 
Number of days/year with Tmin of 0°C at 3 cm soil depth*
Averaged values for:
1975-2005
Tmin_Crown00 (Days)
1 - 10
10 - 50
50 - 75
75 - 100
100 - 130
130 - 160
160 - 263
* Snow insulation was taken into account
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 9. Long-term average of the number of days/year of frost at crown level 
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Number of days/year with Tmin of -6°C at 3 cm soil depth*
Averaged values for:
1975-2005
Tmin_Crown06 (Days)
1
1 - 10
10 - 50
50 - 70
70 - 90
90 - 110
110 - 203
* Snow insulation was taken into account
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 10. Long-term average of the number of days/year of frost below – 6 ºC at 
crown level 
 
Number of days/year with Tmin of -9°C at 3 cm soil depth*
Averaged values for:
1975-2005
Tmin_Crown09 (Days)
1
1 - 5
5 - 25
25 - 50
50 - 75
75 - 100
100 - 188
* Snow insulation was taken into account
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 11. Long-term average of the number of days/year of frost below – 9 ºC at 
crown level 
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Number of days/year with Tmin of -12°C at 3 cm soil depth*
Averaged values for:
1975-2005
Tmin_Crown12 (Days)
1
1 - 5
5 - 10
10 - 40
40 - 50
50 - 75
75 - 164
* Snow insulation was taken into account
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 12. Long-term average of the number of days/year of frost below – 12 ºC at 
crown level 
Number of days/year with Tmin of -15°C at 3 cm soil depth*
Averaged values for:
1975-2005
Tmin_Crown15 (Days)
1
2 - 5
5 - 10
10 - 25
25 - 40
40 - 55
55 - 136
* Snow insulation was taken into account
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 13. Long-term average of the number of days/year of frost  
below – 15 ºC at crown level 
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Number of days/year with Tmin of -18°C at 3 cm soil depth*
Averaged values for:
1975-2005
Tmin_Crown18 (Days)
1
2 - 5
5 - 10
10 - 20
20 - 25
25 - 45
45 - 93
* Snow insulation was taken into account
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 14. Long-term average of the number of days/year of frost below – 18 ºC at 
crown level 
 
Critical minimum temperatures at crown level for winter wheat
Situation for 28-Jan-2006
Killing temperature
-18 - -15
-15 - -12
-12 - -9
-9 - -7
-7 - 0
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 15. Critical minimum temperatures at crown level for winter wheat 
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An estimation of the daily level of resistance of winter wheat may be derived from the 
hardening index (integrating the thermal history of the crop since emergence). This 
calculus better reflects the physiological status of the crop. Quality of the crop 
calendars used in simulation is very important. In case of uncertainty of 
sowing/emergence date, the run of some alternative scenarios may be necessary. 
Direct frost damage represents only a part (even if it is considered the most 
important) of winter kill. Further developments for simulation other aspects of winter 
kill like ice encasement are considered in MARS-STAT (simulation of crop height 
may be a necessary step). 
 
3.3.4. Pasture and fodder: productivity reduction risk  
Evaluating the productivity reduction of pasture and fodder presents a specific 
difficulty for insurance schemes as opposed to annual field crops such as cereals or 
oilseeds. In the case of annual field crops, the evaluation of damage can be made 
with one visit to the field just before the harvest time. In the case of pasture and 
fodder, grass is consumed by animals in a continuous way or has several cuts during 
the year, at irregular dates. On the other hand, there are seldom reliable statistical 
data on pasture productivity. This makes it very difficult to assess, on the field, 
damage to pastures and fodder.  
An alternative approach to overcome this difficulty is provided by vegetation indexes 
from satellite images. We have used the so-called ‘dry matter productivity index’, 
computed from the spot-vegetation sensor with 1 km resolution. This type of sensor 
has the advantage of a high repetitiveness (daily), compared with other types of 
image that can have a finer spatial resolution but for which it becomes very difficult to 
obtain a high number of images throughout the year.  
Insurance products based on indirect indexes computed on satellite images are 
already operational in Spain. The currently used system in Spain is based on the 
normalised difference vegetation index (NDVI) computed on NOAA-AVHRR images, 
but we believe spot-vegetation images are preferable for this purpose because of a 
better geometric co-registration of the images, even if the time series are shorter than 
for NOAA-AVHRR.  
The map in Figure 16 corresponds to the expected payment that an insurance 
company would have to make under the hypothesis of an indirect area index 
insurance policy defined on the basis of these images with a straight deductible of 
20 %. The premium rate would be computed consequently.  
The losses (above the 20 % deductible) in each year are mapped in Figure 17 and 
Figure 18. These maps illustrate how strongly systemic this type of risk is. On the 
other hand it can also be seen that most of the average loss above the deductible is 
due to the losses in the past year; this means that there is a level of uncertainty in the 
estimation of the long-term risk because of the short time series (8 years). A longer 
time series is theoretically possible by inter-calibration of NOAA-AVHRR, but the 
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reliability of the inter-annual comparisons is not as good as with a complete series of 
spot-vegetation images. In terms of insurance this means that the insurance 
companies should probably use slightly higher premium rates. 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 16. Risk index map for pasture and fodder, computed on spot-vegetation 
satellite images 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 17. Yearly dry matter loss index from spot vegetation (1998–2002) 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 18. Yearly dry matter loss index from spot vegetation (2002–06) 
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3.3.5. The impact of climate change on agricultural risk 
Climate change introduces a major factor of uncertainty in meteorological risks for 
agriculture. Some climate change models (sourced from the IPCC Fourth 
Assessment Report, WPII, 2007) support the conjecture that extreme meteorological 
events will become more frequent. There is a general perception that the frequency 
of extreme events (floods, hurricanes, heat waves, severe droughts) is increasing 
with the ongoing climate change. This can be due to an effective increase of extreme 
events, but the perception can be also influenced by the higher rate of information we 
have about disasters happening anywhere in the world. The increased amount of 
high-value property in areas at risk (of flood, for example) can also have an influence 
on the frequency of disasters. An objective assessment of the possible increase of 
extreme events requires a systematic analysis of long series of meteorological 
observations, but the availability and homogeneity of such observations is very 
limited.  
Many studies report partial evidence of this increase for specific types of extreme 
events and partial geographical areas; a large number of references and a general 
view on this issue can be found in the IPCC report, WG I, Chapter 3.8 (Trenberth et 
al., 2007). General conclusions on trends to increasing variability have been difficult 
to reach in the recent past (Frich et al., 2002). Some studies report non-significant 
results; for example Scherrer et al. (2005) study the temperatures in central Europe 
and do not find a significant trend for the variability. Only recently have there been 
more concluding general analyses, reported by Trenberth et al. (2007). This section 
of the IPCC report focuses mainly on ‘moderately extreme events’, defined as the 
observations above percentile 90 or below percentile 10 for the reference period 
1961–90 (percentiles 95 or 99 are sometimes used for precipitation). The reason for 
that choice is to improve the robustness of the conclusions that are strongly method-
dependent when proper extremes are studied (Zhang et al., 2004).  
Alexander et al. (2006) have conducted interesting studies on a global gridded 
temperature and precipitation database (Caesar et al., 2006). Besides confirming the 
significant increase of the maximum and minimum temperatures (stronger for 
minima), Alexander et al. reach an additional conclusion of high interest for 
agricultural insurance: they find a general increase of the contribution of strong 
precipitations to the total yearly rainfall; this increase is significant for more than half 
of the emerged land. The concentration of precipitation in stronger events with 
shorter duration is physically explained by the combined effect of increased 
evaporation and moisture-holding capacity of the atmosphere, both due to warming 
(Trenberth et al., 2003). Coherent results are found at a finer scale for many extra-
tropical regions (Groisman et al., 2005), and, with a more detailed analysis, for the 
USA (Groisman et al., 2004) and for Europe (Klein Tank and Können, 2003). For the 
Mediterranean area, where the climatologic vulnerability is high, several studies find 
an increasing trend towards more intense precipitations in spite of a decreasing total 
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precipitation (Alpert et al., 2002; Maheras et al., 2004, Brunetti et al., 2004). If this 
trend is confirmed in the future, we will have a twofold increase of risk for agriculture: 
more heavy rains and more drought periods.   
The global amount of precipitation does not seem to have a clear, statistically 
significant, trend, but most studies suggest a small negative trend for the period 
1951–2005, larger for some regions, like the Sahel and western Africa, while there 
seems to be a positive trend in northern Europe (Trenberth et al., 2007, pages 255–
256). A significant trend towards drought has been found by Dai et al. (2004) in most 
of the northern hemisphere, and in particular in most of Eurasia, using the Palmer 
drought severity index (PDSI). This index (Heim, 2002) only requires temperature 
and precipitation to compute potential evapotranspiration (PET) with the method of 
Thornthwaite (1948), and is therefore easier to compute for areas with limited amount 
of data than the more reliable, but more complex, PET computation with the method 
of Penman (1948).  
Conclusions are more difficult to reach for wind events and few studies tackle this 
issue; Salinger et al. (2005) have shown, for wind extremes in the southern part of 
New Zealand, a significant increasing trend over the last 40 years, but Smits et al. 
(2005) found a decline in strong wind events in the Netherlands over the same 
period. 
The scientific community does not consider this risk increase as sufficiently proven 
with systematically acquired data at global level. 
Some scenario analysis can be carried out on the basis of climatic scenarios that are 
being built in the framework of the Ensembles (Sources) project (integrated project of 
FP6). At this stage only some exploratory analysis can be carried out on this topic. 
 
3.4. Crop yield variability  
We consider now different possible indicators for crop yield variability. For discussion 
of the most suitable indicators, we take the example of wheat. We use the statistical 
yield data per year for the smallest regions for which data are available in the 
Eurostat REGIO database. 
 
3.4.1. Standard deviation of regional yields 
A first simple way to measure variability is to compute the standard deviation of the 
historical statistical yields. A first attempt can be given by a map of the standard 
deviation along time. Figure 19 represents the coefficient of variation for the historical 
yield data for wheat (standard deviation/average yield).  
( )2
1
1)( ∑ −−= t t yynystd . 
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Data are available for most countries and therefore represented at NUTS 2 level. In 
the case of missing data, the level NUTS 1 is represented, or NUTS 0 (Member 
States) if NUTS 1 data are also missing.  
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Eurostat REGIO data. 
Figure 19. Coefficient of variation (standard deviation/mean) of the wheat yield data 
 
This map in Figure 19 gives some information that is coherent with common 
knowledge, such as a high variability in the Iberian Peninsula and a lower variability 
in most of central Europe, but the information in it is strongly distorted for several 
reasons. 
— The contribution that the technological trend has on the variability (Figure 20 
illustrates this point): in France or Belgium there is a strong tendency to the 
increase of yields. Therefore the standard deviation is high because the first and 
last values (y1975 or y2004 for example) are far from the average y , but each y is 
not that far from the expected value for that year. 
— There is an insufficient number of observations. This happens for example for 
Poland.  
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with Eurostat REGIO data. 
Figure 20. Some time series of yield data of wheat 
 
Figure 20 shows the evolution of average wheat yields in time. We can differentiate 
two groups of countries: Spain, Portugal and Romania with lower yields; and 
Belgium, France and the United Kingdom with much higher yields. This second group 
also shows an important trend upwards from 1976 to 2002.  
 
3.4.2. Measuring the risk by comparing the statistical yield with the 
average yield of the previous years 
A possible way of computing the variability of yield is to compare the yield in a given 
year with the yield that could be expected on the basis of the previous years. A rough 
estimation of the expected yield can be given by the average of the observed yield in 
the previous years. For example, considering a four-year moving average, we can 
obtain an indicator of ‘yield anomaly’ for year t  as the difference tr  between the 
observed yield in year t  and the average yield of the previous years:  
( )43210 4
1
−−−− +++−=−= tttttttt yyyyyyyr . 
The average 0ty  is an approximation of the ‘expected average yield in year t’. We can 
get a yield variability indicator as the standard deviation of tr . This method needs 
some improvement to take into account two points. 
— A period of four years is too short to compute a long-term average that can be 
interpreted as ‘expected yield under normal conditions’; series of four successive 
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good or bad years are not too rare and can have a serious impact on this type of 
indicator. 
— There is usually a technological trend, i.e. the expected yield in normal conditions 
in year t is higher than the expected average yield in normal conditions in the four 
previous years.  
If the time series are very short, the risk indicators are not reliable. We have set a 
minimum threshold of 10 years of data to consider valid the parameter for our 
calculations.  
Measuring the risk with the standard deviation 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Eurostat REGIO data. 
Figure 21. Relative variability of wheat yield evolution compared with the average 
of the previous four years 
 
We can get a yield variability indicator as the standard deviation of rt. Figure 21 gives 
an example of representation of ( )trdevstd  for the particular case of wheat. The 
picture does not really correspond to the risk of yield reduction of wheat; some 
regions give surprising results: the low variability in some Mediterranean regions (in 
Greece for example) is difficult to understand. The high variability in central 
European areas is due to a non-linear technical trend rather than to a risk of yield 
reduction. On the other hand, the geographic level is too coarse, especially in 
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countries where NUTS 2 regions are large. Even when long enough series are 
available at NUTS 2 level, the situation in each region can be very heterogeneous 
due to the differences in soils.  
 
Measuring the risk of negative outcomes applying a deductible 
When an indicator ri of yield anomaly from statistical data has been identified as 
acceptable, the standard deviation ( )trdevstd  can be acceptable as an indicator of 
the variability, but it is not a good measure of the risk of yield reduction, in particular 
from the point of view of insurance. A better indicator is the negative outcome, loss or 
due indemnity, i.e. defining an indicator ts  that corresponds to the compensation that 
an insurance company should pay under a hypothetical insurance. The trigger of the 
loss most often used is the expected yield for the region with a straight deductible d  
(10 % or 20 % for example):  
⎩⎨
⎧
−=≥
=<
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The average of ts  would be the expectation of payment that an insurance company 
would pay under such a hypothetical type of insurance.  
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Eurostat REGIO data. 
Figure 22. Yield reduction risk — comparison with the average of the previous four 
years — deductible 20 % 
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If we apply this function to the anomaly indicator tr  defined in the previous 
paragraph, we get a more sensible picture of the yield reduction risk for wheat 
(Figure 22). However, some regions highlighted as strongly variable, due to only one 
abnormal year, such as North West, Ulster (minor producers) or Brandenburg (more 
important). This suggests that the method needs some improvement.  
 
3.4.3. Measuring the yield anomalies by comparison with the yield  
Computing the ‘expected yield’ as the average yield of the last four years is far from 
being an optimal solution for the reasons mentioned above: it ignores the technical 
trend and can be affected by the presence of one or two very good or very bad 
harvests in the four previous years. A better option is to define the ‘expected yield’ 
through a trend adjusted taking into account all the available information. We have 
estimated the trend on the time series in each region with a quadratic stepwise 
regression with two restrictions: we assume that the trend is growing or constant and 
its slope is constant or decreasing. We obtain this with the following rules. 
— If none of the time terms is significant or the regression-adjusted trend is 
decreasing, the average yield is accepted as trend.  
— If the linear term is significant and the quadratic is not significant or has a positive 
sign, we take a linear trend.  
— If the quadratic trend goes down before the end of the series, we keep it constant 
after the maximum value.  
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Eurostat REGIO data. 
Figure 23. Illustration of the computation of a yield loss indicator with a quadratic 
trend and a deductible 
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Figure 23 illustrates this for wheat in the Loire Region (France). The black curve 
indicates the adjusted quadratic trend, which is growing and with a decreasing slope. 
The grey curve below represents the trend affected by a 10% deductible. The values 
below this second trend are those which would trigger an indemnity, equal to the 
difference between these values and the corresponding value of the grey trend 
curve.  
The risk maps reported below (Figures 24 to 28) are more coherent, although there is 
still one major limitation due to the smoothing effect of working with regional 
averages, especially for major production areas in each crop. A smooth behaviour of 
the regional average yield does not mean that all farms in that region share the 
homogeneity. These maps correspond rather to the level of systemic risk in each 
region.  
Figure 24 reports the risk indicators obtained for the yield of wheat (common and 
durum wheat together). Poland is missing due to insufficient data and Bulgaria is 
missing due to a few likely wrong data in the Eurostat REGIO files used for this 
exercise. The most risky regions are the southern half of the Iberian Peninsula, 
Slovakia, a large part of Romania (Sud and Nord-Est) and a few regions in Italy 
(Sardinia, Basilicata) and Greece (Central Macedonia). The risk appears low in most 
of central Europe, at least for the EU-15 part, the Czech Republic and Hungary.  
 
 
  
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Eurostat REGIO data. 
Figure 24. Yield loss risk map for wheat with a quadratic trend 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with Eurostat REGIO data. 
Figure 25. Yield loss risk map for barley with a quadratic trend 
 
The pattern of risk level for barley (Figure 25) has a similar behaviour, with risk levels 
slightly higher than for wheat, which may be because barley is often cultivated in 
poorer soils than wheat. High risks are concentrated in Romania (Sud, Sud-Est 
regions); the same situation is evident in western Spain (Extremadura). 
Figure 26 reports the risk indicators obtained for the yield of rapeseed. The most 
risky regions are also in this case mainly the Mediterranean regions: Portugal, Spain 
(Comunidad Valenciana, Andalucía), Slovenia, a large part of southern Italy and its 
islands, a few regions of Greece (Thessaly, Central Macedonia), the region of 
Gelderland in the Netherlands and the Styria in Austria. 
Figure 27 shows the risk indicators obtained for the yield of sunflower. Higher risk is 
recorded in Portugal, Greece (Thessaly, Continental Greece), Romania (Sud-Vest), 
Germany (Detmold) and also Slovenia. The risk appears low in most of central 
Europe, at least for the EU-15 part, the Czech Republic and Hungary. Northern and 
central regions seem not to be exposed to high risk. 
 
 
 61 
  
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Eurostat REGIO data. 
Figure 26. Yield loss risk map for rapeseed with a quadratic trend 
 
  
Source: Authors’ elaboration with Eurostat REGIO data. 
Figure 27. Yield loss risk map for sunflower with a quadratic trend 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with Eurostat REGIO data. 
Figure 28. Yield loss risk map for sugar beet with a quadratic trend 
 
Figure 28 analyses the risk indicators obtained for the yield of sugar beet. High risk 
seems to be concentrated only in Romania (Sud and Sud-Est). This crop’s yield has 
a moderate level of risk in the rest of Europe. 
 
3.5. The use of agrometeorological models 
A possible way of mapping the variability of potential yield can be provided by 
agrometeorological models, in particular by crop growth monitoring system (CGMS), 
used by the MARS Stat group for the yield (for further details see Section 3.3). The 
agrometeorological model does not provide direct estimates or forecasts directly for 
yield, because it does not integrate the technological development, which can be 
strongly variable both in time and space.  
Among the parameters estimated by CGMS, the closest to the yield is the so-called 
‘water limited storage organs weight’. It is weaker than the yield data, because it is a 
model output instead of observed data, but has some advantages.  
The resolution is better than the available yield data and it should make a difference, 
to some extent, between zones with better/worse soil inside a NUTS 2 region.  
A similar map can be produced for smaller geographical units, the elementary 
monitoring units (EMU), i.e. the intersection of the 50 km grid cells with soil 
monitoring units (SMU).  
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with MARS data. 
Figure 29. CGMS model for wheat: risk index on the water limited storage organ 
weight 
 
We can downscale the yield kty ,  for region (or country) k using as co-variable etz ,  the 
WLSOW (water limited storage organs weight) computed from CGMS in EMU e. We 
assume that the yield inside a region k varies proportionally to the WLSOW.  
etktet zBy ,,,ˆ = . 
The average of the downscaled yield in a region has to coincide with the statistical 
yield:  
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Where eta ,  is the area of the crop in EMU e for year t.  
There are no suitable data for eta , . The best approximation we can get at the moment 
comes from the downscaled grid product of the CAPRI project (Kempen et al., 2005; 
Köble et al., 2005). This grid represents estimates of crop area for 1 km2 cells 
combining the point survey LUCAS, Corine land cover and soil information. However, 
this product is only available for 2001. Therefore we should use the same weighting 
ea  for any year.  
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From the downscaled yield a new yield risk indicator can be computed that should be 
closer to reality because it takes more into account the local variability: 
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3.6. Income variability 
The farm accountancy data network (FADN) is the main source of data for the 
analysis of farmers’ income. Let us first review the main characteristics of the FADN 
(sometimes known by its French name Réseau d’Information Comptable Agricole 
(RICA)).  
 
3.6.1. The FADN  
The FADN was launched in 1965. It is an annual survey carried out by the Member 
States of the EU. The network collects every year accountancy data from a sample of 
the agricultural holdings in the EU. Derived from national surveys, the FADN provides 
harmonised micro-economic data, i.e. the bookkeeping principles are the same in all 
countries. Holdings are selected to take part in the survey on the basis of sampling 
plans established at the level of each region in the Union. The survey does not cover 
all the agricultural holdings in the Union but only those which due to their size could 
be considered commercial. The method applied aims to provide representative data 
along three dimensions: region, economic size and type of farming.  
The aim of the network is to gather accountancy data from farms for the 
determination of incomes and business analysis of agricultural holdings. Currently, 
the annual sample covers approximately 80 000 holdings. They represent a 
population of about 5 000 000 farms in the 25 Member States, which cover 
approximately 90 % of the total utilised agricultural area (UAA) and account for more 
than 90 % of the total agricultural production of the Union. The information collected, 
for each sample farm, concerns approximately 1 000 variables and is transmitted by 
national liaison agencies. These variables described in a farm return refer to:  
— physical and structural data, such as location, crop areas, livestock numbers and 
labour force; and 
— economic and financial data, such as the value of production of the different 
crops, stocks, sales and purchases, production costs, assets, liabilities, 
production quotas and subsidies, including those connected with the application 
of CAP measures. 
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All individual data relating to individual farms received by the Commission are highly 
confidential. Only aggregated results for groups of farms are published at a level of 
aggregation from which information relating to individual farms cannot be discerned.  
To ensure that this sample reflects the heterogeneity of farming, before sampling the 
farms the field of observation is stratified according to three criteria: region, economic 
size and type of farming. A certain number of farms are selected in each stratum and 
an individual weight is applied to each farm in the sample, this corresponding to the 
number of farms in the three-way stratification cell of the field of observations divided 
by the number of farms in the corresponding cell in the sample. This weighting 
system is used in the calculation of standard results and generally also for the 
estimations in specific studies. 
The standard results are a set of statistics, calculated from the farm returns, which 
are periodically produced and published by the Commission. They describe in 
considerable detail the economic situation of farmers by different groups. The FADN 
survey covers the entire range of agricultural activities on farms. It also collects data 
on non-agricultural farming activities (such as tourism and forestry). 
The FADN provides in fact a unique source of data to analyse the income of farmers 
making the difference between different types of farms, size of the holding and 
regions. The data would a priori allow simulating to a certain extent what would have 
happened without insurance; in particular the costs of insurance premiums are 
collected for each farm of the sample. Unfortunately the compensation received by 
farmers in case of crisis is insufficiently detailed for a proper analysis. We shall come 
later to this point (Section 3.6.33.6.33.6.3).  
 
3.6.2. Income reduction risk 
We have computed the income risks from FADN data as the average loss in 
percentage. These risks-percentages are shown in different maps. The data are 
shown for the so-called ‘FADN regions’ (in general NUTS 0, NUTS 1 or NUTS 2 
regions, depending on the country). They have been calculated considering the time 
series of average income/annual work unit (AWU) for each major farm type or farm 
size category. A trend is estimated on the basis of this time series. Any income 
average below the trend by more than a deductible of 10 % is considered a 
significant loss. 
The trend on the time series in each region has been estimated with a quadratic 
stepwise regression in the same way as has been done with yields in the previous 
section. So, we assumed that the trend is growing or constant and its slope is 
constant or decreasing.  
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
Figure 30. Example of abnormal effect in the adjustment of a quadratic trend 
 
In Figure 30 we show an example of how a quadratic trend is adjusted to the income 
data. This example applies to grazing livestock farms in Sweden. The example is 
quite exceptional, because during the first years of the time series there were 
anomalous income values. These negative income/AWU values were due to the BSE 
crisis. This fact produces a very strong positive slope on the trend. However, given 
the characteristics of our quadratic trend, which is assumed to be growing or constant 
with a slope constant or decreasing, the average yield which issues from this trend is 
not strongly affected by this anomaly.   
Next we show two sets of maps. The first set (Figure 31 to Figure 39) shows the 
income risk per farm specialisation and the second set (Figure 40 to Figure 45) 
shows the income risk per farm size. The maps in the first set show the variability of 
income for different types of farms: 
— field crops (general cropping), 
— horticulture (vegetables and flowers), 
— wine specialists, 
— other permanent crops (mainly fruit trees), 
— mixed crops,  
— milk production,  
— grazing livestock (equidae, bovine animals, sheep, goats), 
— granivores (pigs, poultry). 
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Types of farming are defined in terms of the relative importance of the different 
enterprises on the farm. Relative importance is itself measured quantitatively as a 
proportion of each enterprise’s standard gross margin (SGM) (18) to the farms’ total 
SGM. 
We can see from these maps that there is not a clear correlation with the yield maps 
(Figure 24 to Figure 28). For example, in Figure 31 we can find the higher risk levels 
in Galicia (north-west of Spain), in northern and central Portugal, the south-east of 
Spain and Lazio (the Rome region in Italy). And this is followed by Aragon in the 
north-east of Spain, Scotland and the south of Sweden. However, if we look at wheat 
and barley yields risks (Figure 24 and Figure 25), we only find similar risk levels in 
Murcia. Rapeseed yields in Figure 26 can be a little bit more correlated, given that 
Portugal and the Rome region also show high risks. However, the same risk levels 
can be found in many other Italian regions, and in Greece, etc.  
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
Figure 31. Risk index for income reduction: field crop specialists 
 
                                            
(18) See the glossary. 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
Figure 32. Risk index for income reduction: horticulture specialists 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
Figure 33. Risk index for income reduction: wine specialists 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
Figure 34. Risk index for income reduction: other permanent crops 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
Figure 35. Risk index for income reduction: mixed farming 
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Figure 35 shows the risk percentage for mixed crop farms. A holding is deemed not 
to be specialising when the ratio of the main crop SGM on total SGM is below a 
threshold 2/3. We find an absence of data in some regions, which probably means 
that in those regions farms are highly specialised. These areas are in the north of 
Spain (area mainly dedicated to milk and livestock production), the north of Finland 
and Sweden, and in some regions of France.  
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
Figure 36. Risk index for income reduction: milk specialists 
 
It is interesting to see that there are not very big differences among crop and 
livestock in general, the most risky areas being found in the Mediterranean countries 
and in the Scandinavian countries (see milk specialists and grazing livestock income 
risks in Figure 36 and Figure 37). However, as the granivores farming system is hors-
sol and so much more independent from climate, we can observe in Figure 38 that 
risks are more homogeneously spread all around Europe. Also we can see that the 
level of risks are higher than for other speciality farms, at least for the data available, 
given that high risk levels of more than 10 % average or expected loss are found  
very often and the lowest risk areas are not below 2 % average losses.  
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
Figure 37. Risk index for income reduction: grazing livestock 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data 
Figure 38. Risk index for income reduction: granivore specialists 
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Lastly, Figure 39 shows the weighted average of all the risks indexes per farm type. 
We can see that both maps present similarities, as if the mixed farms combined in 
themselves the main productions of the region, and so the resulting risk levels would 
assimilate the average risk levels of the region. 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
Figure 39. Average risk index for income reduction per farm type 
 
The next set of maps (Figure 40 to Figure 45) shows the income risk per farm size. 
The economic size of farms is expressed in terms of European size units (ESU) (19).  
We can see in Figure 40 that very small farms (below 4 ESU) are not very 
widespread in Europe. They are mainly concentrated in the Mediterranean countries, 
like Portugal, Spain, Italy and Greece, and in Ireland. We can also see that they have 
an associated high level of income risk. Small farms (4–8 ESU), in Figure 41, show a 
similar geographic distribution, but the levels of risk are slightly lower.  
 
                                            
(19) See the glossary 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
Figure 40. Risk index for income reduction: very small farms (< 4 ESU) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
Figure 41. Risk index for income reduction: small farms (4–8 ESU) 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
Figure 42. Risk index for income reduction: small to medium farms (8–16 ESU) 
 
 
Small to medium farms (8–16 ESU) are more widespread throughout Europe, 
although they still do not appear in some regions of France or Germany, in the 
Benelux, Sweden and some regions of Finland (Figure 42). Instead, medium to large 
farms (16–40 ESU) are common in all European countries (Figure 43).  
We can observe in Figure 44 that risks levels decrease as farms grow bigger. So, for 
large farms (40–100 ESU), we find a high frequency of average losses around 1 % 
(blue colours) while average losses around 10 % are only found in some regions in 
Spain. It is curious to see in Figure 45 one Spanish region with very large farms and 
also important risks. This probably corresponds to the existence of large extensions 
of land under a single owner whose income is not dependent on agriculture.  
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
Figure 43. Risk index for income reduction: medium to large farms (16–40 ESU) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
Figure 44. Risk index for income reduction: large farms (40–100 ESU) 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data.. 
Figure 45. Risk index for income reduction: very large farms (> 100 ESU) 
 
3.6.3. The impact of agricultural insurance on the income of farmers 
The fact sheets collected gave us an approximate idea of the compensation that 
farmers get from insurance companies for damages due to unfavourable 
meteorological conditions. The data for different countries do not correspond to the 
same period of time, and there is a large variation of compensation from one year to 
another, but we can say that the average compensation that farmers obtain from 
insurers is around EUR 1 000 million/year. These payments mitigate the situations of 
serious farmers’ income reduction. In order to know which part of the problem these 
payments reduce, we have to quantify in some way the income reduction risk.  
Quantification of the income reduction risk necessarily involves some subjectivity. We 
have chosen an indicator computed on an approach that is consistent with the maps 
of income variability risk in Section 3.6.2, i.e. based on the time series of average 
income/AWU for each major farm type (or farm size category), considering a 
significant loss the one corresponding to an income below the trend by more than a 
10 % deductible. Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3 report the total loss per farm size 
category, per farm type and per country with this definition. The total reduction is 
around EUR 3 000 to EUR 3 500 million/year and would be around EUR 1 000 
million/year higher without agricultural insurances. This means that agricultural 
insurances mitigate significant farm reduction income by around 22 % to 25 %.  
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This approach has several limitations and needs a more in-depth analysis. The main 
limitation is that considering the behaviour of the ‘average farm’ for each class and 
region smoothes out a lot of the irregularities in farm income. This leads to an 
underestimation of the reduction risk that is in part compensated by choosing a low 
deductible level (10 %).  
 
Table 1. ‘Significant’ farm income reduction per year by farm size class 
Farm size Income reduction risk 
(million EUR) 
0–4 ESU 1 201 
4–8 ESU 487 
8–16 ESU 344 
16–40 ESU 359 
40–100 ESU 376 
> 100 ESU 423 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
 
Table 2. ‘Significant’ farm income reduction per year by farm type 
Farm type Income reduction  
(million EUR) 
Field crops 1 109 
Horticulture 193 
Wine 270 
Other permanent crops 526 
Milk 196 
Grazing livestock 310 
Granivores 311 
Mixed 579 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
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Table 3. ‘Significant’ farm income reduction per year by country 
Country Income reduction risk
(million EUR) 
Belgium 49 
Denmark 84 
Germany 240 
Ireland 11 
Greece 148 
Spain 577 
France 396 
Italy 703 
Luxembourg 2 
Netherlands 177 
Austria 11 
Portugal 864 
Finland 16 
Sweden 45 
United Kingdom 172 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with FADN data. 
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4. Policies for disaster aid and for risk 
management in agriculture 
 
4.1. Chapter synthesis 
In this chapter the CAP origin is introduced and its history explained. Moreover, the 
chapter presents the definitions of crisis and disasters adopted by each Member 
State within the EU policy framework. The types of public aid that are allowed within 
WTO agreements, the EU legislation and the Member States’ individual policies are 
discussed. Lastly, we present the state of the art of policy discussion in Europe on 
risk management in agriculture and, for comparison purposes, the current US 
agricultural risk management policy. 
 
4.2. Policy framework: the EU agricultural policy 
4.2.1. CAP origin  
The creation of a common agricultural policy was proposed in 1960 by the European 
Commission (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Commission). It followed the 
signing of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, which established the European Economic 
Community. The six Member States (20) strongly intervened individually in their 
agricultural sectors, in particular with regard to what was produced, maintaining 
prices for goods and how farming was organised.  
By 1962, three major principles had been established to guide the CAP: market unity, 
community preference and financial solidarity.  
The initial objectives were set out in the Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome: 
— to increase productivity by promoting technical progress and ensuring the 
optimum use of production factors, in particular labour;  
— to ensure a fair quality of life for the agricultural community;  
— to stabilise markets;  
— to guarantee availability of supplies;  
— to provide consumers with food at reasonable prices.  
The CAP recognised the need to take into account the social structure of agriculture 
and the structural and natural disparities between the various agricultural regions. 
                                            
(20) Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.  
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4.2.2. How the CAP works 
The CAP is an integrated system of measures which works by maintaining 
commodity price levels within the EU and which supports production, through 
subsidies. There are three main mechanisms. 
— Import tariffs are applied to specific goods imported into the EU. These are set at 
a level to raise the world market price up to the EU target price. The target price is 
chosen as the maximum desirable price for those goods within the EU.  
— An internal intervention price is set. If the internal market price falls below the 
intervention level then the EU will buy up goods to raise the price to the 
intervention level. The intervention price is set lower than the target price. The 
internal market price can only vary in the range between the intervention price 
and target price.  
— Subsidies are paid to farmers growing particular crops. This was intended to 
encourage farmers to choose to grow those subsidised crops. The current reform 
of the subsidy system phased out specific crop subsidies in favour of flat-rate 
subsidies based on the area of land cultivated and for adopting environmentally 
beneficial farming methods. This strategy reduces, but does not eliminate, the 
economic incentive to overproduce.  
 
4.2.3. Reforming the CAP 
Pre-1992 
In the 1960s, the Mansholt Plan was an idea that aimed to reduce the number of 
small farmers and consolidate farming into a larger, more efficient industry. Farming’s 
special status, and above all the extremely powerful farming lobbies across the 
continent, saw the plan disappear from the Union’s objectives. 
Bruised by the failure of Mansholt, reforms were mostly absent throughout the 1970s, 
not least due to the various financial crises that rocked the Union during that decade, 
such as the oil supply problems. 
The 1980s was the decade that saw the first key reforms of the CAP, foreshadowing 
further development from 1992 onwards. The influence of the farming community 
declined and, with the decline, reforms were encouraged. Environmentalists garnered 
great support in controlling the CAP, but it was a financial matter that ultimately offset 
the balance of the situation: due to huge overproduction, the CAP was becoming 
expensive and wasteful. These factors combined saw the introduction of a quota on 
dairy production in 1984 and, finally, in 1988 a ceiling on EU expenditure to farmers. 
However, the basis of the CAP remained in place, and the CAP was not drastically 
reformed until 1992. 
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1992 — the MacSharry reforms 
In 1992, the MacSharry reform was conceived to limit rising production. At the same 
time another aim was to adjust to the trend toward a more free agricultural market. 
The reform reduced levels of support for cereals and for beef. It also created ‘set 
aside’ (21) payments to withdraw land from production and payments to limit stocking 
levels, and introduced measures to encourage retirement and forestation. 
One of the main motors behind the 1992 reform was the need to pacify the EU’s 
external trade partners at the Uruguay Round of the GATT trade talks with regard to 
agricultural subsidies. 
The 1992 reform signalled a very important change. Several measures were 
introduced for the reduction of prices (making them more competitive on the 
European and world markets); for the farmers, compensation in case of big losses 
and environmental protection measures were also introduced.  
In general, the MacSharry reform is considered successful and its results have had a 
positive impact on European agriculture. 
 
Agenda 2000 
During July 1997, the Commission proposed a reform of the agricultural sector within 
the framework of Agenda 2000, the negotiations ended during the European Council 
in March 1999 in Berlin. 
Agenda 2000 represents the most radical and innovative common agricultural policy 
(CAP) reform since its origin. It brought the process started in 1992 to a solid base, 
giving a strong structure to the future development of the European agriculture 
competences: economics, environment and rural development. 
 
2003 — Fischler reform: a long-term perspective for sustainable agriculture 
‘On 26 June 2003, EU farm ministers adopted a fundamental reform of the common 
agricultural policy (CAP). The reform will completely change the way the EU supports 
its farm sector. The new CAP will be geared towards consumers and taxpayers, while 
giving EU farmers the freedom to produce what the market wants. To avoid 
abandonment of production, Member States may choose to maintain a limited link 
between subsidy and production under well defined conditions and within clear limits. 
These new “single farm payments” will be linked to the respect of environmental, food 
safety and animal welfare standards. Severing the link between subsidies and 
production will make EU farmers more competitive and market orientated, while 
providing the necessary income stability. [. . .] The different elements of the reform 
will enter into force in 2004 and 2005. The single farm payment will enter into force in 
                                            
(21) Set-aside is a term for land that farmers are not allowed to use for any agricultural purpose. 
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2005. If a Member State needs a transitional period due to its specific agricultural 
conditions, it may apply the single farm payment from 2007 at the latest.’ (22) 
The reform of June 2003 and the publication of Regulations (EC) No 1782/2003 and 
(EC) No 1783/2003 (23) brought an end to the complex process of market 
reorganisation of European Community support for agriculture and rural development 
that began in 1992. The Fischler reform signalled a decisive step towards a more 
selective support, aimed at the conservation and enhancement of the environment, 
explicitly linked to beneficiaries’ mode of conduct. One relevant aspect of the reform 
is that it offers Member States some options for putting into action the new reform 
instruments. In substance, it grants countries and local institutions an ample role, 
also in the area of market policies, and abandons the idea of a mechanistic, ‘single’ 
policy for the entire EU. 
In April 2004, regulations were published containing methods of application (24). 
Basically the key elements of the 2003 CAP reform are those listed below. 
— ‘A single farm payment for EU farmers, independent from production; limited 
coupled elements may be maintained to avoid abandonment of production, 
— this payment will be linked to the respect of environmental, food safety, animal 
and plant health and animal welfare standards, as well as the requirement to keep 
all farmland in good agricultural and environmental condition (“cross-
compliance”), 
— a strengthened rural development policy with more EU money, new measures to 
promote the environment, quality and animal welfare and to help farmers to meet 
EU production standards starting in 2005, 
— a reduction in direct payments (“modulation”) for bigger farms to finance the new 
rural development policy.’ (25)  
 
4.3. Definitions of ‘disaster’ and ‘crisis’ 
In the policies for disaster aids and risk management, it is essential to have clear 
definitions of risks, disaster, calamity, crisis, etc. In this section, we look at the 
definitions we can find in the literature and, in the following sections, to the definitions 
applied in the context of public aid given in international, European and national 
spheres.  
                                            
(22) http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/capreform/index_en.htm 
(23) Establishes the legal framework for the new decoupled scheme: the single payment scheme (SPS). 
(24) Regulations (EC) No 795/2004, (EC) No 796/2004 and (EC) No 817/2004. 
(25) http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/capreform/index_en.htm 
 83 
4.3.1. Definitions of disaster, natural disasters, disasters in agriculture, 
calamity and crisis 
Disaster 
Nowadays it is widely accepted that a disaster is multifaceted and open to a range of 
different interpretations. Disaster synonyms used by practitioners and experts have 
included ‘calamity’ and ‘catastrophe’; similar words are ‘emergency’ and ‘crisis’. 
Disasters are abrupt shocks to the socioeconomic and environmental system, 
involving loss of life and property.  
The definition that is provided by the United Nations International Strategy for 
Disaster Reduction (UN/ISDR) (26) is one of the most appropriate definitions.  
‘A disaster is a sudden, calamitous event that causes serious disruption of the 
functioning of a community or a society causing widespread human, material, 
economic and/or environmental losses which exceed the ability of the affected 
community or society to cope using its own level of resources’ (UN/ISDR, 2004). This 
definition is also used by the European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department 
(ECHO). 
Disaster is a ‘situation or event, which overwhelms local capacity, necessitating a 
request to national or international level for external assistance’ (definition considered 
in EM-DAT, the international emergency disasters database). Other definitions are: 
‘An unforeseen and often sudden event that causes great damage, destruction and 
human suffering. Though often caused by nature, disasters can have human origins’; 
‘the combination of hazards, vulnerability and inability to reduce the potential 
negative consequences of risk results in disaster’; etc.  
For a disaster to be entered into the database of the UN/ISDR, at least one of the 
following criteria must be met: 
— a report of 10 or more people killed,  
— a report of 100 people affected,  
— a declaration of a state of emergency by the relevant government,  
— a request by the national government for international assistance.  
                                            
(26) The UN/ISDR aims at building disaster-resilient communities by promoting increased awareness of the 
importance of disaster reduction as an integral component of sustainable development, with the goal of 
reducing human, social, economic and environmental losses due to natural hazards and related technological 
and environmental disasters. The UN/ISDR is the focal point in the UN system to promote links and synergies 
between, and the coordination of, disaster reduction activities in the socioeconomic, humanitarian and 
development fields, as well as to support policy integration. It serves as an international information 
clearinghouse on disaster reduction, developing awareness campaigns and producing articles, journals and 
other publications and promotional materials related to disaster reduction. The UN/ISDR headquarters is 
based at the Palais des Nations in Geneva. 
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Even though there is no common worldwide definition of ‘disaster’, there are some 
characteristics which are common to most definitions. 
A disaster is generally considered as: 
— being sudden, abrupt or unpredictable, 
— causing human, material, economic or environmental losses, 
— exceeding the ability of the affected community to cope with it. 
The economic impact of a disaster usually consists of direct (e.g. damage to 
infrastructure, crops, housing) and indirect (e.g. loss of revenues, unemployment, 
market destabilisation) consequences on the local economy.  
 
Natural disasters  
Following the definitions of natural disaster by the UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs, natural disasters can be divided into three specific groups: 
hydro- meteorological disasters, geophysical disasters and biological disasters. 
Hydro-meteorological disasters are natural processes or phenomena of an 
atmospheric, hydrological or oceanographic nature that may cause loss of life or 
injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental 
degradation. These include floods and wave surges, storms, landslides, avalanches, 
and droughts and related disasters (extreme temperatures and forest/scrub fires). 
Geophysical disasters are natural earth processes or phenomena that may cause 
loss of life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or 
environmental degradation. These include earthquakes, tsunamis and volcanic 
eruptions. 
Biological disasters are processes of organic origin or those conveyed by biological 
vectors, including exposure to pathogenic micro-organisms, toxins and bioactive 
substances, which may cause loss of life or injury, property damage, social and 
economic disruption or environmental degradation. These include epidemics and 
insect infestations. 
However, the European Commission includes in natural disasters only hydro-
meteorological disasters and geophysical disasters, considering biological disasters 
(diseases, pests, contamination in the food chain as by dioxins) a separate group 
(EC, 2005b).  
 
Disasters in agriculture 
The disasters typical of the agricultural sector are mostly natural disasters. They can 
be classified in the following groups of risks: 
— climatic events: hail, flood, drought, storms, etc.; 
— damage caused by pests: snails, insects, etc.; 
— diseases/epizootics: foot-and-mouth disease, swine fever, etc. 
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This differentiation of hydro-meteorological disasters or climatic events, and 
biological disasters, either caused by pests or by diseases, is also apparent in the 
definitions of the European agricultural legislation (see the following sections).  
 
Calamity 
Calamity also has several definitions and it is often considered equivalent to 
catastrophe, disaster or crisis. French legislation refers to calamity as a synonym of 
agricultural disaster. We adopt the French position in this report.  
 
Crisis 
A crisis may occur on a personal or societal level. It may be a traumatic or stressful 
change in a person’s life, or an unstable and dangerous social situation, in political, 
social, economic or military affairs, or a large-scale environmental event, especially 
one involving an impending abrupt change. More loosely, it is a term meaning ‘a 
testing time’ or ‘emergency event’ (27). While crisis can affect at a personal or societal 
level, a disaster is the impact of a natural or man-made hazard that negatively affects 
society or the environment (28).  
According to EC (2005b), while risk may be associated with either a positive or a 
negative outcome, the assumption is always made that a crisis has significant 
negative consequences. In the EC (2005b) report, a crisis is understood to be an 
unforeseen situation that endangers the viability of agricultural holdings, either at a 
localised level, across a whole sector of production or at a wider geographical level. 
In agriculture, a crisis may be caused by: natural disasters, diseases and pests 
affecting animal or plant health or contamination in the food chain; economic factors 
having short-term but significant effects on farm income; or market shocks with high 
intensity negative consequences. 
 
4.3.2. Further discussion on the above definitions 
As previously mentioned, all the definitions of disaster are quite relative. On one 
hand, the UN/ISDR criteria either cannot be applied to agricultural losses or are very 
relative, depending on the subjective appreciation of each government. At the same 
time, what the difference is between the terms related to ‘disaster’, ‘calamity’, 
‘catastrophe’, ‘emergency’ and ‘crisis’ is widely discussed. Lastly, the definitions do 
not usually differentiate the big disasters and crises from minor natural events 
causing small losses.  
                                            
(27) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crisis (2007). 
(28) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crisis#Disaster (2007). 
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From this reflection we can conclude that it is not easy to reach a definition of 
disaster. Nevertheless, it can be easier and it seems to be necessary to define when 
the losses due to an event can be eligible for assistance and aids. So, this is what is 
going to be reviewed and discussed in the following sections. First, we address the 
conditions under which forms of aid are allowed by the international trade 
agreements (WTO). Secondly, we look at the conditions stated and the aids and 
subsidies allowed by the European Union legislation. Thirdly, we present the 
European States’ definitions of those disasters eligible for ad hoc aids and for 
insurance subsidies.  
Disasters and risks are managed in a different way in Europe. While risks are usually 
managed through risk management tools (production techniques, diversification, 
contracts, hedging, mutual stabilisation funds, insurance, etc.) described in Section 
2.3, in the event of crisis, public solidarity at regional, national or EU level is broadly 
expected and accepted. However, as will be seen below, natural disasters and 
catastrophic events (in the sense of hydro-meteorological and geophysical disasters) 
and sanitary crises (biological disasters) are managed in a different way (EC, 2005b).  
As will be seen in Section 4.5 and Section 4.6, each country follows its own 
legislation, its own definition of disaster and crisis. 
 
4.4. Disasters and crises policies and aids from a WTO 
perspective 
 
4.4.1. The EU and the WTO: committed to multilateral trade rules 
The growing trade between all countries, whether developed or less must be 
conducted under multilateral trade rules for the benefit of all countries, in particular 
developing countries. This is why the EU is a strong supporter of the WTO and has 
always played an active role in the WTO discussions and negotiations on trade in 
agriculture (29).  
The EU is committed to the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) (30) negotiations, 
which aim at further liberalising trade while enhancing development. As regards 
agriculture, the agreement reached in August 2004 paved the way for further 
negotiations that could deliver a considerably bigger farm trade liberalisation than the 
previous trade negotiations (the Uruguay Round). The agreement locks in the EU’s 
CAP reform. It should bring a substantial cut in trade-distorting agricultural support, 
the elimination of trade-distorting export competition practices and contribute to a 
                                            
(29) http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/may/tradoc_113528.pdf 
(30) Launched in November 2001 in Doha, Qatar. 
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significant opening of agricultural markets. The EU has made major efforts to redirect 
its farm policy towards more transparent and non trade-distorting instruments — 
principally by divorcing most of the payments to farmers from levels of production. 
 
4.4.2. The WTO agreements 
‘The Final Act embodying the results of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade 
negotiations’, signed by ministers in Marrakesh on 15 April 1994 contains legal texts 
which spell out the results of the negotiations since the round was launched in Punta 
del Este, Uruguay, in September 1986. In addition to the texts of the agreements, the 
Final Act also contains texts of ministerial decisions and declarations which further 
clarify certain provisions of some of the agreements.  
In WTO terminology, subsidies in general are identified by ‘boxes’ which are given 
the colours of traffic lights: green (permitted), amber (slow down — i.e. to be 
reduced), red (forbidden). In agriculture, things are, as usual, more complicated. The 
Agreement on Agriculture has no red box. All domestic support measures considered 
to distort production and trade (with some exceptions) fall into the amber box, which 
is defined in Article 6 of the Agreement on Agriculture as all domestic supports 
except those in the blue and green boxes. These include measures to support prices, 
or subsidies directly related to production quantities. These supports are subject to 
limits: de minimis minimal supports are allowed (5 % of agricultural production for 
developed countries, 10 % for developing countries); the 30 WTO members that had 
larger subsidies than the de minimis levels at the beginning of the post-Uruguay 
Round reform period are committed to reduce these subsidies. Domestic support 
exceeding the reduction commitment levels in the amber box is prohibited. The 
reduction commitments are expressed in terms of a ‘total aggregate measurement of 
support’ (total AMS) which includes all supports for specified products together with 
supports that are not for specific products, in one single figure. 
There is a blue box for subsidies that are tied to programmes that limit production. 
This is the ‘amber box with conditions’ — conditions designed to reduce distortion. 
Any support that would normally be in the amber box is placed in the blue box if the 
support also requires farmers to limit production (details are set out in paragraph 5 of 
Article 6 of the Agreement on Agriculture). There are also exemptions for developing 
countries, sometimes called an ‘SDT box’ (special and differential treatment), 
including provisions in paragraph 2 of Article 6 of the agreement. 
The green box is defined in Annex 2 to the Agreement on Agriculture. In order to 
qualify, green box subsidies must not distort trade, or at most cause minimal 
distortion (paragraph 1). They have to be government funded (not by charging 
consumers higher prices) and must not involve price support. They tend to be 
programmes that are not targeted at particular products, and include direct income 
supports for farmers that are not related to (are ‘decoupled’ from) current production 
levels or prices. They also include environmental protection and regional 
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development programmes. ‘Green box’ subsidies are therefore allowed without limits, 
provided they comply with the policy-specific criteria set out in Annex 2. 
In the current negotiations, some countries argue that some of the subsidies listed in 
Annex 2 might not meet the criteria of the annex’s first paragraph — because of the 
large amounts paid, or because of the nature of these subsidies, the trade distortion 
they cause might be more than minimal. Among the subsidies under discussion here 
are: direct payments to producers (paragraph 5), including decoupled income support 
(paragraph 6), and government financial support for income insurance and income 
safety-net programmes (paragraph 7), and other paragraphs. Some other countries 
take the opposite view — that the current criteria are adequate, and might even need 
to be made more flexible to take better account of non-trade concerns such as 
environmental protection and animal welfare. 
The abovementioned, paragraph 7 of Annex 2, and also paragraph 8, relate to the 
governmental service programmes which care about the consequences of calamities. 
These programmes are:  
— the economical risk insurance (for the price and of the revenue), 
— the climate risk insurance. 
Paragraph 7 opens the green box for government financial support for income 
insurance and income safety-net programmes under certain conditions. This 
paragraph was included under the proposal of Australia, Canada and the USA. Next 
we show the original text, together with that of paragraph 8, which includes in the 
green box payments for relief from natural disasters made either directly or by way of 
government financial participation in crop insurance schemes.  
 
Annex 2 to the Agreement on Agriculture: ‘Domestic support: The 
basis for exemption from the reduction commitments’ 
 
7. Government financial participation in income insurance and income safety-net 
programmes 
(a) Eligibility for such payments shall be determined by an income loss, taking into 
account only income derived from agriculture, which exceeds 30 % of average 
gross income or the equivalent in net income terms (excluding any payments from 
the same or similar schemes) in the preceding three-year period or a three-year 
average based on the preceding five-year period, excluding the highest and the 
lowest entry. Any producer meeting this condition shall be eligible to receive the 
payments. 
(b) The amount of such payments shall compensate for less than 70 % of the 
producer’s income loss in the year the producer becomes eligible to receive this 
assistance. 
(c) The amount of any such payments shall relate solely to income; it shall not relate 
to the type or volume of production (including livestock units) undertaken by the 
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producer; or to the prices, domestic or international, applying to such production; 
or to the factors of production employed. 
(d) Where a producer receives in the same year payments under this paragraph and 
under paragraph 8 (relief from natural disasters), the total of such payments shall 
be less than 100 % of the producer’s total loss. 
 
8. Payments (made either directly or by way of government financial participation in 
crop insurance schemes) for relief from natural disasters 
(a) Eligibility for such payments shall arise only following a formal recognition by 
government authorities that a natural or like disaster (including disease outbreaks, 
pest infestations, nuclear accidents, and war on the territory of the Member 
concerned) has occurred or is occurring; and shall be determined by a production 
loss which exceeds 30 % of the average of production in the preceding three-year 
period or a three-year average based on the preceding five-year period, excluding 
the highest and the lowest entry. 
(b) Payments made following a disaster shall be applied only in respect of losses of 
income, livestock (including payments in connection with the veterinary treatment 
of animals), land or other production factors due to the natural disaster in 
question. 
(c) Payments shall compensate for not more than the total cost of replacing such 
losses and shall not require or specify the type or quantity of future production. 
(d) Payments made during a disaster shall not exceed the level required to prevent or 
alleviate further loss as defined in criterion (b) above. 
(e) Where a producer receives in the same year payments under this paragraph and 
under paragraph 7 (income insurance and income safety-net programmes), the 
total of such payments shall be less than 100 % of the producer’s total loss. 
Source: WTO (2004). 
Figure 46. Annex 2 to the WTO Agreement on Agriculture 
 
There is wide debate about which current payments fall within each box. The 
‘Canadian farm income program’ (CFIP), formerly ‘agricultural income disaster 
assistance’ (AIDA), was notified in the green box because it provides cover to income 
(so it should fall within the conditions stated by paragraph 7). However, this 
programme no longer exists. Both CFIP and ‘Net income stabilisation account’ 
(NISA) were substituted by one single programme, ‘Canadian agricultural income 
stabilisation’ (CAIS), in 2003. 
The revenue insurance programmes in the USA do not fall under paragraph 7 or 
paragraph 8. They cannot be included under paragraph 7 because they do not cover 
income but revenue, and they do not fall under paragraph 8 because they do not 
cover only against climatic or natural disasters but also against market risks. So, they 
have been notified in the amber box and, thus, they are subject to reduction 
compromises.  
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Public aid to crop insurance is ‘conceptually’ included in the green box, as can be 
deduced from paragraph 8. However, when this would be applied, subsidies to 
agricultural insurances result, by a formal requirement, excluded from the box. 
Assuming that aid complies with the trigger or threshold of the 30 % minimum loss, 
the exigency of a public formal declaration by government authorities every time 
there is a loss constitutes a constraint as it is not operational in an insurance model 
managed by private companies. This would eliminate one of the advantages of the 
insurance schemes over the ad hoc aids: the agility of the system. Therefore most of 
the subsidies to the European and North American crop insurance schemes have 
been notified within the amber box. 
 
4.5. Disaster and crisis policies and aids in EU legislation 
4.5.1. European aid for disasters  
In the event of a natural disaster or major catastrophe, local, regional or national 
authorities in the Member States may intervene with appropriate emergency aid or 
restorative measures. At EU level, the Commission has the role of assessing these 
forms of State aid to ensure that they do not distort competition (see the following 
sections).  
To supplement regional and national measures, the EU rural development policy may 
provide support both for restoring agricultural and forestry production potential 
damaged by natural disaster and for appropriate preventive actions. The current 
regulation, however, excludes Community financial participation in insurance and 
payments for income or yield losses, since insurance is not regarded as a preventive 
action.  
In the event of natural disasters, the Community may also apply ad hoc derogations 
to common market organisations. Past examples have included the use of set-aside 
land for animal feed production, the advanced transfer of direct payments and the 
sale of intervention stocks at reduced prices to improve supplies of animal feed.  
Following the floods which hit central Europe in August 2002 the European Union 
Solidarity Fund (EUSF) was created, mainly to assist Member States and countries 
negotiating accession, in the event of major natural disasters where the cost of the 
damage exceeds EUR 3 billion or 0.6 % of the gross domestic product of the Member 
State in question.  
The EUSF does not compensate for individual losses. It is designed to provide 
effective and flexible emergency financial aid for measures such as temporary 
accommodation or the provisional repair of vital infrastructures permitting the 
resumption of everyday life. With an annual budget of EUR 1 billion, the EUSF was 
not set up with the aim of meeting all the costs linked to natural disasters. Also, long-
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term action — lasting reconstruction, economic redevelopment, disaster prevention 
— is not covered by the EUSF (EC, 2005b).  
In the case of sanitary crises, Community legislation clearly establishes that it is the 
Member States which are primarily responsible for preventing the outbreak and 
spread of animal diseases and other sanitary crises. In the event of emergency 
measures to eradicate epizootic diseases in livestock, Member States may 
compensate farmers for their capital losses and loss of profit linked to animals 
slaughtered or crops destroyed, within the limits specified by Community State aid 
rules (see the following sections). Nevertheless, the EU Veterinary Fund reimburses 
up to 50 % of Member States’ costs in compensation for culling, destruction of 
animals and animal feed, cleaning and disinfection. For measures to eradicate foot-
and-mouth disease, EU cover may increase to up to 60 % of Member States’ 
expenditure. Member States’ vaccination schemes can also be co-financed. The 
Veterinary Fund does not, however, compensate farmers who suffer economic losses 
due to limitations imposed on the movement of livestock for sanitary reasons. These 
are dealt with under the CAP.  
Several common market organisations (CMOs) (31) have a specific veterinary crisis 
provision, allowing exceptional market support measures to be taken in the event of 
animal disease, to react to market distortions caused by transport restrictions 
imposed to combat the spread of disease. This applies to beef and veal meat, milk 
and milk products, sheepmeat and goatmeat, pigmeat, poultrymeat and eggs. Since 
it is the Member States that are primarily responsible for preventing the outbreak and 
spread of disease, the cost of these exceptional market measures should not be 
borne by the Community budget alone, but should be shared between the 
Community and the Member State concerned. There is a co-financing rate of 50 %, 
which corresponds to the general reimbursement rate provided by the Veterinary 
Fund (EC, 2005b). 
Economic crises affecting the EU internal market for agricultural products are 
addressed at Community level. Although the CAP reform has substantially reduced 
the relevance of supply control and price stabilisation instruments, safety-net 
provisions in the event of crisis remain available in several CMOs. This is the case, 
for example, for the main cereals and skimmed milk powder, where the role of the 
intervention mechanism has been limited to that of a genuine safety net. In the event 
of a market crisis in the beef sector, the Commission has the possibility of introducing 
exceptional measures. Under certain conditions producer organisations in the fruit 
and vegetables sector may apply withdrawal measures. The common market 
organisation for wine provides producer organisations with the option of applying 
crisis distillation measures if the market is seriously unbalanced. Thus, the 
instruments available differ significantly between market organisations. 
                                            
(31) See the glossary. 
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4.5.2. State aid rules 
The 1957 Treaty of Rome established the European Economic Community. Title V in 
Part Three of this Treaty settled the common rules on competition. Its Section 3, 
Article 92, delimited the aid that can be granted by the States. The 1997 Treaty of 
Amsterdam amended the Treaties establishing the European Communities, including 
the Treaty of Rome and also the Treaty on European Union (Maastricht 1992). The 
1997 Treaty of Amsterdam provides a consolidated version of the Treaty of Rome. 
Both in this consolidated version and in the 2002 consolidated version of the same 
Treaty (from now on the Treaty), the categories of aid that can be granted by the 
States appear in Part Three, Title VI, Chapter 1, Section 2, Article 87. 
Article 87 (previously Article 92 of the 1957 Treaty of Rome) prohibits certain State 
aid, and authorises the European Commission to accept some such categories of aid 
as ‘compatible with the common market’. Among the accepted forms of aid are aid to 
soothe the effects of natural disasters, and other types of aid. Article 87(2)(b) and 
Article 87(3)(c), reproduced in Figure 47, are the basis for aid related to risk 
management and safety-net programmes in agriculture. 
 
Section 2 
Aids granted by States 
Article 87 (ex Article 92)  
1.  
2. The following shall be compatible with the common market:  
(a) … 
(b) aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional 
occurrences;  
(c) …  
3. The following may be considered to be compatible with the common market:  
(a) … 
(b) … 
(c) aid to facilitate the development of certain economic activities or of certain 
economic areas, where such aid does not adversely affect trading conditions to 
an extent contrary to the common interest;  
(d) … 
(e)  … 
Source: Official Journal of the European Communities (2002) 
Figure 47. Aids granted by States in the European treaties 
 
The Commission has applied Article 87 of the 1997 Treaty in numerous decisions. 
The 1993 publication of the then Economic and Social Committee (ESC) on EC 
systems of agricultural insurance already collected information on how the former 
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Article 93 was to be applied. Later, the Commission stated its policy in the 
‘Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture sector’ (‘agriculture guidelines’ 
from now on). These guidelines were not compulsory for Member States but they 
constituted a guide for the Commission in order to approve or reject Member States’ 
aid.  
The former agricultural guidelines applied from 2000 to 2006. In December 2006 the 
application of Articles 87(2)(b) and 87(3)(c) was reviewed with the introduction of a 
regulation (EC, 2006a) and new Commission guidelines (EC, 2006b). The regulation 
is compulsory for Member States and it avoids the need for many different forms of 
aid to be notified to the Commission (the regulation makes them exempt from the 
notification requirement of Article 88(3) of the Treaty). The regulation establishes 
that, following the 2006 guidelines, Member States’ aid needs to be evaluated on an 
individual basis by the Commission only for some cases. Next we will comment the 
2006 regulation (which entered into force the 1 January 2007) and the guidelines 
2007–13. 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 of 15 December 2006 
The former regulation, ‘Commission Regulation (EC) No 70/2001 of 12 January 2001 
on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the EC Treaty to small and medium-sizes 
enterprises’ (OJ L 10, 13.1.2001, pp. 33–42) did not directly address the aid to be 
given to risk and crisis management in agriculture. So, all the aid given for agriculture 
under Article 87 should follow the ‘Community guidelines for State aid in the 
agriculture sector’ (agricultural guidelines) which have been mentioned above. In 
January 2007 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 on the application of 
Articles 87 and 88 of the Treaty to State aid to small and medium-sized enterprises 
active in the production of agricultural products and amending Regulation (EC) 
70/2001 (from now on ‘the 2006 regulation’) entered into force (EC, 2006a). This 
regulation includes the aid given under Article 87(3)(c), and some types of aid given 
formerly under Article 87(2)(b), which are now given also under Article 87(3)(c) (see 
Table 4).  
 
Table 4. Main rules applying for the different types of risk management State aid 
Before 2007 From 2007 
Aid 
Main rule Treaty 
article 
Main rule  Treaty 
article 
Natural disaster Guidelines 2000–06 87(2)(b) Guidelines 2007–
13 
87(2)(b) 
Adverse climatic events Guidelines 2000–06 87(2)(b) 2006 regulation (1) 87(3)(c) 
Agricultural insurance Guidelines 2000–06 87(2)(b) 2006 regulation (1) 87(3)(c) 
Sanitary risks Guidelines 2000–06 87(3)(c) 2006 regulation (1) 87(3)(c) 
(1) In cases not covered by the 2006 regulation the guidelines 2007–13 apply. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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As can be observed in Table 4, the forms of aid given in the case of natural disaster, 
in the case of climatic events which assimilated to natural disasters, and to 
agricultural insurance under certain conditions were included under Article 87(2)(b) of 
the Treaty. It considered that, besides the evident natural disasters and natural 
occurrences, other risks that could be considered as natural disasters could be 
included as such under the damage intensity criterion (32). Sanitary risks had a 
different treatment: ‘this does not normally constitute a natural disaster or an 
exceptional occurrence within the meaning of the Treaty. In such cases aid to combat 
animal and plants diseases may only be permitted by the Commission on the basis of 
Article 87(3)(c) of the Treaty’ (EC, 2000), which provides that aid to facilitate the 
development of certain activities may be considered compatible with the European 
Union provided that it does not affect trading conditions to an extent contrary to the 
common interest. So, these forms of aid ‘may only be accepted as part of an 
appropriate programme [. . .] for the prevention, control or eradication of the disease 
concerned’ (EC, 2000). 
With the introduction of the 2006 regulation, adverse events that can be assimilated 
to natural disasters and aids given to agricultural insurance programmes are no 
longer justified by Article 87(2)(b), but they fall under Article 87(3)(c). 
The 2006 regulation applies only for a selected number of cases. 
— It applies only to ‘transparent aid’ (33). 
— It does not apply to aid granted to enterprises active in the processing or 
marketing of agricultural products. 
— It does not apply to fishery and aquaculture products. 
All the cases not covered by the regulation have to be evaluated by the Commission, 
following the guidelines. According to Article 3 of the regulation, ‘aid which does not 
fall within the scope of this regulation [. . .] shall be notified to the Commission in 
accordance with Article 88(3) of the Treaty. Such aid shall be assessed in 
accordance with the criteria laid down in the Community guidelines for State aid in 
the agriculture and forestry sector 2007 to 2013’ (EC, 2006a). 
The 2006 regulation does not enter into the definition of aid to be given in the case of 
a natural disaster, leaving its establishment to the guidelines. It defines the aids that 
can be given in the other three cases: adverse climatic events (which are not any 
                                            
(32) The damaged intensity criterion specified that the loss in the normal agro-livestock production must reach the 
30 % and the 20 % in the less-favoured areas. In the case of damage to the means of production the effects 
of which are felt over several years (for example the partial destruction of tree crops by frost) for the first 
harvest following the occurrence of the adverse event the percentage real loss in comparison with a normal 
year, determined in accordance with the principles set out in the previous paragraphs, must exceed 10 % and 
the percentage real loss multiplied by the number of years in which production is lost must exceed 20 % in 
the less-favoured areas and 30 % in other areas. 
(33) See the glossary.  
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more assimilated to natural disasters), insurance and sanitary risks. It includes four 
articles which are related to these aids: 
— Article 10: Aid in respect of animal and plant diseases and pest infestations, 
— Article 11: Aid for losses due to adverse climatic events, 
— Article 12: Aid towards the payment of insurance premiums (there is also a 
reference to this in Article 16), and 
— Article 16: Support for the livestock sector. 
 
Article 10 
Regarding animal and plant diseases, it clearly differentiated two types of aid: 
payment of the costs of prevention or eradication of animal or plant diseases or 
pest infestations — this aid must not involve direct payments to producers — and 
the compensation to the farmers for their losses, which requires a formal 
recognition by public authorities. Both types of aid are allowed to compensate up 
to 100 % of the costs. 
 
Article 11 
Regarding adverse climatic events which can be assimilated to natural 
disasters (34), they are eligible for aid but the compensation cannot exceed 80 % 
of the losses and 90 % in less-favoured areas (35). These same maximums (or 
gross aid intensity) of 80 % and 90 % apply for damages to farm buildings and 
farm equipment (36). Also, the event must be formally recognised by public 
authorities as a disaster.  
One of its main novelties is that it sets a condition for losses suffered from 1 
January 2010: compensation must be reduced by 50 % unless it is given to 
farmers who have taken out insurance covering at least 50 % of their average 
annual production or production-related income and the statistically most frequent 
climatic risks in the Member State or region concerned (37). Also, from January 
                                            
(34) For a definition on ‘adverse climatic event that can be assimilated to a natural disaster’ see the glossary. 
(35) In the guidelines 2000–06 there was also the 30 % threshold that now applies to the definition of ‘adverse 
climatic events that can be assimilated to a natural disaster’, but there was also an additional and different 
threshold of 20 % for less-favoured areas. Instead, there was no relative deductible as there is now, so that a 
part of the damage is always borne by the farmer, but the compensation could be up to 100 % of the 
damages (see the glossary for definitions of threshold and deductible). This led to the result that a farmer with 
a loss of 29 % received no compensation, whilst a farmer with a loss of 30 % may have received 
compensation for 30 %, which did not sufficiently encourage farmers to make all efforts to limit the damage. 
(36) In the guidelines 2000–06, neither thresholds nor deductibles applied to buildings and equipment, where the 
damages could be accepted up to 100 % of actual costs. 
(37) The condition to be insured in order to receive the whole compensation for losses suffered after 2010 aims at 
encouraging farmers to buy insurance whenever possible and to improve their own risk management. In the 
2006 version, there is a clerical error which refers to this condition as applying only to farm buildings, but it 
should be modified in the first corrigendum.  
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2011, there is an additional requirement for the State: it has to comply with the 
water directive in order to be able to compensate for losses due to drought. 
 
Article 12 
Regarding the aid towards the payment of insurance premiums, it is stated that 
‘The gross aid intensity must not exceed:  
(a) 80 % of the cost of insurance premiums, where the policy specifies that it 
provides cover against losses caused by adverse climatic events which can be 
assimilated to natural disasters; 
(b) 50 % of the costs of the insurance premiums, where the policy specifies that it 
provides cover against: 
(i) losses referred to in point (a) and against other losses caused by climatic 
events; and/or 
(ii) losses caused by animal or plant diseases or pest infestations.’ (38) 
Where the insurance also covers other losses caused by adverse climatic events, 
or losses caused by animal or plant diseases, the aid rate is reduced to 50 % of 
the cost of the premium. 
There is a novelty in reference to the old guidelines 2000–06, besides that of the 
regulation not applying to big firms or big agricultural holdings nor to firms 
dedicated to the transformation and commercialisation of agricultural products, in 
that ‘The aid must not be limited to insurance provided by a single insurance 
company or group of companies, or be made subject to the condition that the 
insurance contract be taken out with a company established in the Member State 
concerned.’  
 
Article 16 
Within the support for the livestock sector, some aid can be allowed in the 
following cases: ‘aid at a rate of up to 100 % of costs of removal of fallen stock, 
and 75 % of the costs of destruction of such carcasses; alternatively, aid up to an 
equivalent amount towards the costs of premium paid by farmers for insurance 
covering the costs of removal and destruction of fallen stock’. ‘The aid shall not 
involve direct payments of money to producers.’ 
 
                                            
(38) This point presents only one change when compared with the guidelines 2000–06: under these guidelines, 
insurance for animal and plant diseases had the same treatment of insurance against climatic events in the 
sense that it needed to be combined with cover against natural disasters or assimilated climatic events in 
order to be eligible for a 50 % subsidy. In the 2006 regulation there is no more the obligation to combine 
insurance for animal or plant diseases with insurance against catastrophes and assimilated events. The 
Commission considers that ‘Member States should be allowed to offer public support for animal and plant 
disease alone’ (EC, 2006b, p. 22). 
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Articles 10 and 11 include the constraints that aid schemes must be introduced within 
three years following the occurrence of the expense or loss, and that aid must be 
paid out within four years following the occurrence (39). 
 
Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture and forestry sector 
2007–13  
The ‘Community guidelines for State Aid in the agriculture and forestry sector 2007 to 
2013 (2006/C 319/01)’ (OJ C 319, 27.12.2006, pp. 1–33), from now on ‘guidelines 
2007–13’, ‘apply to all State aid, granted in connection with activities related to the 
production, processing and marketing of agricultural products […]. They apply to any 
aid measure in whatever form, including aid measures financed by parafiscal taxes, 
which falls within the definition of State aid laid down in Article 87(1) of the Treaty. 
These guidelines do not apply to State aids in the fisheries and aquaculture sector.’ 
(guidelines 2007–13, p. 1). 
It is stated in the general principles, and again in Section V.B, that the compensation 
will not be paid later than four years after the occurrence of the losses. Regarding the 
application of Articles 87(2)(b) and 87(3)(c) of the Treaty, there are four points related 
to this within Section V ‘Risk and crisis management’. These points are listed below. 
 
V.B.2. Aid to make good the damage caused by natural disasters or exceptional 
occurrences  
This point defines the notions of ‘natural disaster’ and ‘exceptional occurrence’ 
contained in Article 87(2)(b). The ‘Commission has consistently held that the notions 
of “natural disaster” and “exceptional occurrence” contained in Article 87(2)(b) must 
be interpreted restrictively. [. . .] Hitherto the Commission has accepted that 
earthquakes, avalanches, landslides and floods may constitute natural disasters. 
[. . .] Exceptional occurrences which have hitherto been accepted by the Commission 
include war, internal disturbances or strikes, and with certain reservations and 
depending on their extent, major nuclear or industrial accidents and fires which result 
in widespread loss. [. . .] As a general rule, the Commission does not accept that 
outbreaks of animal or plant diseases can be considered to constitute natural 
disasters or exceptional occurrences. However, in one case the Commission did 
recognise the very widespread outbreak of a completely new animal disease as an 
exceptional occurrence. Because of the inherent difficulties in foreseeing such 
events, the Commission will continue to evaluate proposals to grant aid in 
accordance with Article 87(2)(b) of the Treaty on a case by case basis, having regard 
to its previous practice in this field. 
                                            
(39) This constraint did not exist in the guidelines 2000–06. 
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Once the existence of a natural disaster or an exceptional occurrence has been 
demonstrated, the Commission will permit aid of up to 100 % to compensate for 
material damage.’ (EC, 2006b, p. 18) (40). 
 
V.B.3. Aid to compensate farmers for losses caused by adverse weather 
conditions 
This point follows closely Article 11 of the 2006 regulation and clarifies the changes 
from the guidelines 2000–06 (41).  
 
V.B.4. Aid for combating animal and plant diseases 
The same as in the previous point, it explains the changes from the previous 
guidelines and refers to Articles 10 and 16 of the 2006 regulation. It also adds that 
the Commission will neither authorise State aid for fallen stock given to operators 
active in the processing and marketing, nor aid towards the costs of the disposal of 
slaughterhouse waste. 
 
V.B.5. Aid towards the payment of insurance premiums 
It also analyses the changes from the previous guidelines and refers to Article 12 of 
the 2006 regulation. It again mentions that the Commission will not authorise State 
aid towards the payment of insurance premiums in favour of large companies, and 
companies active in the processing and marketing of agricultural products. Lastly, it 
refers to reinsurance: ‘The Commission will examine other aid measures in 
connection with insurance against natural disasters and exceptional occurrences on 
a case by case basis, in particular reinsurance schemes and other aid measures to 
support producers in particularly high risk zones.’ (EC, 2006b) 
De minimis aids 
‘Until recently, the Commission took the view that any national or regional aid given 
to support agriculture, however small, had the potential to distort competition and 
affect trade between Member States. All cases of State aid in the agricultural sector 
were therefore subject to Commission authorisation; the de minimis rule (42) applied 
                                            
(40) In the definition of natural disasters and exceptional occurrences there are no significant changes from the 
guidelines 2000–06. 
(41) For example, the 30 % threshold of losses in the year of the adverse weather conditions’ occurrence also 
applies to perennial crops, such as fruit trees. Instead, in the previous guidelines the losses were considered 
during several years: ‘In the case of damage to the means of production the effects of which are felt over 
several years (for example the partial destruction of tree crops by frost) for the first harvest following the 
occurrence of the adverse event the percentage real loss in comparison with a normal year, [. . .] must 
exceed 10 % and the percentage real loss multiplied by the number of years in which production is lost must 
exceed 20 % in the less-favoured areas and 30 % in other areas,’ (EC, 2000) 
(42) See Section 4.4.1. 
 99 
in other sectors was not applied to agriculture. However, the procedure for notifying 
State aid was criticised for being too heavy, in particular for small amounts of aid 
intended for delivery without delay. Member States needed more flexibility, in 
particular concerning these small amounts.’ 
‘Very small amounts of aid granted in the agricultural and fisheries sector do not have 
to be regarded as distortive to the internal market, provided certain conditions are 
met. [. . .] For these reasons, the Commission adopted a regulation on de minimis aid 
in the agricultural and fisheries sector, allowing a maximum of EUR 3 000 per farmer 
to be paid over any three-year period. The total amount of de minimis aid granted to 
all farming enterprises in a Member State over three years must remain below a 
ceiling set by the Commission of about 0.3 % of the value of its total agricultural 
output, in order not to affect trade between Member States or distort competition. 
Export aids and aid conditional upon the use of domestic over foreign products, as 
well as any aid fixed on the basis of the price or quantity of the product placed on the 
market, are excluded from the de minimis exemption. Within these limitations, 
Member States may spend the money in any way they consider appropriate and 
without any delay.’ (EC, 2005b, pp. 10–11).  
 
4.6. Disaster and crisis definitions, policies and aid in the 
EU-27 member countries 
Through the fact sheets, national experts provided information on the Member States’ 
definitions of disaster and crisis which are eligible for aid, as well as the definitions of 
insurable risks, when they exist. These definitions are shown in Table 5.  
 
Table 5. Definitions of disaster 
Country Definition, concept 
Austria — Catastrophe: The catastrophe fund compensates extraordinary losses such 
as flood, avalanches and storm. The compensation of loss by the 
catastrophe fund is linked to the condition that there is a disaster defined by 
the public authorities. But there is no legal title of compensation. 
— Most of the financial contributions of the public fund are used for preventive 
measures.  
— Insurable risk: Only a small part from the catastrophe fund is reserved for the 
support of agricultural insurance (hail and frost). Other insurable risks like 
drought, storm, flood and livestock are without public support to the premium 
paid by farmers.  
— There is no ad hoc aid for insurable risks.  
Belgium According to the Law of 12 July 1976, the agricultural calamities are defined 
as ‘The natural phenomena of exceptional nature and character, or the 
unforeseeable and massive action of noxious organisms only in the case in 
which they have caused important and generalised destruction of soils, crops 
or harvests, as well as the diseases and intoxications of exceptional 
character if they have caused, by mortality of compulsory slaughter, 
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important and generalised losses of animals useful to farming’. The Royal 
Act 6 July 2002, in order to conform to the European legislation, introduces a 
deductible of 30 %.  
Bulgaria — The new Law on Crisis Management defines ‘crisis’ as ‘an unexpected or 
expected change of already established living conditions as a result of 
human activities, events or natural phenomenon, and when the life, the 
health or the property of big groups of people, territories, environment, the 
cultural or the material values of the country are in danger’. The law 
stipulates the publication of a statute for its application but it has not yet been 
published. 
— Insurance is not subsidised. 
(Croatia) — The Law on Protection from Natural Disasters regulates actions (financial 
and other types of help) in the case of disaster. According to the law, disaster 
is a sudden and huge accident that severely interrupts everyday life, causes 
victims, property, infrastructure and/or environmental damages to an extent 
higher than the local community’s ability to eliminate consequences. 
— Disaster could be caused by natural, technical, technological or biological 
events. Earthquakes, (degree VII or more on the Mercalli–Cancani–Seiberg 
scale), fire, floods, drought, hail, frost, high snow, snowdrifts and avalanche, 
ice on the watercourses, landslides and similar phenomena which cause 
significant changes in everyday life are understood as disasters. To obtain 
aid some conditions should be satisfied. The volume of direct damages must 
be higher than 20 % of the local unit annual budget in the last year and the 
yield must be a minimum of 30 % less than the three-year average.  
Cyprus — The first definitions of natural disaster in Cyprus were specified in 1977 when 
the government prepared the first legislation for creating an organisation 
(AIO) and a relevant scheme (agricultural insurance scheme) which was 
initiated in 1978. The major perils which are covered by the Cyprus 
legislation are hail, frost, drought, rain, flood, water spot, windstorm, strong 
dry wind, heatwave and warm dry air. Currently the subsidisation level is 
50 %, which is the maximum possible under the EU’s current guidelines. 
— Some ad hoc aids are given for products not covered by the public scheme, 
but triggers are not specified. 
Czech 
Republic 
According to Act No 586/1992 Coll., concerning income taxes, as amended, a 
natural disaster is defined as accidental fire or explosion, thunderbolt, 
windstorm with wind speed exceeding 75 km per hour, flood, hail, land 
slippage, landslide and rockfall not caused by industrial activity or building 
activity, avalanches or earthquake recording at least fourth degree on the 
international macro-seismic scale. 
Denmark No explicit definition seems to exist. The government has a support scheme that 
grants subsidies in accordance with the Danish Act on Compensation for 
Damage Caused by Storm (storm surge flooding and forest storm damage). 
Estonia Laws are harmonised with EU laws, but no definitions are provided. 
Finland — The Crop Damage Compensation Act has been amended several times 
since 1975. It allows the government to compensate loss of crop yield due to 
frost, hailstorm, pouring rain, storm, unexceptional flood, unexceptional 
drought, or other similar and unusual (‘catastrophic’) change in the natural 
conditions, to which an agricultural producer is unable to adapt, unusual 
conditions during the over-wintering, or unusual flood or unusually 
voluminous rain, which prevents a producer from seeding the crop. There is 
a reference yield for each region and crop. Reference yield is the arithmetic 
mean of the average yield of the crop during the past five years in a given 
region. Franchise deductible is 30 %; i.e. producer is eligible for the 
compensation if actual yield (calculated at the farm level) is less than 70 % of 
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the reference yield. The producer must farm in Finland and he must cultivate 
at least 3 ha of field crops or at least 0.5 ha of vegetables (including 
horticulture). The farm must be cultivated in accordance with the common 
agricultural practices of the region. 
— Another public system is the practice of compensating direct losses due to 
highly contagious animal diseases from the State budget. It is based on the 
Animal Disease Act, which has been amended several times in recent 
decades. 
France — The 1964 Law for Agricultural Calamities, modified by the 2006 Orientation 
Law, defines the characteristics of the damages that can be subject to a 
public indemnity from the ‘Agricultural Calamity Regimen’, among them: 
• exceptional character of the climatic phenomenon causing the damages 
(long periods between events, losses intensity), which has to be officially 
established by inter-ministerial decree on the basis of a local assessment 
performed by the administration and of an examination conducted by a 
national administrative corporation; 
• damage for which there is no efficient preventive technique available; 
• in the case of crop losses, they must be above a double threshold: 27 % or 
more of normal crop value and 14 % of the farm gross revenue; the 27 % 
which meant a loss of EUR 27 per EUR 100 of ‘production value + CAP 
aids’, after the single payment has now become 42 % of production value 
alone, regardless of the single payment value. 
— Multi-peril insurance is subsidised at maximum rate of 35 %. 
Germany No definition, in the case of natural disasters the competence is of the federal 
states. 
Greece Disaster and related concepts are defined in the regulation for ‘State financial 
aid’, recently issued by ELGA (1/2006), and are similar to those found in the 
Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture sector (2000/C 28/02). 
Hungary — The definitions of disaster were laid down in Law LXXIX of 1991 on Land 
Taxation. Natural disasters can be, according to Article 7: Drought in all 
cultivation activities; hailstorm, flood, standing water and fire losses in all 
taxable cultivation activities; frost and sand-blast on arable farming, 
horticulture, viticulture and fruit farming. 
— Farmers are eligible for lease reduction or cancellation when the yield does 
not reach two thirds of their average yield. They are eligible for tax and to 
lease reduction or cancellation when the losses exceed 25 % of the yield in 
the affected area or 15 % of the crop yield in the whole farm (since 1994). 
— Direct ex post aids are defined on an ad hoc basis. In the case of the 2003 
extreme drought and frost, the regulation issued established that farmers 
would be entitled to subsidies if the extent of frost and/or drought losses 
together exceeded 30 % in the case of arable crops (including vegetables), 
viniculture, fruit farming, forestation and fishponds. The final amount of the 
compensation is 30 % of the loss value exceeding 30 %. Farmers would be 
entitled to preferential credit if frost and/or drought losses are 20 % or 
greater. 
— Insurance has not been subsidised since 2004. 
Ireland There is no definition of ‘disaster’ used in public policy. Responses to 
situations are on an ad hoc basis. The typical policy response has been to 
seek EU approval for limited measures, such as paying direct payments 
earlier than scheduled.  
Italy — For the purposes of the national farm risk management system, natural 
calamity or exceptional event are those defined in point 11.2 of the 
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‘Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture sector’ (2000/C 28/02) 
and also the adverse atmospheric conditions foreseen in point 11.3 of the 
foresaid orientations. That reference is explicitly contained in the main law 
currently in force on the subject: Legislative Decree 29/March 2004 No 102: 
Reform of the National Solidarity Fund. 
— Insurance is subsidised. There are no explicit definitions. 
Latvia Upon entering the European Union, the definitions which are specified in 
Community guidelines for State aid in the agriculture sector were applied. 
Lithuania Criteria of natural disaster are indicated in Lithuanian Government Resolution 
No 241 ‘Regarding confirmation of criteria of extreme events’ of 9 March 
2006. Natural events which cause more than 20 % of losses in average 
agricultural production in LFAs and more than 30 % of losses in other areas 
are considered to be a natural disaster. 
Luxembourg — There is no definition of ‘disaster’ used in public policy. No ad hoc aid has 
been given. 
— The EC guidelines are followed in insurance subsidisation. 
Netherlands — There is a general law on indemnity payments for disasters but the 
government has announced that this is no longer applicable for agriculture. 
Weather adversaries are considered to be normal risks for which the 
taxpayer does not have to pay. 
— For livestock there are funds that are sector-wide and ultimately financed by 
all the farmers until a maximum per sector. It is a fund for epidemic livestock 
diseases, concerning cattle, pigs, poultry, sheep and goats. It is financed by 
farmers through levies on the production of milk, meat, etc. When the costs 
of suppression of an epidemic outbreak reach a certain level, agreed in 
advance, the government will carry the costs. 
Poland No explicit definition seems to exist. The government offers ad hoc aid in the 
case of tremendous natural disasters (i.e. flood), but we could not find any 
regulation fixing the conditions under which an event can be considered as a 
disaster. 
Portugal — Aid is given by the fund for losses caused by risks not covered by the current 
crop insurance products, in those cases where a calamity situation is 
officially declared both by the Ministry of Finances and by the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Rural Development and Fisheries. 
— Climatic agricultural calamity is defined as the happening of phenomena, 
exclusively climatic, with an exceptional character, which cause a 
generalised damage on crop production of at least 50 %, resulting from this 
in an important decrease in the farmers’ yields. The determination of the 
damages refers to the yields usually obtained in the region, calculated on the 
basis of the average obtained in the last six years, with exclusion of the year 
of lowest productivity. 
Romania — According to Law 381/2002, natural phenomena and diseases are 
considered to be the following: excessive drought, floods coming from 
overflowing rivers, or broken bridges, heavy rains, excessively low 
temperatures below the biological resistance limit of the plant, heavy 
snowfalls which cause loss in vegetal and livestock sectors, rapid melting of 
snow which causes floods, rivers overflowing, hurricanes. 
— The indemnities are granted to the agricultural producers as follows. 
• For agricultural crops and plantations affected by calamities, only for 
losses which exceed 30 % of production, the maximum level of 
indemnities being 70 % of the expenses made until the date the event 
occurred. 
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• For animals, birds, bees’ families and fish, the indemnity represents 
maximum of 80 % of the insurance value, diminished with the value of 
the resulting by-products which can be commercialised according to legal 
provisions.  
— The agricultural producers benefit from the stipulation of this law if they are 
affected by natural phenomena presented above and if they are located in a 
calamity area declared by governmental decision, and if their crops, 
plantations, animals, fowls, or fish are insured by insurance companies 
approved by the Ministry of Agriculture.  
Slovakia No information 
Slovenia — According to the Slovenian law a natural disaster is a ‘disaster caused by 
earthquake, flood, landslide and snow slide and disasters in agriculture and 
forestry caused by adverse weather conditions’. The causes for disaster in 
agriculture and forestry are sleet, frost, drought, storm and hail. In addition, 
mass outbreak of plant or animal diseases and pests are included. 
— The Law on Natural Disaster Relief (Official gazette No 114/2005; p. 12354) 
is related to the Law on protection from natural and other disasters (Official 
gazette RS No 21/2006; p. 5609). 
— Disaster aid is paid to the applicant if the evaluated damage resulting from 
natural disaster reaches 30 % of normal production; whereas for the less-
favoured areas (LFAs) the limit is set at 20 %. If a natural disaster results in a 
long-term production potential deterioration (e.g. perennials), the aid is paid 
when the production in the first year after the natural disaster occurrence is 
reduced by 10 %. Moreover, in all the following years in which the production 
is reduced due to the natural disaster, the total damage has to add up to 
30 % of a standard annual production and for the LFAs the damage is set at 
20 %. 
Spain — For ad hoc measures, a legal declaration by the government is necessary. 
Damages must be caused by extraordinary phenomena. There is no explicit 
mention of definition of crisis and disaster. The guidelines implicitly apply. Aid 
can only be given for non-insured risks. 
— According to the Spanish law, it is permitted to insure all the damages 
produced by natural phenomena which cannot be managed by the farmer, 
always under the condition that the losses are higher than a minimum 
threshold, established in every insurance contract. 
Sweden — Ad hoc measures for climatic calamities not covered by insurance: There is 
no particular definition of disaster, and the Swedish policy is to apply these 
measures restrictively. Until now no such compensation has been paid. The 
government does not consider the market has suffered from any obvious 
market failures.  
— Regulated measures for infectious diseases, contaminated feed, plant pests 
and radioactive fall-out: The Swedish Board of Agriculture is responsible for 
the management and combat of these disasters. Regarding infectious 
disease there is a pre-existing system for compensation payments. For the 
other types of disasters mentioned, ad hoc compensations apply. Farmers do 
not pay any explicit fee. 
(Turkey) — On aid given for natural disasters (1977): Aid is given to farmers and 
agricultural production cooperatives whose farms, agricultural products, 
livelihood stocks, and production means and facilities are damaged or have 
completely vanished because of fire, earthquake, landslide, storm, flood, 
frost, hail, drought, pests and diseases, etc. and whose working and 
production conditions suffer a significant collapse, that is, either (a) a loss of 
40 % (in terms of value) damage on products, production factors and 
facilities, with no other agricultural and other income to compensate for this 
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loss and no possibility to barrow from money landing banks, cooperatives 
and other such institutions; or (b) in the case where less than 40 % of 
production, production factors or facilities are damaged, there is no possibility 
of barrowing credit and there are no other income sources and, thus, no 
possibility to continue agricultural activity and to survive. 
— On insurable risks (Law 2005): the cover for losses caused by drought, hail, 
flood, storms, whirlwind tornadoes, earthquakes, fire, accidents, pests and 
animal diseases for crops, greenhouses, agricultural buildings, agricultural 
machinery and livestock and/or other risks considered as important for 
agriculture shall be determined by the Council of Ministers upon the 
proposals of the Committee. 
 
UK — There is no definition, no legislation and no disaster assistance for crops. 
— Livestock: A ‘notifiable disease’ is a disease named in Section 88 of the 
Animal Health Act 1981 or an ‘Order’ made under that Act.  
— Insurance is not subsidised. 
Note: Croatia and Turkey are in parentheses because they are not yet part of the EU. 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets. 
 
Some of the countries have the constraint that aid must not be given in the case of 
crisis or disaster due to an insurable risk. This is the case for Austria, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and Turkey for subsidised insurable risks and in France if 
insurance has reached a significant diffusion level. 
As can be seen from the definitions in Table 5, most EU States follow the Community 
guidelines (2000) on agriculture in order to decide when they are going to bestow aid. 
We have classified the Member States in four groups according to their observance 
of the guidelines: some of them incorporate or explicitly mention the guideline 
definitions in their legislation; others just assume them without explicit mention; some 
others have a definition more restrictive than that established in the guidelines, as is 
the case for the calamity fund system in France. Lastly, some States have less-
restrictive definitions than those in the guidelines (43). Table 6 summarises which 
Member States follow more or less closely the Community guidelines. 
 
 
                                            
(43) As such, the guidelines were not enforcing but ‘advisory’, so countries were not obliged to follow them. This 
situation has changed since the entry into force of the regulation.  
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Table 6. States’ crisis and disaster definitions in relation to their following of the 
agricultural guidelines 
Explicitly 
mention the EC 
guidelines 
definition 
EC guidelines 
with no explicit 
mention in 
legislation 
More restrictive 
definition 
Less restrictive 
definition Unknown 
Belgium Finland Austria Bulgaria Denmark 
Cyprus Germany France Czech Republic Poland 
Estonia Ireland Portugal Hungary Slovakia 
Greece Luxembourg Romania  Malta 
Italy Spain Netherlands   
Latvia  Sweden   
Lithuania  UK   
Slovenia     
Legend:  
Explicitly mention the EC guidelines definition: means that the Member State’s official definition of risks eligible for 
State aid reproduces and/or cites the guidelines. 
EC guidelines with no explicit mention in legislation: means that Member State follows the guidelines, but does 
not mention them. 
More restrictive definition: means that the Member State’s definitions of risks eligible for State aid comply with the 
guidelines and are sometimes even stricter.  
Less restrictive definition: means that the Member State’s definitions of risks eligible for State aid do not follow the 
guidelines. 
Unknown: information is not provided by the Member State. 
Notes: 
As Croatia and Turkey are still not part of EU they are not included in the table. Croatia has a less restrictive 
official definition of disaster and crisis; Turkey has a more restrictive official definition of disaster and crisis but a 
less restrictive one for insurance subsidies. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from information in fact sheets provided by the experts in each country (2006).  
 
This classification for the Member States which do not exactly follow the guidelines is 
justified by the following highlights.  
 
- EU States with a more restrictive definition: 
Austria: Disaster defined by the public authorities related to the occasion; no aid for 
insurable risks. 
France: Crop losses above a higher threshold: 42 % of the production value of the 
damaged crop and 14 % of the whole farm gross revenue. It also requires that no 
efficient preventive technique be available. 
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Portugal: Damage on crop production of at least 50 % [. . .] of the yields usually 
obtained in the region. 
Romania: Additional condition that their crops, plantations or animals are insured by 
insurance companies approved by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
Netherlands, Sweden and the UK: No aid is given for climatic risks on crops, only 
for livestock diseases  
 
- EU States with a less restrictive definition: 
Bulgaria: more general definition. 
Czech Republic: More detailed specification of defined risks called ‘natural 
disasters’. 
Hungary: More risks defined as ‘natural disasters’; Lower triggers, 15 % or 20 %, 
applying for some kinds of support, like preferential credit or tax and lease reduction 
and cancellation. 
 
4.7. Discussion on a disaster definition common for the EU  
From the analysis of the EU and Member States’ definitions of disaster and crisis we 
have seen that the whole system misses a common definition and attitude against 
risks and disasters. In the current policy context, where the EU agriculture is going in 
the direction of a more liberalised market, the EU legislation on matter of risk could 
be adapted to the changes by providing or allowing further protection against climatic 
and market risks. This adaptation should take into account the conditions set in the 
WTO agreements. Further than the definitions established by the new regulation, we 
suggest completing them with the information learnt from the Member States’ 
individual experiences and the authors’ reflections. 
 
If a common EU definition was to be applied to all member countries, it could take 
into consideration the following aspects:  
— the exceptional character of the climatic, geophysical or biological phenomenon; 
— a minimum number of farms or a surface large enough must be affected; 
— minimum thresholds for the losses should be established at crop level and/or at 
farm level (these already exist in the European Guidelines and Regulation (EC 
2006a, EC 2006b) 
— an official declaration of disaster should be required (this implies the need to 
establish a fast procedure) 
— no efficient preventive technique should be available 
— no insurance should be available 
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4.8. The state of the discussion on the options on an EU 
risk management policy  
 
4.8.1. The communication from the Commission to the Council 
The communication from the Commission to the Council on risk and crisis 
management in agriculture (COM(2005) 74) (EC, 2005a) had the purpose to launch a 
discussion on risk and crisis management in the framework of the CAP reform. It 
fulfils the Commission’s commitment to the Agricultural Council when the CAP reform 
was agreed. The mandate of the Council had two aspects. 
— Whether it was appropriate to include provision for crisis in each common 
market organisation (CMO), as exists in the CMO for beef. This latter option is 
rejected. This first option was rejected in the Commission communication. 
— How some of the funds generated by the new ‘modulation’ mechanism might be 
used to finance risk, crisis and disaster measures in agriculture (44).  
A Commission staff working document (EC, 2005b), linked to the communication, 
analyses several types of risks and crises in agriculture, and the measures that have 
been applied in recent years. The possible support to insurance in this scheme would 
come from the funds assigned to the second CAP pillar. 
The communication from the Commission to the Council (EC, 2005a), proposes a 
few possible measures to help farmers in the European Union manage risks. The aim 
is to help farms resist temporary shocks and improve their access to finance. Such 
measures would in any case differ from the type of guarantees provided by the ‘old’ 
CAP. Three main options are identified. They refer to agricultural insurance, mutual 
funds and to an income crisis tool. Specific training for farmers on the use of risk 
management instruments within rural development programmes is also mentioned.  
The communication specifies that ‘the wide range of risk management tools available 
in the Member States could be developed further to help to improve competitiveness 
and the economic sustainability of farm enterprises. However, these tools cannot and 
are not intended to offer the kind of guarantees provided by the former CAP, but 
would rather help the farm business withstand temporary shocks and improve its 
access to finance for the development of its activities. It is with this perspective that 
the development and availability of risk management instruments might usefully be 
encouraged’ (EC, 2005a, p. 4). 
‘The Commission has looked at a number of options for encouraging the 
development of risk management tools and providing an improved response in the 
event of crisis. The Commission suggests that the potential of certain possibilities 
                                            
(44) http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/publi/communications/risk/index_en.htm 
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should be assessed, from the point of view of individually or jointly, completely or 
partially replacing Community and Member States’ ad hoc emergency measures. If 
introduced to the menu of rural development measures, these options would be 
available for Member States and regions to take up and use, according to their 
specific priorities for the next programming period. 
Independent of any decision on the [foresaid options, which are commented on 
below[, the causes of the rather weak development and use of market-based risk 
management tools (insurance, futures market, contract farming) could be addressed 
by training measures within rural development programmes. This would help improve 
awareness of current risks, improve risk management strategies and provide know 
how, for instance on the use of futures and options, which could also lead to a wider 
use of contracts between the food industry, traders, and farmers.’ (EC, 2005a, p. 6) 
 
The three options for risk and crisis management 
The three options identified are as follows. 
— Option 1: contributing to the payment of premiums farmers pay for insurance 
against natural disasters, extreme weather conditions or animal and plant 
diseases. Supporting reinsurance might also be an option.  
— Option 2: encouraging the development of mutual funds for agriculture, by 
granting temporary and digressive support for the funds’ administration.  
— Option 3: launching new instruments to protect farmers in different types of 
income crises.  
 
‘Option 1: Insurance against natural disasters — Financial participation in 
farmers’ premium payments 
Insurance provides an alternative to public ex post compensation payments for 
losses caused by natural disasters at EU and national or regional level. Certain 
Member States have already established national schemes to encourage farmers to 
obtain insurance cover against such events. 
A new measure, eligible under the rural development regulation, could therefore 
provide a financial contribution towards the premiums paid by farmers for insurance 
against income loss as a result of natural disaster or disease. 
The amount granted per farmer under such a measure by EU and national/regional 
support should not exceed 50 % of the total premium cost for the insurance in 
question.  
To be eligible for support from rural development funding, disaster insurance 
schemes must comply with EU agricultural State aid guidelines and WTO green box 
requirements. Insurance schemes eligible for co-financing would determine the level 
of compensation for production losses [. . . , which has to] exceed 30 % of the 
average agricultural production in the preceding three-year period, or a three-year 
average based on the preceding five-year period, excluding the highest and the 
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lowest entry. This measure would require Member States to establish a historical 
reference system at farm level. 
Insurance payments should compensate not more than 100 % of the income loss, at 
the level of the beneficiary, in the year the disaster occurred. [. . .] If the natural 
disaster, in addition to insurance, would trigger eligibility for other public 
compensation, the overall compensation by all schemes should not exceed 100 % of 
the income loss in the year the disaster occurred. 
As many agricultural risks normally affect a large number of farms (systemic risk) 
insurance companies have to buy relatively expensive reinsurance. This is one of the 
reasons why private markets for agricultural insurance are not [everywhere] well 
developed. Thus, a policy measure improving access to reinsurance could also help 
develop private agricultural insurance schemes. As an alternative to supporting 
insurance premiums, the encouragement of national reinsurance schemes could also 
be examined. At the national level, in addition to co-insurance arrangements between 
private insurance companies, governments could:  
(1) offer full reinsurance at reduced prices,  
(2) offer part of the necessary reinsurance at no cost, thus reducing the insurance 
company’s overall need for reinsurance, and 
(3) be a partner for reinsurance via stop loss agreements [(45)]. 
 
Option 2: Supporting mutual funds 
Mutual funds represent a way of sharing risk among groups of producers who want to 
take their own responsibility for risk management. The fund’s capital can be called on 
by members in the event of severe income losses to be specified by predefined rules. 
Up till now agricultural mutual funds, established on private initiative, have been set 
up mainly at a sector-specific level, where producers share comparable risks. While 
they are not currently available to all agricultural holdings they have the potential to 
develop into a more common risk management tool to cover income losses. 
With this in mind, the Community could envisage providing support for developing 
mutual funds in the agricultural sector. Under this option, temporary and degressive 
support for the administrative operation could be granted per farmer participating in 
funds formally recognised by the Member State’s competent authority. 
 
Option 3: Providing basic cover against income crises 
With CAP reform focusing on income stabilisation and decoupling support from 
agricultural production, a generalised approach to respond to income crises seems to 
be more appropriate than any sector-specific approach. A more general cover 
against crises that result in severe income losses would allow existing safety net 
                                            
(45) See the glossary. 
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provisions to be further simplified and improve the balance between different 
agricultural sectors. 
[. . .] if the scope of rural development measures should prove insufficient, the 
question of new instruments to address situations where liquidity problems and 
serious income losses occur must be raised. Any such measures should meet the 
[conditions set by paragraph 7, Annex 2 to the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture (46). These income stabilisation payments] would require agreement on a 
precise, accounting definition of income and for Member States to establish a system 
of reference income at farm level. [. . .]’ (EC, 2005a, pp. 6–8). 
 
4.8.2. The position of the insurance sector 
In April 2005, the European Committee of Insurers (CEA) addressed a letter to the 
Deputy Director-General of the Agriculture and Rural Development the Commission’s 
communication (COM(2005) 74) (see the previous section). Some of the comments 
are shown below. 
— The Agriculture DG’s paper proposes a different level of financial aid to the cost 
of the premium compared with the directive (2000/C 28/02), paragraph 11.5. 
— The provisions of the paper are based on WTO requirements, in particular on 
those of the ‘green box’. Nevertheless, the interpretation of such requirements is 
also quite confusing. The CEA considers it useful to review all the definitions 
under the said ‘green box’. 
In global terms, the position of the insurance companies represented by the CEA 
active in the agriculture sector is that they strongly support the EC initiative, which 
envisages new measures to enable farmers to react in the event of a crisis. They 
welcome the idea to support crop and livestock insurance with subsidies to the cost 
of premiums. They also express their interest in the political measures to improve 
access by insurers to reinsurance. In particular they mention the possibility of 
establishing co-insurance and co-reinsurance systems at a national level, as well as 
a public reinsurance system, possibly supported by the EU common agricultural 
policy (CEA, 2005b). However, according to the report by Wilkens (2003) and to the 
CEA (2005c), they prefer the coexistence of national systems rather than the 
implementation of a standardised European direct insurance system (47).  
                                            
(46) See Section 4.4.2. 
(47) Wilkens justifies his position by arguing that, as a whole, national insurance systems should be formed in 
such a way that they correspond to the agricultural needs of each EU country and their structures. A 
standardised European direct insurance system would not meet these demands. The CEA justifies this 
position by arguing that the wide differences existing between the different countries must be taken into 
account. 
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During the year 2004 the Committee for the Insurance for Agricultural Risks of the 
CEA had elaborated a questionnaire with the aim of establishing the ‘average annual 
amount of losses’, that is, the average ‘risk premium’ (costs of acquisition and 
management not included) needed to cover natural catastrophic risks related to 
agriculture and livestock (only cows, pigs and sheep) on the bases of a combined 
cover. The CEA estimated the ‘average annual amount of losses’ was around 
EUR 3.7 billion for the EU-15 (the 15 Member States before the enlargement) (CEA, 
2004). The CAP budget (direct aids and market measures only) was close to EUR 50 
billion (48) for 2006  (http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/05/ 
489&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en), so it is much higher. 
 
4.9. The US agricultural risk management policy 
Some information on the US agricultural risk management policy is given below for 
information purposes, for comparison with the EU policy, and with the aim of 
clarifying the framework when the US agricultural insurance system and products are 
presented in the next chapter. 
The US agricultural insurance policy is defined in the insurance acts. However, 
agricultural insurance policy is closely related with farm policies, which are settled in 
the farm bills (see Table 7 ).  
 
Table 7. US farm bills and insurance acts 
US farm bills US insurance acts 
1990 Food, Agriculture, Conservation and Trade Act 1980 Act 
1996 Farm Bill 
The Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform Act 
1994 Act 
2002–07 Farm Bill 
The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act 
2000 ARPA 
Agricultural Risk Protection Act 
2008–13 Farm Bill  
Source: Authors’ compilation  
 
Insurance was strongly promoted from the 1994 Act, which opened the way for 
revenue and income insurance products. After the 1996 Farm Bill, an important 
weight of the US farm policy was laid on agricultural insurance. However, by 
establishing the counter-cyclical payments, the 2002 Farm Bill established an 
important public tool for market risk management. 
                                            
(48) In this report 1 billion is 1 000 million.  
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The 2002–07 Farm Bill and counter-cyclical payments 
 
The 2002–07 Farm Bill (49) establishes among other Commodity programmes (Title I), 
a support programme which is directly related with risk management: counter-cyclical 
payments (CCPs). CCPs are subsidies given to farmers by the government 
whenever the commodities’ effective price is lower than a target price established by 
the government. Because they are in an inverse relation with the market price, these 
payments have been called ‘counter-cyclical’. The effective price for a covered 
commodity is equal to the sum of the following: 
(1) The higher of the following: 
(A) The national average market price received by producers during the 12-month 
marketing year for the covered commodity, as determined by the Secretary. 
(B) The national average loan rate for a marketing assistance loan for the covered 
commodity in effect for the applicable period under subtitle B. 
(2) The payment rate in effect for the covered commodity for the purpose of making 
direct payments with respect to the covered commodity. 
The target prices are established in the 2002 Farm Bill. They apply to wheat, maize, 
grain sorghum, barley, oats, upland cotton, rice, soybeans and other oilseeds. 
The payment rate used to make counter-cyclical payments with respect to a covered 
commodity for a crop year shall be equal to the difference between (1) the target 
price for the covered commodity; and (2) the effective price. If counter-cyclical 
payments are required to be paid for any of the 2002 through 2007 crop years of a 
covered commodity, the amount of the counter-cyclical payment to be paid to the 
producers on a farm for that crop year shall be equal to the product of the following: 
(1) The payment rate. 
(2) The payment acres of the covered commodity on the farm. 
(3) The payment yield or updated payment yield for the farm, depending on the 
election of the owner of the farm. 
CCPs are paid according to a fixed yield per farm, so that they are not directly 
coupled to the farmer’s final production. However, the payments are made according 
to the farmers’ most recently seeded surfaces, so they are not completely decoupled 
from production.  
Also, CCPs are commodity-specific payments and they cannot be considered non-
specific. The decoupling is a classification criterion in the green box. But because 
CCPs are dependent on the prices, it can be argued that they are not decoupled from 
prices and, so, not eligible for the green box (Basco et al., 2002). 
 
                                            
(49) http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=107_cong_public_laws&docid=f:publ171.107.pdf 
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The standing disaster assistance programme 
 
The Senate-approved 2008–13 Farm Bill version includes a standing disaster 
assistance programme that is expected to replace the ad hoc aids provided until now. 
The proposed programme would provide compensation based on shortfalls in ‘whole 
farm’ revenue, including all crops produced on the farm. To be eligible for the 
proposed standing disaster payment programme, farms would be required to 
purchase at least the catastrophic level of federal crop insurance. The disaster 
payment programme would compensate farms for 52 % of the difference between 
their disaster payment programme guarantee and their realised total farm revenue. 
For purposes of the proposed programme, realised farm revenue would include 
market revenue, any crop insurance indemnities, and 20 % of any federal direct fixed 
payments. Other federal income support payments (e.g. price or revenue counter-
cyclical payments and loan deficiency payments) would not be included in revenue to 
count against the disaster payment programme guarantee. 
The proposed standing disaster payment programme would also provide authority for 
a permanent livestock indemnity programme. This programme would compensate 
livestock producers for death losses in excess of normal mortality, caused by adverse 
weather conditions (Anderson et al., 2008). 
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5. Existing agricultural insurance systems  
 
5.1. Chapter synthesis 
This chapter describes the agricultural insurance systems existing throughout the 
world, and then the European systems. In the USA, Canada and other non-EU 
countries, there are some insurance instruments developed, such as index 
insurances, area insurances, whole farm insurance or types of revenue insurance 
which are not developed in EU. The EU has mostly classic insurance schemes 
(mainly single-risk and combined insurance, but also yield insurance), mainly private 
except in Greece and Cyprus where insurance is public and compulsory. In many 
countries the market is in the hands of no more than two or three insurance 
companies. 
An overview is given on the main figures of insurance at country level, their 
evaluation and market conditions. On average, in 2004 approximately 23 % of crop 
value was insured. Premiums amounted on average to EUR 1 583 million and 4 % of 
the insured value, and subsidies to EUR 497 million or 32 % of the premiums. Data at 
country level come from two sources: the information collected in the fact sheets and 
information provided by the European Committee of Insurers (CEA). Average loss 
ratios are from 60 % to 70 %. 
Section 5.6 enters into more details about technical aspects of agricultural insurance 
to better explain the countries’ data and the different insurance products. Average 
premiums for hail can vary from 1 % for arable crops to 18 % for fruits. Deductibles, 
franchises, bonus/malus and other techniques are usually used to avoid moral 
hazard and adverse selection. Section 5.7 describes the role of the European 
reinsurance systems. Reinsurance is mostly done from the international reinsurance 
market (Swiss Re, Munich Re, Partner Re, etc.), mainly in the modalities of stop-loss 
and quota-share reinsurance. 
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5.2. General overview of the agricultural insurance 
systems in non-European countries (50) 
A wide range of agricultural insurance schemes based on different approaches exist 
in the world. The following figures and tables give an overview of the main types of 
insurance in the different countries. They can be compared with similar schemes 
available in the EU Member States and candidate countries (Section 5.3). 
The figures represent maps corresponding to the same type of insurance products. 
Figure 48 shows the existence of single-risk and combined insurance schemes. 
Figure 49 addresses yield and income insurances. Figure 50 focuses on index-based 
schemes and Figure 51 points out non-insurance schemes such as calamity funds, 
stabilisation accounts and ad hoc aid. The information shown in the maps is 
contained in Table 8, which follows the figures. Next we comment on the table, 
following the order of the columns, that is, by type of insurance system, which have 
been defined in Section 2.4. 
 
Single- and combined-risk insurance 
Single- and combined-risk insurance schemes are available in most countries, 
predominantly with a basic cover in hail insurance. The particular case of Canada 
and the USA is quite different because, even though there is yield insurance, single-
risk insurance schemes are not popular. In both countries, there is a basic cover 
which corresponds to yield insurance which covers only for losses above 50 % of the 
average yield (it is called CAT or catastrophic cover). It is highly subsidised by the 
government (almost entirely in the USA — where farmers only pay an administrative 
fee — and 50 % in Canada). As the level of cover increases, the subsidy decreases. 
But for any level of cover, the most important risks are included, so it is possible to 
speak of yield insurance at a wide variety of cover levels.  
 
Revenue and income insurance  
The USA is currently the only country where revenue and income insurance exists. In 
the UK there was a private revenue insurance product offered by Dalgety Co. but it 
was soon removed from the market. In Canada there was an income insurance 
named gross revenue insurance plan (GRIP), which also failed, and now there is an 
income stabilisation programme, which will be presented below.  
The USA has developed a wide variety of revenue insurance products: three 
standard revenue insurance products, one livestock price insurance, one livestock 
gross margin insurance, one area revenue index insurance and one whole-farm 
income insurance.  
                                            
(50) For the definitions of agricultural schemes used in this and the following chapter, see Section 2.4. 
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The three standard revenue insurance products are crop revenue cover (CRC), 
revenue assurance (RA) and income protection (IP). Among them, the most popular 
is CRC, which offers the possibility to get a higher price if the market price increases. 
These revenue insurance products apply for the main field crops such as maize, 
soybeans, wheat, rice and cotton. Livestock risk protection (LRP) provides protection 
against declining livestock prices for swine, feeder cattle and fed cattle. Livestock 
gross margin (LGM) protects the gross margin between the value of insured hogs 
and the cost of feed input (maize and soybean meal). The area revenue index 
insurance and the whole-farm income insurance products are introduced below. One 
main characteristic of most of the US insurance products which offer some price risk 
protection is that the reference price is the futures market price and, mainly, the 
guaranteed price is that predicted by the futures market. So, they provide cover 
against the oscillation of the price within the year. Revenue insurance is very 
important in the USA, 73 % of the premiums collected come from these types of 
insurance. 
 
Whole-farm insurance 
In Japan there is a whole-farm insurance which covers against all climatic hazards for 
all crops on the farm. The USA offers an adjusted gross revenue (AGR) insurance, 
which uses a grower’s historic tax information as a basis to calculate a level of 
guaranteed revenue. It can cover both crops and livestock whenever the income 
coming from livestock is less than 35 % of the total income. AGR-Lite is also 
available in limited areas and is identical to AGR with some exceptions. Among 
these, producers are eligible for this programme regardless of the percentage of their 
income which is derived from animals or animal by-products. 
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Figure 48. Single and combined insurance schemes in the world 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration from information in ALASA (1992), ENESA-ID (2004), Ibarra and Mahul (2004), 
Skees et al. (2005), Skees and Enkh-Amgalan (2002), Skees et al. (2001), Stoppa and Hess (2003) and World 
Bank (2005). 
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Figure 49. Yield and revenue insurance schemes in the world 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration from information in ALASA (1992), ENESA-ID (2004), Ibarra and Mahul (2004), 
Skees et al. (2005), Skees and Enkh-Amgalan (2002), Skees et al. (2001), Stoppa and Hess (2003) and World 
Bank (2005). 
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Figure 50. Index-based insurance schemes in the world 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration from information in ALASA (1992), ENESA-ID (2004), Ibarra and Mahul (2004), 
Skees et al. (2005), Skees and Enkh-Amgalan (2002), Skees et al. (2001), Stoppa and Hess (2003) and World 
Bank (2005). 
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Figure 51. Calamity funds and stabilisation account-based insurance schemes and 
ad hoc aid in the world 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration from information in ALASA (1992), ENESA-ID (2004), Ibarra and Mahul (2004), 
Skees et al. (2005), Skees and Enkh-Amgalan (2002), Skees et al. (2001), Stoppa and Hess (2003) and World 
Bank (2005). 
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Table 8. Agricultural insurance systems in non-EU countries 
Country 
Single-
risk 
insurance 
(1) 
Combined 
insurance 
(2) 
Yield 
insurance 
(3) 
Revenue 
insurance 
(4) 
Whole-
farm yield 
insurance 
(5) 
Whole-
farm 
income 
insurance 
(6) 
Area 
index 
insurance 
(7) 
Indirect 
index 
insurance 
(8) 
Stabilisation 
accounts 
(9) 
Calami-
ties 
fund 
(10) 
Ad 
hoc 
aid 
(11) 
Date of 
most 
recent 
info 
available 
Argentina P P - - - - - # - - - 2002–04 
Australia - - - - - - - - S - GF 2000 
Brazil - PS PS - - - PS - - -  2002–04 
Canada (P) - GS   - GS ## S -  2005 
Chile PS  -  - - - - - -  2002–04 
Colombia - PS - - - - - ## - - - 2002–04 
Cuba - G (GS) GS - - - - - - - - 2002–04 
Ethiopia - - - - - - - G#    2005 
Honduras - P - - - - - - -   2006 
India - - - - - - P P#    2005 
Japan  GC+GS GS  GS - - -   GF 2000 
Malawi - - - - - - - ## -   2005 
Mexico  P + PS + 
GS 
 #?      -  2002–04 
Mongolia  P (+GC#)     ## -    2005 
Morocco P PS - - - - PS - -   2005 
Nicaragua       - ##    2005 
Peru - - - - - - - ## -   2005 
South 
Africa P P P -   - -    2002–04 
Ukraine  P (S#) - - - - - P# -  GF 2005 
Uruguay PS P 
Pilot 
experience 
in 2002 
- - - - - - GF - 2002–04 
USA - - PS PS - PS PS - - - GF 2005 
Venezuela  P - - - - - - - GF - 2002–04 
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Legend: 
- Not existing (empty space means that there 
was no information about it) GC Public compulsory partially subsidised 
S Subsidised GF Public free 
P Private non-subsidised # Pilot experience 
PS Private partially subsidised ## On project 
G Public non-subsidised § Failed experience 
GS Public partially subsidised   
Notes: 
Due to the differences in denominations in the different countries, we use the following nomenclature. 
(1) Single-risk insurance means hail, or hail and fire insurance, or one single peril for livestock. 
(2) Combined insurance means a combination of several risks protection. It would be the Italian ‘poli-’ or ‘combined’. 
(3) Yield insurance means multi-peril insurance where the main important risks are comprised (also drought), so some countries call it combined. 
(4) Revenue insurance covers yield and price risks for a single product. 
(5) Whole-farm yield insurance consists of a combination of yield guarantees for the different agricultural productions on a farm; in case of loss, with compensation between 
each other. 
(6) Under whole-farm revenue insurance we include two types of insurance products: those that work as a combination of revenue insurance policies for various crops and/or 
livestock on the farm (in a similar way to whole-farm yield insurance), and also those products which directly cover the total revenue of the farm. 
(7) Area index insurance refers to area yield insurance or area income insurance (indemnities are computed from the decrease on the average yields or income in an area). 
(8) Indirect index insurance reports to those indices of yields or vegetation computed from satellite images, weather-based indices, etc.  
(9) Stabilisation accounts are individual bank accounts for self-insurance but which are publicly regulated or promoted. 
(10) Calamities funds, from single-product funds (crop or livestock) to funds that cover not only agricultural production. 
(11) Ad hoc aid is government aid after a calamity or catastrophe. 
Sources: Authors’ elaboration from information in ALASA (1992), ENESA-ID (2004), Ibarra and Mahul (2004), Skees et al. (2005), Skees and Enkh-Amgalan (2002), Skees et 
al. (2001), Stoppa and Hess (2003) and World Bank (2005). 
 
  124 
Index insurances 
Index insurances differ from the other type of insurances in that the indemnities are 
not computed from the individual farmer’s loss but from a parameter or index external 
to the farm. They have been divided into two categories: area index insurance (the 
index is directly an area average yield or income) and indirect index insurance (other 
kind of indices, such as the vegetation indices computed from satellite images). The 
reason for this division is that the latter are more complex and so more difficult to 
understand or to trust for the farmers. Even if all of them have a short history, the 
area index insurance schemes have been experienced for some years in some 
countries (Brazil , Canada, India or the USA), while the indirect indices are brand new 
and are only under study in most countries.  
The area index insurance is most often based on the yields of an homogeneous 
area, so that if the area yield decreases below a given value, all the insured farmers 
in that area get an indemnity independent of their having a loss or not. An example of 
this is the group risk plan (GRP) in the USA. There is also another area insurance 
available in the USA, group risk income protection (GRIP), for which the index is the 
‘area revenue’; that is the product of the area yield times the price of the specific 
product. In 2004, area yield and area revenue policies accounted for 7.4 % of total 
acreage insured but less than 3 % of total premiums.  
One particular case has been included in the area indices: Mongolia. The insurance 
policy that could be implemented in Mongolia in a near future is for livestock, and it is 
based on area mortality rates. This is possible because Mongolia performs a 
complete census of every species each year (Skees et al. 2005).  
Regarding the indirect indices, the World Bank is promoting this kind of product as a 
tool for developing countries, sometimes for the individual farmers, sometimes for the 
governments, so that they get funds to give aid to the rural population when there is a 
catastrophe. In the case of Nicaragua, a weather index insurance was offered to the 
government with this purpose, but the government considered it unnecessary 
because ‘they could depend on the global community for assistance when major 
catastrophes occurred’ (World Bank, 2005).  
 
Stabilisation accounts  
Following the order of the columns in Table 8, stabilisation accounts are present in 
some countries. As mentioned before, these stabilisation accounts are individual 
accounts where farmers put an amount of money every year, which they can 
withdraw in a year of big losses. They can be based on yields, revenues or other 
indices. These particular accounts are considered because they are not self-
insurance accounts created under the farmers’ own initiative but they are supported 
and usually regulated by the government. The support can be given by means of 
direct subsidies complementing the farmers’ contributions to the accounts, and/or by 
means of fiscal incentives. In the case of Australia, the account has fiscal incentives 
and the farmer can freely choose when he wants to withdraw the money. As a 
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curiosity, there is also an example of a stabilisation account in Spain. It is available to 
potato producers in only one province (Alava) and it is based on an area index. It 
benefits both from fiscal incentives and from subsidies from the regional government. 
The Canadian system is mainly led by public insurance agencies, from the provincial 
governments. It profits from subsidies from both the federal and the provincial 
governments, which total EUR 425.5 million and which amount to 66 % of the 
premiums. Besides yield insurance products similar to those in the USA, it has an 
important income programme: Canadian agricultural income stabilisation (CAIS), 
which consists on a stabilisation account. It started in 2003 and substitutes two 
former programmes: net income stabilisation account (NISA) and Canadian farm 
income program (CFIP), an income disaster assistance programme. CAIS is based 
on a farm’s production margin, or farm revenue minus expenses directly related to a 
commodity’s production (such as fuel, fertiliser, pesticide and feed costs). The CAIS 
programme is a whole-farm programme available to eligible farmers regardless of the 
commodities they produce. A programme payment is generated when a producer’s 
current year production margin falls below that producer’s reference margin, which is 
based on an average of the previous five-year programme margins less the highest 
and lowest. Producers are required to open a CAIS account at a participating 
financial institution and deposit an amount based on the level of protection they have 
chosen. For a disaster level of cover (0 % to 70 % of their reference margin) 
producers must deposit an amount equal to 20 % of their reference margin; the other 
80 % is put up by the federal and provincial governments. For a second tier of 
protection (71 % to 85 % of the reference margin), producers must deposit an 
amount equal to 30 % (and the governments 70 %). Finally, if producers choose for 
their protection (86 % to 100 % of their reference margin), they must deposit an 
amount equal to 50 % (and the governments 50 %). Under the programme, 
governments pay increasing portions of the payment as the seriousness of the 
income decline increases. But governments only provide their share of funding when 
producers withdraw funding from their accounts. 
The programme now includes cover for negative margins (programme margins which 
fall below zero). CAIS participants will be eligible for cover of 60 % of their negative 
margins should they occur. The negative margins payments will be fully funded by 
the federal and provincial governments, without the need for further producer 
deposits. 
 
Calamities funds and ad hoc aid 
The calamities funds and ad hoc aid are all forms of aid given by the provincial 
governments under the declaration of catastrophes. The ad hoc aid is ex post aid 
which has to be budgeted after a catastrophe has occurred, while the funds are 
provided every year by the government and they are regulated. The main advantage 
of the funds over the ad hoc aid is that they avoid big distortions of the government 
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budget. Funds sometimes also receive contributions from the private sector, usually 
compulsory, in the form of levies on production or levies on insurance premiums.  
 
5.3. General overview of agricultural insurance systems in 
Europe 
This section describes in a general way the insurance systems existing in Europe. A 
more in-depth analysis of the European reality is undertaken in the coming sections. 
The figures and table shown in this section are similar and can be compared with 
those shown in Section 5.2 on risk management instruments in the world. The figures 
show maps corresponding to the same type of insurance products.  
On the map shown in Figure 52, the existence of single-risk, combined and yield 
insurance schemes is illustrated together with the presence of public involvement. 
The information shown in the map is contained also in Table 9, and is commented on 
later in the text. 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration from fact sheet information.  
Figure 52. Single, combined and yield insurance schemes in Europe 
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Table 9. Agricultural insurance systems in Europe 
Country Single-risk insurance 
Combined 
insurance 
Yield 
insurance 
Revenue 
insurance 
Whole-
farm yield 
insurance 
Indirect 
index 
insurance 
Belgium P - - - - - 
Bulgaria P P - - - - 
Czech Rep. PS PS - - - - 
Denmark P - - - - - 
Germany P - - - - - 
Estonia P (1) - - - - - 
Ireland P - - - - - 
Greece P GC + GS +
 G 
- - - - 
Spain PS PS PS #§ (4) - PS 
France P P PS # PS ## 
Italy PS PS PS - - - 
Cyprus GC GC - - - - 
Latvia PS - - - - - 
Lithuania PS - - - - - 
Luxembourg PS PS PS ## (1) - - 
Hungary P P - - - - 
Netherlands P - - - - - 
Austria PS PS PS - - # 
Poland P (S#) P (S#) (3) - - - - 
Portugal PS PS - - - - 
Romania PS PS - - - - 
Slovenia PS (2) P - - - - 
Slovakia PS PS - - - - 
Finland P (1) P (1) - - - - 
Sweden P P - - - - 
UK P - - - - § 
Legend: 
- Not existing GC Public compulsory partially subsidised 
S Subsidised GF Public free 
P Private non-subsidised # Pilot experience 
PS Private partially subsidised ## On project 
G Public non-subsidised § Failed experience 
GS Public partially subsidised   
Notes: 
(1) Livestock only. 
(2) A national programme in Slovenia for subsidizing insurance in 2006 for the first time (subsidies from 30 to 
50 % of the premium) 
(3) Offered but bought very rarely while no subsidies. 
(4) The failure of this pilot revenue insurance experience in Spain was due to the little interest expressed by the 
farmers. This insurance product was offered only for one agricultural product (potato) and for only five 
provinces. It lasted two years. 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets data provided by the experts in each country in 2006 (Malta is 
missing). 
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Table 10. Agricultural insurance systems in other European countries 
Country Single-risk insurance 
Combined 
insurance 
Yield 
insurance 
Revenue 
insurance 
Whole-farm 
yield 
insurance 
Indirect 
index 
insurance 
Croatia PS PS - - - - 
Turkey PS PS PS - - - 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheet data provided by the experts in each country 
 
Single-risk insurance 
Single-risk insurance for hail is the most developed insurance with a long history and 
exists in all countries. For several countries, in particular Belgium, Germany, Ireland, 
the Netherlands and the UK, hail insurance or single-products insurance are the main 
insurance product available. Probably there is no broad cover provided in these 
countries because of the missing public support for insurance. Besides, if we look at 
the risk maps in the chapter on production and income variability in Europe (Chapter 
3), we can confirm that these countries, mainly the UK, Ireland, the Netherlands, 
Denmark or even Germany, correspond to the countries with lower climatic risks (see 
dry matter, drought, rain at harvest, and freeze maps). 
In some northern countries and also in the Baltic States there is less demand on crop 
insurance or they are starting to develop their systems, as is the case in Poland, 
Latvia and Lithuania. 
 
Combined-risk insurance 
In Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Slovakia and 
Sweden, single- and combined-risk insurance is available. Again, if we look at the 
maps in Chapter 4, we see that these regions in general have higher risks than those 
considered previously. For example Sweden has high freeze risks, Poland has rain at 
harvest, freeze and drought risks, and Portugal has drought risks. However, in 
combined insurance, only hail and a few additional risks like fire, frost, rain and wind 
are covered. The cover against drought, as one of the most difficult insurable 
systemic risks (because a large area can be affected), is usually not included in 
combined-risk insurance, whereas it is usually in the wide cover against all climatic 
risks of yield insurance. 
In Finland, with high risks related to low temperatures, private crop insurance is less 
developed but a public crop compensation scheme is provided to compensate yield 
losses after natural disasters.  
The schemes in Greece and Cyprus are different: a compulsory insurance system is 
provided by the public sector. 
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Yield insurance  
Yield insurance guarantees the main risks affecting production. So, in the case of 
crops, the main risks affecting the yield (e.g. drought) are comprised. It exists in 
Spain, Italy, Austria and since recently in France. Again, as can be verified from the 
maps in Chapter 3, Spain and Italy are some of the countries with the highest drought 
and pasture reduction risk levels, and rain at harvest constitutes a risk for Italy, 
Austria and also Poland. Poland has no yield insurance but insurance is developing 
fast and subsidies to insurance have recently been introduced (2007). The countries 
with highest income risk are again Spain, France, Italy, Portugal, and Sweden; so we 
can see that in general, even if not total, there is a high correspondence between risk 
and insurance risk cover: countries with higher risk levels correspond to insurance 
covering more risks; and countries with more public sector involvement in the 
insurance system correspond to countries with cover of highly systemic risks, such as 
drought.  
The Spanish insurance system is the most developed in Europe: insurance policies 
cover most risks affecting agricultural yields. The government, farm unions and 
insurance companies agreed that the farm insurance system defined in a law would 
be the tool for managing catastrophic damages in the farm sector. One of the specific 
characteristics of the Spanish agricultural insurance system is that all the insurance 
companies operate within a pool, which assumes the risk in a co-insurance regime.  
In Austria the insurance industry founded one specialised mutual insurance company 
providing broad cover in yield insurance. Also in Italy, France and Luxembourg 
agricultural insurance is well developed and most risks are covered, depending on 
the contracts. Mostly there is basic cover for hail and, in addition, a yield insurance 
covering the most important risks in the country. In the majority of cases there is also 
a high level of public support in these countries. 
 
Income/revenue insurance 
Whole-farm income insurance and area yield/area revenue insurance do not exist in 
Europe. 
 
Index insurance 
Area index insurance has been commented on with the examples of GRP and GRIP 
in the USA and Mongolia in the previous chapter. In Europe this kind of insurance 
does not exist. 
Regarding indirect indices, there are three examples in Europe. From the information 
gathered through the Member State fact sheets compilation, it appears that probably 
the first country where indirect indices insurance have been commercialised is Spain, 
where an insurance product for pastures has been available since 2001 based on 
vegetation indices computed on coarse resolution satellite images.  
In Austria an indirect index insurance based on meteorological data for the cover of 
arable crops against drought risk was commercialised for the first time in 2007.  
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In the United Kingdom an index-based insurance programme was launched in 1998 
based on the yield statistics of the Home Grown Cereals Authority and prices based 
upon the LIFFE commodity futures. The cover provided indemnity for a 10 % fall in 
yield and a 5 % fall in price. Premium rates varied depending on the region from 
1.10 % to 3.5 %. Take-up was minimal and the product offer was cancelled in the 
following season. 
 
5.4. Comparison of the EU and US agricultural insurance 
systems 
Insurance in the USA is private but subsidised and benefits from public reinsurance. 
Currently, 17 companies are involved, and among the main ones are Ace Property 
and Casualty Insurance Company, Hartford Fire Insurance Company, and Rural 
Community Insurance. They work in agreement with the government’s Risk 
Management Agency (RMA), which is part of the USDA (United Sates Department of 
Agriculture). 
 
Table 11. Comparison of US and EU-25 crop insurance aggregate data 
 Unit USA EU-25 
Total production value 2004  Million EUR 
81 560 total crops 
(of which 50 154 field 
crops (1)) 
161 923 
Currently insured production 
value  
Million EUR 37 000 36 730 
Shared of insured production 
value on total/insurable 
% 45/74 23/? 
Premiums Million EUR 3 300 1 538 
Share of premium on insured 
value 
% 9 4 
Subsidies Million EUR 1 900 497 
Share of subsidies on 
premiums 
% 
58 
 (72 including 
administrative costs 
and reinsurance) 
32 
Note: 
EUR 1 = USD 1 273 (September 2006). 
(1) From a total crop production of EUR 81 560 million, EUR 50 154 million correspond to field crops, which are 
the crops considered insurable in the USA. 
Sources: Approximate values calculated from data in CEA (2005) Data, World Bank (2005), Rain and Hail 
Insurance Society (2005) and AGmanager.info 
(http://www.agmanager.info/crops/insurance/risk_mgt/rm_html05/ABksLR.asp). 
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Approximately 45 % of crops produced in the USA are insured while in Europe only 
approximately 23 %. The average premium rates in the USA (9 %) are much higher 
than in Europe (4 %), most probably because they correspond in a big proportion to 
revenue insurance schemes and in a lower proportion to yield insurance schemes, 
whereas in Europe they correspond to single-risk, multi-risk and yield insurance 
schemes. The premium subsidies in the USA amount to EUR 1 900 million, which 
corresponds to 58 % of the total risk premiums. The US government also provides 
funds for the administrative costs of the insurance companies and reinsurance. The 
total support thus provided to insurance would amount to 72 % of the total premiums. 
European subsidies to insurance premiums are around EUR 500 million (32 %). 
 
5.5. Main insurance data at country level 
Collecting basic information on the situation of agricultural insurance schemes in 
countries of the EU is not straightforward. Few or no figures at all can be found in the 
standard statistical sources. Collection has been undertaken by two channels:  
— through a series of experts (consultants, insurance companies, public 
organisations), who have accepted to provide such information in the fact 
sheets described in the introduction; 
— through the members of the Agricultural Risks Insurance Committee from the 
European Insurance Committee (Comité Européen des Assurances (CEA)). 
Some information has been extracted from a document entitled ‘European 
insurance system for agricultural risks’ (CEA, 2005a), which contains a number 
of very valuable quantitative indications, suitable for comparison of the situation 
in different Member States. Additional work is certainly needed to complete 
data, check its comparability and analyse the differences. 
 
5.5.1. Insurance demand and market penetration 
One fact interesting to analyse is the demand for insurance, which can be expressed 
in absolute terms as the number of insured farms, the insured surface or the insured 
value. It can also be expressed in relative terms — in per cent — as the proportion of 
insured farms of the total farms, as the insured surface of the total surface or as the 
insured capital of the total production value. In these cases, we speak of market 
penetration or of participation rates. Sometimes, the market penetration is not 
expressed as a percentage of the total value or total surface, but as a percentage of 
the insurable value or insurable surface. The definition of insurable depends on the 
country and the insurance system, but often only those crops for which an insurance 
product exists are considered instead of all crops, and it is similar for livestock (Bielza 
et al., 2004). 
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Table 12. Demand for crop and animal insurance: farms, area and animals 
Country and 
insurance 
systems 
Years 
availa-
ble 
Number of 
farms  
(number 
of 
contracts) 
Insured 
farms of 
insurabl
e farms 
(%) 
Total area 
insured 
(ha) 
Insured 
area of 
insur-
able 
area 
(%) 
Insured 
area of 
total 
agricul-
tural 
area 
(%) 
Number 
of 
animals 
covered 
Insured 
animals 
of 
eligible 
animals
(%) 
Belgium °  1993–04 - - - - - - - 
Bulgaria •♦ (2) 2000–05 - - 1 275 989 52 - 14 519 000 62 
Czech 
Republic •♦ 2000–05 4 000 - 1 072 667 35 35 - 85 
Denmark °♦ 2001–05 - 95 - - 82.5 - - 
Germany °♦ 2000–05 - - 7 265 071 - 43 - - 
Estonia ♦ 2005 - - 0 % 0 0 7 136 6 
Ireland ° - - - - - - - - 
Greece 
compulsory 
ELGA •♦ 
- - (100) - (100) - - (100) 
Greece private 
•♦♠ (3) 2000–04 987 < 1 5 300 < 1 - - - 
Spain ♣♦♠ (3) 2001–05 (477 354) - 5 849 598 - - 102 854 756 - 
France ♣ 1996–04 60 000 15 3 507 186 (6) - - - - 
Italy ♣ (5)  2001–05 84 373 (212 733) - 975 667 - 8 - - 
Cyprus •  2005 (49 954) 100 112 173 100 - 0 0 
Latvia °♦ 2000–05 54 < 1 - < 1 < 1 - < 1 
Lithuania °♦ 2004–05 2 062 - 9 000 < 1 < 1 164 647 < 1 
Luxembourg♣  2001–05 1 555 57 26 000 45 45 - - 
Hungary •♦ 1999–05 14 108 -  52 30   
Netherlands° (
4) - - - - - - Fund Fund 
Austria ♣♦ 2000–05 68 851 (78 418) 78 1 053 991 78 46 270 911 14 
Poland °♦ - - 3 (1) - 6.6 - - > 4 
Portugal • 1998–03 77 954 40 298 329 22 22 - - 
Romania •♦ 2005 43 000 1 812 109 - 12 141 360 (7) 8 
Slovenia •♦  2000–05 (65 992) - - 17 - - 16 
Slovakia •♦ 2000–04 - - - - - - - 
Finland ♦  1996–05 20 600 30 - - - - - 
Sweden •♦ 2005 - - 1 500 000 60  80 730 700 91 
UK °♦ - - - 370 000 - 6.9 1 280 000 2.6 
(Croatia) •♦ 2000–04 (24 726) - - - 3 61 917 13 
(Turkey) °♦ 1996–06 (192 390) - 439 200 - 1.8 - 0.3 
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Legend: 
° Hail insurance for crops ♦ Livestock insurance 
• Combined insurance (possibly single-risk for 
some crops)  
♠ Fish/forest insurance 
♣ Yield insurance (possibly single or combined for 
some crops) 
- Not available 
(1) Only crops. Livestock excluded. 
(2) There are no official data about the agricultural insurance market in Bulgaria. For this reason, all data is 
based on interviews with senior experts from leading insurance companies.  
(3) Aquaculture is included in Greece and Spain. In the number of animals, poultry insurance is included in 
Spain. 
(4) Data from the Netherlands are for hail and glasshouse insurance. Most data are not supplied by the 
companies, for reasons of competition. 
(5) Animal insurance data are not available for Italy because they are not subsidised. The insured values and 
premiums data include crops and structures. 
(6) Only the area from subsidised insurance in 2005. 
(7) Data only on cows. 
Note: All values shown are averages of the last three years from available data. 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets, with own calculations. 
 
Data on the demand for insurance in the different countries has been provided in the 
fact sheets. Table 12 shows the demand expressed in number of insured farms, the 
participation rates on insurable farms, the demand expressed in insured surface, the 
market penetration in respect of insurable and total surface and, lastly, the number of 
insured animals and the percentage of insurable animals. Table 14 completes the 
documentation of the national demands, with the demands and market penetration 
expressed in value (million euros).  
We can see in Table 12 that in Austria the percentage of insured farms and insured 
area on insurable area is the highest, which is explained by the existence of 
subsidies given since 1995 covering most risks. Since then there has been a 
continuous increase on insured area every year. Currently almost 80 % of insurable 
area is covered against hail as basic cover, but also around 46 % is covered for yield 
insurance. 
The relatively high demand of insurance in Bulgaria (52 %) and around 1.2 million 
hectares in the absence of subsidies needs to be explained. It can be explained 
because the government settles buying insurance as a condition for getting some 
forms of public aid. This applies for crops receiving annual State support. In 2005 
those were wheat, maize and sunflower, rape, rice, potatoes, red peppers and 
tomatoes. 
The total area insured in Spain, Austria and Italy, three countries with subsidised 
insurance, is respectively 6 million, 1 million and almost 1 million hectares. It is 
interesting to note that only 8 % (nearly 1 million hectares) of the total area is insured 
in Italy, in a system with the highest level on subsidies to insurance (67 %). 
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A high level of insured area, with 43 % and more than 7 million hectares, is found in 
Germany, but no yield insurance is available. So the penetration level refers to 
single-risk (hail) insurance. 
In the Czech Republic the market penetration in crop insurance is about 35 % (more 
than 1 million hectares, close to the Austrian insured area, 33 % in arable crops, 
67 % of hop fields, but only 15 % of the wine area and 20 % of fruits). In livestock 
insurance (cattle) the degree of penetration is about 85 %.  
In Cyprus crop insurance is compulsory in a public system, so it seems to be 100 %, 
but there is no insurance for livestock available and no complementary insurance in 
the private sector for crops. 
In Finland no commercial crop insurance is available, but almost the whole area is 
covered by the public crop compensation scheme. For livestock insurance, around 
30 % is covered in a model of group insurance. 
In the Baltic States (Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) agricultural insurance has only started 
to build up. The insurance market penetration is around 1 %. In Estonia only livestock 
insurance is available. 
Again, we find there is a lack of data, even from other countries, such as Greece or 
France, which subsidise insurance. But the total insured area in France with around 
3.5 million hectares is very high.  
In Sweden and Hungary there is also a high degree of market penetration (60 % and 
52 %) but no yield insurance is available. 
Figure 53 presents the penetration in terms of percentage of insured area on 
insurable area (when available) or on total crop area. For comparison purposes, in 
Figure 54 we show the most comprehensive insurance schemes in every country, 
assuming that yield insurance is more comprehensive than multi-peril, and that multi-
peril is more comprehensive than single-risk insurance. Also, we show them only if 
they have some significance, thus omitting pilot schemes and those with a negligible 
demand. By comparing both figures, we can observe that there are many countries, 
like the United Kingdom, Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, with low market 
penetration and where only single-risk insurance is developed. However, assuming 
that a more developed insurance system offers more comprehensive insurance 
schemes, we can see that a high market penetration is not always associated to a 
more developed insurance system. For example, in the case of Austria it could be 
true, but in Italy insurance is very developed and penetration is quite low.  
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Source: Authors’ elaboration from fact sheet information and from CEA (2005a) for Spain. 
Figure 53. Market penetration of crop insurance (% of insured area) 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from fact sheet information.  
Figure 54. Most comprehensive insurance schemes per country 
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Additionally, there is a clear example for the case of Germany, where market 
penetration is higher than in many other countries (Spain, Italy, Slovenia, Czech 
Republic, etc.) where insurance is more developed. This high market penetration 
corresponds only to basic cover (mainly hail insurance) while the lower market 
penetration for the other countries corresponds to a more developed insurance 
system and, perhaps, to a higher market penetration in terms of value.  
From this analysis we can conclude that the percentage of insured area does not 
give an objective measure to understand the importance or the development of 
insurance in a country, but it needs to be combined with the cover offered by the 
insurance schemes and, if available, with the market penetration in terms of insured 
value.  
Table 13 shows the insured capital or liabilities in absolute values and as a 
percentage of the insurable production and the total production. In general we have 
to point out that there are a lot of data missing and that these data are difficult to 
compare, particularly on the livestock sector. Aquaculture has been included in cattle 
production in Spain and Greece. In Greece’s private insurance, aquaculture 
production accounts for 98 % of the livestock insured value, and for 93 % of the total. 
The total insured production without aquaculture would be EUR 21.7 million instead 
of EUR 307 million. In Spain we only have this information disaggregated for 2005, 
but aquaculture in that year represents less than 0.5 %, more or less the same as 
forest insurance. Lastly, it seems unavoidable to notice the decreasing trend in 
private crop and livestock insurance in Greece. The insured value of crops has 
decreased from 2000 to 2005 in a continuous way from EUR 23 million to EUR 15 
million, and that of livestock, from EUR 18 million to EUR 5 million. 
The highest insured production values in crop insurance are in France (EUR 12 
billion), Germany (EUR 11 billion), Spain (EUR 6 billion), Italy (EUR 3.5 billion) and 
Austria (nearly EUR 2 billion). 
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Table 13. Demand for crop and animal insurance: insured value 
Country and 
insurance 
systems 
Years 
available 
Crop 
insured 
value 
(million 
EUR) 
Livestock 
insured 
value 
(million 
EUR) 
Production 
value covered 
crop + 
livestock 
(million EUR) 
Total 
insured 
value on 
insurable 
production 
(%) 
Total 
insured 
value on 
total 
production 
(%) 
Belgium °  1993–04 - - - - - 
Bulgaria •♦ (2) 2000–05 111.8 151.3 263.1 20.4 9 
Czech Republic •♦ - 708 1 062 1 770 - - 
Denmark °♦ - - - - - - 
Germany °♦ 2000–05 11 293  -    
Estonia ♦ 2005 0 - - - - 
Greece ELGA •♦ - - - - - - 
Greece private 
•♦♠ (3) 2000–04 15 292 307   
Spain ♣♦♠ (3) 2001–05 5 659 (6) 4 096 (6) 9 033   
France ♣ 1996–2004 12 149 - -   
Italy ♣ (5) 2001–05 3 636 - 3 636 20 12.6 
Cyprus •  2001–05 120.8 0 120.8 - - 
Latvia °♦ 2000–05 - - - < 1 < 1 
Lithuania °♦ 2004–05 3 22.6 25.6 - - 
Luxembourg ♣  2001–05 56 - - - - 
Hungary •♦ - - - - - - 
Netherlands ° (4) - - - - - - 
Austria ♣♦ 2000–05 1 739 (7) 267 2 006  79 (6) - 
Poland °♦ - - - - - 5.5 (1) 
Portugal • 1998–2003 561 - 561 14 14 
Romania •♦ 2005 258 5 - 25.5 - 6 
Slovenia •♦  2000–05 59 9 64.8 124.7 16 - 
Slovakia •♦ 2000–04 - - - - - 
Finland ♦  1996–2005 - - - - - 
Sweden •♦ 2005 - - - - - 
UK °♦ - 198 1 130 1 328 - - 
(Croatia) •♦ 2000–04 179 - - - - 
(Turkey) °♦ 2004 371 8 (7) - - - - 
Legend: 
° Hail insurance for crops ♦ Livestock insurance 
• Combined insurance (possibly single-risk for some crops)  ♠ Fish/forest insurance 
♣ Yield insurance (possibly single or combined for some crops) - Not available 
(1) Only crops. Livestock excluded. 
(2) There are no official data about the agricultural insurance market in Bulgaria. For this reason, all data is 
based on interviews with senior experts from leading insurance companies.  
(3) Aquaculture is included in Greece and Spain. In the number of animals, poultry insurance is included in 
Spain. 
(4) Data from the Netherlands are for hail and glasshouse insurance. Most data are not supplied by the 
companies for competition reasons. 
(5) Animal insurance data are not available for Italy because they are not subsidised. The insured values and 
premiums data include crops and structures. 
(6) Only 2005. 
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(7) Without greenhouses. 
Note: All values shown are averages of last the three years from available data. 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets, with own calculations. 
 
Livestock insurance market penetration 
In the Netherlands, the existence of a compulsory fund for livestock producers 
hinders the development of livestock insurance. For Italy and France, animal or 
livestock insurance data are not available because this type of insurance is not 
subsidised. Nevertheless, the demand of livestock insurance for those countries, as 
well as for the UK, seems to be quite residual.  
In Greece, insurance is compulsory for livestock, but it is voluntary for pigs and 
poultry. Pigs and poultry insurance are also offered by the public entity ELGA. In the 
case of Spain, the number of animals includes also those for poultry insurance which 
has been offered in 2004 and 2005. If we ignore poultry insurance, the average 
number of animals insured for the last three years would be reduced from 
102 850 000 to 3 800 000. Data on the number of animals would become more 
meaningful by applying equivalence coefficients to different species, so that 
everything is expressed in UGBs (unités gros bétail = large livestock unit) or LSUs 
(livestock standard units). 
 
5.5.2. CEA data on insured value 
The Comité Européen des Assurances (CEA) had been informed about the existence 
of the request by the Agriculture and Rural Development DG to have a description of 
the situation of agricultural insurance schemes in Europe. The Secretariat in Paris 
took the initiative in December 2005 to send a questionnaire form to their members 
(national associations of insurers). Replies were received from Austria, Germany, 
France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Spain and Switzerland (CEA, 
2005d). The preliminary analysis of the replies indicates that they are, in general 
terms, too generic and insufficiently specific. Some of this information is used in other 
sections of the report.  
The Agricultural Risks Insurance Committee of the CEA has also provided a 
document ‘European Insurance system for agricultural risks’ (CEA, 2005a), which 
summarises the responses by CEA members to another questionnaire launched by 
CEA in 2004 (CEA, 2004). The analysis and tables below are based in this 
document.  
Table 14 and 15 and report the information regarding insured value. The provided 
data are incomplete for the EU but the listed nine countries in Table 14 account for 
81 % of the total EU-25 crop production value.  
The ‘total production value (Eurostat) 2004’ data refer to crop and livestock outputs at 
basic prices. This information was collected in order to provide market penetration 
measures. We have to take into account that the percentage of insured production 
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value reclusively considered is not an indicator of the development of agricultural 
insurances, because it also depends on the existence of only single-risk insurance or 
also combined insurance. The ‘insurable production value (CEA)’ is data from the 
2004 CEA questionnaire and in it CEA members try to estimate the insurable 
production value in the countries. Looking at the percentage data of insurable 
production value to the total production value, it seems that around 60 % to 70 % of 
the total production value is a realistic percentage of the insurable production value 
for the countries with well developed insurance systems. It is surprising that the 
percentage of insurable production value in France is only 33 %. A possible reason 
for this low insurable production rate could be the existence of a calamity fund which 
can reduce the offer of insurance products. In contrast, if we compare this high 
possible level of penetration of 60 % to 70 % with the development of insurance in 
Spain over time, where insurance is offered practically for all products and for most 
risks, it seems to be too high. One of the possible reasons for the 72 % value in 
Spain could be the differences in accounting for values. For example, in the Eurostat 
production value, olive oil is considered, while in the insurable production, the value 
of the olives is accounted, which is much lower. Another example of these 
discrepancies can be found in the Netherlands, where the insurable production value 
is lower than the total production value.  
 
Table 14. CEA data: production value and insurance (crops) 
 Total 
production 
value 
(Eurostat) 
2004 
(million EUR) 
Insurable 
production 
value (CEA) 
(million EUR) 
Currently 
insured 
production 
value 
(million 
EUR) 
Insurable 
production 
value/total 
(Eurostat) 
(%) 
Currently 
insured 
pv/insurable 
pv 
(%) 
Currently 
insured 
pv/total 
(Eurostat)
(%) 
Austria (1) 2 639  1 700 1 739 80 83 66 
Denmark 3 227  2 613 2 613 81 100 81 
France (1) 36 508  12 000 9 477 33 79 26 
Germany 22 848  16 742 11 120 73 66 49 
Greece (1) 8 378  6 317 6 317 75 100 75 
Italy (1) 29 405  27 333 3 384 93 12 12 
Netherlands 9 915  10 677 1 736 108 16 18 
Portugal (1) 3 964  1 178 634 30 54 16 
Spain (1) 28 403  20 328 5 310 72 26 19 
(1) Countries with combined or yield insurance.  
Source: Authors’ elaboration from CEA (2005a) data. 
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Table 15. CEA data: production value and insurance (livestock) 
 Total 
production 
value 
(Eurostat) 
2004 
(million EUR) 
Insurable 
production 
value (CEA) 
(million EUR) 
Currently 
insured 
production 
value 
(million 
EUR) 
Insurable 
production 
value/total 
(Eurostat) 
(%) 
Currently 
insured 
pv/insurable 
pv 
(%) 
Currently 
insured 
pv/total 
(Eurostat)
(%) 
Austria 2 614  1 100 267 42 24 10 
Denmark 4 880  10 451 10 451 214 100 214 
France 23 903  8 000 633 33 8 3 
Germany 19 784  6 094 8 993 31 148 45 
Greece 2 877  2 007 2 007 70 100 70 
Norway 1 683   279 278 17 100 17 
Spain 13 871  4 427 997 32 23 7 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from CEA (2005a) data. 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from fact sheet information.  
Figure 55. Production value (Eurostat 2004) to insured value (CEA 2005a) separated 
for crops and livestock in Europe 
 
Also in the case of livestock (Table 15) there are important discrepancies about the 
production value. For example in Denmark, the total production value is much lower 
than the insurable value. This needs to be clarified, mainly for the German livestock, 
where the discrepancy is not minor. The rates over 100 % are of course a 
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consequence of the discrepancy of the figures of production value, insurable 
production and currently insured production value. The reason could be that different 
bases by product prices have been used. Another explanation could be the fact that 
the same production value can be insured within several insurance schemes (against 
several individual risks).  
It should also be verified as to why in Denmark the insured values equal the insurable 
values. In contrast, in the case of Greece, this can be explained because the Greek 
insurance system is compulsory for farmers.  
 
5.5.3. Premium amount, subsidies and indemnities 
 
Table 16 attempts to summarise the main data collected from the fact sheets. The 
first four columns show the main types of insurance schemes available in every 
country, as shown previously in Table 9. Then it shows the insured area and market 
penetration, also commented on before. The last columns deal with premiums, 
indemnities and subsidies. This can help the reader to understand and explain the 
differences in the figures, which are sometimes marked by the differences in 
insurance systems.  
First we can point out that there is no comprehensive yield insurance without public 
support available in Europe. It seems that for non-systemic risks like hail the private 
sector offers suitable insurance schemes, but for insurance products offering a wide 
cover in yield insurance, there is a direct relationship between development of the 
system and public support. In countries where there is no subsidy, insurance 
companies do not supply broad cover. The amount of support provided by EU 
Member States to subsidise insurance premiums varies depending on the country’s 
policy to promote some particular type of cover. 
Premiums expressed as a percentage of the insured value in Table 16 are also 
shown on the map in Figure 56. On looking at these premium rates, we find very 
different levels, from a low level around 1.5 % corresponding to private insurance in 
the Czech Republic, Greece and France, to the highest level around 6 to 7 % in 
Cyprus, Italy, Portugal and Spain. First we must point out that these rates are the 
total amount of premiums expressed as a percentage of the total national insured 
value in crop or livestock production, so they do not constitute premium rates on risk 
level. More detailed information on premium rates can be found in Section 5.6 
‘Technical aspects of agricultural insurance at product level’ where some examples 
are given for specific insurance systems in Member States. It is shown for particular 
cases because the magnitude of premium rates depends on the insurance type (risks 
covered, type of crops covered and other technicalities). Further examples of 
premium rates for single-, combined- and yield insurance can be found can be found 
in Table 41 (Section 8.7). 
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Table 16. Summary of data provided from fact sheets 
Country 
Single-
risk 
ins. 
Com-
bined 
ins. 
Yield 
ins. 
Market 
pene-
tration 
(%) 
Insured 
area 
(1 000 ha) 
Premium 
amount 
(million 
EUR) 
Premium 
/insured 
value 
(%) 
Average 
indem-
nities 
(million 
EUR) 
Loss 
ratio 
(%) 
Insurance 
subsidies 
(million 
EUR/%) 
Belgium P - - n.d. n.d. 49.0 n.d. n.d. 65 (1) 0 
Bulgaria P P - 52 1 276 6.6 4.8 4.5 65 0 
Czech Rep. PS PS - 35 1 074 32.0 1.8 24.0 73 7/30 
Denmark P - - n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 0 
Germany P - - 43 7 265 129.2 1.2 104.5 83 0 
Estonia P (2)  - - < 1 n.d. 0.1 n.d. n.d. n.d. 0 
Ireland P - - n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 0 
Greece P 
GC + 
GS + 
G 
- (100) n.d. n.d. 2.5–3 218.0 n.d. n.d. 
Spain PS PS PS 26 5 850 564.7 6.3 388.3 69 232/41 
France P P PS n.d. 3 507 211.0 1.7 n.d. n.d. 5/2.4 
Italy PS PS PS 8 976 271.2 7.4 166.2 63 180/67 
Cyprus GC GC - (100) 112 8.7 7.2 4.5 95 4.4/50 
Latvia PS - - < 1 n.d. 0.1 n.d. n.d. n.d. 0.05/50 
Lithuania PS - - 1 9 1.1 4.3 1.1 100 0.55/50 
Luxembourg PS PS PS 45 26 1.3 2.3 1 86 0.65/50 
Hungary P P - 52 n.d. 43.5 n.d. 30.7 74 0 
Netherlands P - - n.d. n.d. 75.0 n.d. 30.7 41 0 
Austria PS PS PS 78 1 054 52.0 2.6 32.0 72 24/46 
Poland P(S#) - - 7 n.d. 9.9 n.d. 6.3 64 0 
Portugal PS PS - 22 298 46.9 8.4 30.2 60 32/68 
Romania PS PS - 12 812 14.0 n.d. 4.4 32 7/50 
Slovenia PS (3) P - 17 n.d. 9.5 7.6 13.8 148 4.3/45 
Slovakia PS PS - n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. -/50 
Finland P (2) P (2) - < 1 n.d. 1.8 n.d. 1.1 67 0 
Sweden P P - 60 1 500 n.d. n.d. n.d. n.d. 0 
UK P - - 7 370 11.1 0.8 n.d. n.d. 0 
Total      1 537  1 061  497 
(Croatia) PS PS - 3 n.d. 12.6 4.1 11.5 91 2.6/25 
(Turkey) PS PS PS 1.8 439 20 n.d. 16 67 n.d./50 
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Legend: 
S Subsidised GC Public compulsory partially subsidised 
P Private non-subsidised GF Public free 
PS Private partially subsidised # Pilot experience 
G Public non-subsidised - Not existing 
GS Public partially subsidised n.d. No data 
Notes: 
Loss ratio is not computed from the three-year average of premium shown in the table, but of the longest period 
available! 
(1) Loss ratio is computed only for a small part of hail insurance.  
(2) Livestock only. 
(3) A national programme in Slovenia for subsidies insurance, in 2006 for the first time (30 to 50 %). 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets, with own calculations. 
 
Secondly, it is necessary to specify that the Greek ELGA premiums do not follow the 
actuarial rule of insurance premiums: they are not calculated on the basis of the risk 
of loss for the covered events. The rates fixed by ELGA are the same for all crops (or 
livestock) throughout the country, so we will not take them into account in further 
analysis of potential European scenarios.  
. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from fact sheet information. 
Figure 56. Premium amount to insured value 
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For further understanding of the data on premiums, we must indicate that the French 
1.7 % corresponds to hail and windstorm insurance only, not subsidised by the 
government. Multi-peril insurance is not included, because it started in 2005; this 
explains the low rate. The high values in Spain and Italy can be explained mainly by 
the higher number of perils covered, apart form the effect of the potentially higher 
risks in those countries.  
In Greece’s private insurance, 89 % of the premiums and 80 % of the indemnities 
come from aquaculture. Greek private insurance has such low premium rates 
because of the low rates of aquaculture insurance. The rates for aquaculture 
insurance are around 1.6 % while the rest of rates would average 2.5 %, very similar 
to the Austrian premium rates. The low risk of aquaculture also diminishes the 
proportion of the indemnities on the insured value from 1.9 % to 0.7 %. Lastly, the 
loss ratio if we did not include aquaculture would be 60 % instead of 38 %. 
Loss ratios in the summary table express the proportion between indemnities for a 
series of years and premiums paid during that period. They are graphed in Figure 57. 
Because we are not referring to a yearly loss ratio, but to a long-term average, for an 
insurance system to be ‘actuarially sound’, the loss ratios should be lower than 1, so 
that the premiums would be greater than the indemnities in a quantity enough to pay 
the administrative costs, costs for reinsurance and loss adjustment costs.  
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Figure 57. Average loss ratio graph 
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It should be taken into account that the average indemnities and the loss ratios are 
not calculated for the last three years but for the longest period of time available 
(mostly from 2000 to 2005), because in this way they are more representative of the 
soundness of the insurance systems. However, available timetables of data varied 
from country to country, so these ratios are not suitable to be compared. 
It is interesting to find the lowest values for Romania, for the Greek private insurance 
and for the Dutch non-subsidised insurance. In Greece it is explained by the 
particular case of aquaculture. For the Netherlands and for Romania, the available 
data do not allow for the actual reasons to be identified. In Romania, it could be 
explained by the fact that a big proportion of the farmers buying insurance do so for 
asking for banking credits, financing from the European Union or ad hoc aid from the 
government which is conditioned to being insured, so that this could result in the risks 
of the insured population being lower than the average. But this is just a hypothesis; 
another possible reason could simply be a lower number of calamities during the time 
period considered.  
In general we can say that in most countries the average loss ratio is between 0.60 
and 0.75. The highest loss ratio is found in Slovenia with 1.48 (from 2000 to 2005), 
followed by Lithuania with 1. Germany and Luxembourg also have a high loss ratio, 
of more than 0.8.  
 
5.5.4. CEA data on premium amounts 
In Table 17 we can see data provided from CEA (2005a) about premiums for crops, 
livestock and crops plus livestock. The first columns show the 2004 premium amount 
and the second columns the average premium rates, that is, the premium amount 
expressed as a percentage of the insured value.  
The total premium amount of CEA data (EUR 1 395 million) corresponds more or 
less to the premium amount of the fact sheets (around EUR 1 500 million) if we take 
into account that CEA data do not correspond to EU-27, and that they include the 
Greece public sector, for which there was no data in the fact sheets. 
If we compare the premium rates from the fact sheets (Table 16) and those from the 
CEA (Table 17) we can see that the order of magnitude is coherent between both 
databases. They are in both databases around 1 % for Germany, 2 % for France, 
3 % for Austria and, in another order of magnitude, around 6 % for Spain and 7.5 to 
8 % for Portugal and Italy. The Greek premium rate from the CEA is relatively low 
(1.4 %) because it probably corresponds only to private insurance, while the public 
insurance collects a premium close to 3 % for more comprehensive cover of risks.  
According to the CEA information, the premium rates in Denmark, Germany and the 
Netherlands are very low. Potential casuals for low premium rates can be that mainly 
single-risk insurance exists, that not many high risk hazards or sensitive crops are 
insured and that sensitive crops (vegetables), in the northern countries, are mostly 
produced in greenhouses. The greatest premium rates are for Italy, Portugal and 
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Spain, the systems where more perils are covered and also where there are high-risk 
productions such as fruits and vegetables. In France, the premium rate should be 
greater with the last reforms, but not with the system existing until 2004.  
 
Table 17. CEA data on premiums (2004) 
 Crops Livestock Crops and livestock 
 Premium 
amount 
(million 
EUR) 
Average 
premium 
rate 
(%) 
Premium 
amount 
(million 
EUR) 
Average 
premium 
rate 
(%) 
Premium 
amount 
(million 
EUR) 
Average 
premium 
rate 
Austria 49 3.3 1.3 1.15 50.0 (2) 3.2 
Denmark 18 0.7 104.5 1 122.5 0.94 
France 203 2.14 19.0 3 222.0 2.2 
Germany 124 1.12 38.7 0.43 163.2 0.8 
Greece 88 1.4 30.0 1.5 118.0   
Italy 274 8.1   274.0 8.1 
Netherlands 15 0.89     
Norway   4.8 1.7   
Portugal 50 7.86 0.3  50.0   
Spain 286 5.4 55.3 5.55 341.7 5.4 
Switzerland 34 2.5 20 2 54.0 2.3 
Total (1) 1 141   273.9  1 395.6  
Notes:  
(1) Total includes Switzerland. 
(2) Without greenhouses. 
Source: Authors’ compilation from CEA (2005a) data with own calculations. 
 
It is interesting to see that the Spanish livestock insurance premium rates are the 
highest. In Austria the livestock premium rate is also very low, but in this system the 
livestock insurance is combined with the insurance against hail and flood in grassland 
(so the total premium rate for the insurance product is higher). 
Some of the data collected in the from the CEA (2005a) document are estimated 
values sent by CEA members of the losses under a hypothetical scenario where yield 
insurance existed for all crops and all farmers were insured. Our document does not 
explain how these losses were estimated. We can see in Table 18 the data for this 
scenario in the case of crops (there is not enough data to give a good view of the 
possible scenario for livestock). The projected average annual amount of losses does 
not include cover and deductibles and for their calculation it is assumed that all crops 
and all operators are insured. 
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Table 18. CEA scenario of yield insurance with maximum demand (crops) 
 Losses Risk rate 
 Projected average 
annual amount of 
losses (CEA) 
(million EUR) 
Average annual amount 
of losses/crops 
production value (1) 
(%) 
Germany 711 3.1 
Austria 108.7 4.1 
Spain 1 237.71 4.4 
France 2 949 8.1 
Greece 80.5 1.0 
Netherlands 110 1.1 
Portugal 131.2 3.3 
Switzerland 163.2 9.6 
Total (2) 5 491.31   
Notes:  
(1) Production value from Table 14 and Table 15. 
(2) Total includes Switzerland. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with own calculations from CEA (2005a) data.  
 
The risk rates (average losses/total production value) shown in the last column of 
Table 18 should give an idea of the risks in each country. We see that there are great 
differences. In France the risk rates are the highest among the countries for which 
data is available, followed by Spain and Austria. It can be deduced that the rates 
calculation are biased by the characteristics of the current insurance systems in the 
different countries. Besides, given that the assumptions made for the calculation of 
the data for the Greek complex insurance system, where currently private insurance 
coexists with a public compulsory system, it seems useless to try to explain the low 
risk rate for Greece.  
Given that the risk rates should be indicative of the potential value of the premium 
rates in the scenario simulation, it can be interesting to compare these projected or 
potential risk rates with the actual average premium rates from Table 17. We have to 
take into account that, given that the actual situation there is a big proportion of 
single-risk insurance, the average premium rates should be greater for the case of all 
yield insurance. According to this reasoning, we see as can be expected, an increase 
in the rates for many countries: a moderate increase for Germany, Austria and the 
Netherlands, and a really big increase for France and Switzerland from premium 
rates around 2 to 2.5 % to risk rates of 8 to 9 %. This can be explained because until 
now in these countries mainly hail insurance has existed, and yield insurance for 
some crops such as fruit trees can be expensive. This magnitude of risk rate of 8 % 
is close to the current average premium rate of Portugal (8.4 % facts sheets source, 
and 7.86 % CEA (2005a) source), which is however much lower than that of Spain, 
where currently a broad cover exists for many products. In fact, we observe that for 
Spain there is a small decrease from the current premium rate to the potential risk 
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rate. Even if this is not very realistic for a risk rate, it could be for a premium rate. If 
already high risks and sensitive crops are insured, an adjustment downward of 
premium rates may be possible, because if the insurable production value is insured 
to a certain percentage the risks will be more widespread. However, for the case of 
Portugal, with a decrease from 7.8 % to 3.3 % from our point of view it is difficult to 
find an explanation. Either the high premium rate corresponds mainly to sensitive 
crops insured (fruits and vegetables) and the new scenario with insurance of cereals 
or other crops could make the risk rate decrease, or there is some mistake in the 
calculations or in the simulation assumptions.  
 
5.5.5. Level of subsidies to insurance 
In some countries public support has been provided to agricultural insurance for a 
long period of time. This has a number of advantages. For example, the insurance 
industry has had the time to develop their systems and to provide wide cover. 
Countries with public insurance systems or with support to the private insurance 
sector sometimes have integrated it as an essential agriculture policy instrument for 
the stabilisation of agriculture income. With such a support to the insurance premium, 
it seems easier to encourage farmers to take an active role in risk management and 
participate in insurance systems. From the economical point of view, these tools have 
the advantage over public ex post or ad hoc payments that they allow for better 
planning and continuity (see Babusiaux, 2000). But they also can have 
disadvantages when compared with ad hoc payments, as they can be the lower 
economic efficiency in terms of net gain received by the farmer per unit spent by the 
government (see Bielza et al. 2004).  
From data provided in the fact sheets, the total amount of subsidies to insurance in 
Europe is around EUR 500 million, which represents 32 % of the total premium 
amount. However, differences in average subsidies from one country to other can be 
very big, as can be observed in Figure 58. 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration from fact sheet information. 
Figure 58. Level of subsidies to insurance in Europe 
 
Subsidies are available only in a number of countries. Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, 
Germany, Estonia, Ireland, Hungary, the Netherlands, Poland, Finland, Sweden and 
the United Kingdom do not offer any subsidies to insurance premiums. The countries 
in which premiums are subsidised are:  
— Portugal: around 68 % of total premiums, subsidies vary from 35 % to 75 %; 
— Italy: around 67 % of total premiums, 64 % for the multi-peril yield-type product; 
— Slovakia: 50 %; 
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— Latvia and Lithuania: 50 %, but there is a very low market penetration of 
insurance; 
— Cyprus: 50 % for all insurable risks in the compulsory scheme; 
— Luxembourg: 50 % for all insurable risks; 
— Romania: 50 % since 2005, 20 % before 2005; 
— Spain: around 49 % of total premiums including the regional subsidies; 
— Austria: around 46 % of total premiums, 50 % for hail and frost; 
— France: the 2.5 % average of three years is due to a majority of non-subsidised 
single-risk insurance; since 2005 new yield products have been launched with 
subsidies of 35 % (40 % for young farmers); 
— Slovenia: in the year 2006, subsidies of insurance premiums in crop production 
were available for the first time; the level of subsidy was set at 30 to 50 % for the 
basic risk cover (hail, fire and thunderstorm); 
— Czech Republic: subsidies from 15 % for livestock insurance and 30 % for crop 
insurance; 
— (Croatia): up to 75 % including national (25 %), county and municipality subsidies 
(since 2003); 
— (Turkey): 50 % since 2006. 
Even within a country, the subsidies can vary a lot depending on the country’s policy 
to promote some particular type of cover, to help some agricultural subsector or to 
give facilities to some types of farms from a sociological point of view. For instance 
less-developed areas, young farmers or women farmers, associations or 
cooperatives, can apply for higher subsidies in some countries.  
Looking at the subsidies, it can be observed that the average subsidy rates in Italy 
and Portugal are the highest in Europe. In Portugal, the subsidy varies from 35 % to 
75 % depending on the risks covered, on the crop, on the reference premium rate, on 
the location, on the preventive measures used and on the type of contractual 
agreement. In Italy, single-risk insurance products receive a subsidy of 50 %, while 
combined and yield insurance products get 80 %. The subsidy is a percentage of a 
risk parameter fixed by the government per crop and per geographic area. This 
percentage depends on the characteristics of the contract. 
— If the threshold is greater than 20 %, the subsidy is 80 %. 
— If the threshold is lower than 20 %, the subsidy is 50 %. 
— If the contract considers also other events, for example animal diseases, the 
subsidy is 50 %. 
The threshold of 20 % is interesting for fruits and vegetables, which have big losses, 
so the threshold is easily passed, and as the premiums are high they need a high 
subsidy. In contrast, for cereals, a lower threshold and lower subsidy is preferred. 
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The Austrian, Luxembourgish and Spanish subsidies amount to almost 50 % of the 
premiums (including the regional support). In Austria only hail and frost is subsidised, 
with 50 %. In Luxembourg all insurable risks are subsidised at 50 %. In these 
countries subsidies have been provided for a long time and the insurance system is 
well developed with most risks and crops covered.  
In France, the average subsidy rate is very low (2.5 % of the total premium amount) 
because hail insurance has no subsidy and, until 2004, only some insurance for 
specific products and specific regions were granted a subsidy. There is a 35 % 
subsidy for new products, but it only applies to the insurance premiums with a 
deductible of 25 %. If the deductible is lower than this, then the subsidy only applies 
to the part of the premium which corresponds to this deductible, the rest not being 
subsidised. Subsidies were mainly given for fruits and vegetables insurance. 
Other countries with subsidy levels of up to 50 % are Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Romania and Slovakia, . These countries have in common a short history in the EU, 
and it could seem that they have adapted their subsidies to what is allowed by the 
EC guidelines. Most of them have young histories also for insurance development, 
especially Latvia and Lithuania, where the systems have only started to build up. In 
Latvia the subsidies are limited per unit (hectare, livestock). In Romania initially the 
subsidy represented 20 % of the insurance premium but beginning with 2005 the 
level of subsidy rose to 50 %. Particular is The case of Cyprus is particular in that 
there is a compulsory crop insurance system.  
In Slovenia in 2006, subsidies for insurance premiums in crop production were 
available for the first time. The level of subsidy was set at 30 % of the insurance 
premium including the tax on insurance transactions. The maximum level of subsidy, 
when a municipality programme of the same purpose exists, is 50 % of the insurance 
premium including tax. However, only the basic risk cover (hail, fire and 
thunderstorm) is eligible for co-financing. This seems to be an initiation to more 
systematic public–private cooperation in agricultural risk management in Slovenia. In 
the period 2004–06 about half the municipalities (102 from 210) notified a State aid 
measure to co-finance insurance premiums to farmers.  
There are lower subsidy levels but with a longer history in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary. In the Czech Republic crop insurance was subsidised with 30 % and 
livestock insurance with 15 % in 2005. In Hungary, from 1996, the State has 
contributed to the agricultural insurance premiums (for crops and livestock) paid by 
farmers by 30 %. This measure facilitated the increase of agricultural insurance 
contracts. If no claims were reported the farmers had to pay an even lower proportion 
of the insurance premiums: around 40 %. In 2004 this State subsidy was abolished, 
which resulted in a great fallback in agricultural insurance as many producers 
cancelled their policies. Along with these cancellations their risk of losses increased 
considerably. In 2003, revenues of insurance companies from agricultural insurance 
reached around EUR 78.8 million, while in 2004 it hardly exceeded EUR 26.2 million. 
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This collapse was the direct result of the termination of subsidies (Hungarian 
Financial Supervisory Authority, 2005). 
We can point out that in countries where public support has been provided for a 
longer time, the insurance systems are developed to comprehensive cover against 
adverse weather conditions. Governments of many Member States apply a 50 % 
subsidy to agricultural insurance but since only a few years, and it needs a long time 
to change the mentality and behaviour of farmers to use these supported instruments 
for risk management. 
 
5.5.6. Market conditions  
Information with reference to the market conditions was collected in the facts sheets; 
more precisely, whether the agricultural insurance market is wholly competitive, 
partially competitive (it sometimes happens that the premium rates are not 
competitive but companies can compete in the services offered) or monopolistic; if 
there is one company or a few dominant companies; and the percentage of the 
market of the dominant company/ies. The information provided by the national 
experts is shown in Table 19.  
We can see that in most countries, there is competition both in prices and in services. 
However, we find five monopolistic markets, with very different characteristics 
(Cyprus and Greece with governmental systems, Austria and Luxembourg with 
subsidised systems, and Ireland with no subsidies and also little importance of the 
market).  
 
 
Table 19. Agricultural insurance market conditions 
Country 
Is there 
competition on 
prices? 
Is there 
competition on 
quality of 
services? 
Is there a dominant 
company? 
Percentage of the 
market of the 
dominant 
company, if any 
Belgium Yes Yes KBC, AXA, OFH - 
Bulgaria Yes Yes No. There are three or four leading companies - 
Cyprus No No 
Agricultural insurance 
organisation (public, 
compulsory) 
100 % 
Czech 
Republic Yes Yes 
Ceska pojistovna  
Generali pojistovna 
86.1 % 
11.3 % 
Denmark Yes Yes Five companies 45 %, 28 %, 13 %, 10 %, 2 % 
Germany Yes Yes 
Vereinigte 
Hagelversicherung 
VVaG 
Approx. 60 % 
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Country 
Is there 
competition on 
prices? 
Is there 
competition on 
quality of 
services? 
Is there a dominant 
company? 
Percentage of the 
market of the 
dominant 
company, if any 
Estonia - - 
IF Eesti Kindlustus 
Ergo 
47 % 
24 % 
Ireland No No FBD Insurances plc 100 % 
Greece 
No. For compulsory 
insurance by ELGA 
premium rates are 
fixed by law. 
Free competition 
for aquaculture 
insurance 
 
No 
Free competition 
for aquaculture 
insurance 
There is only one 
insurance company, the 
Agrotiki Insurance SA, 
operating in the field of 
crop and livestock 
insurance 
 
Almost 100 % of 
crop and livestock 
insurance not 
covered by ELGA 
Spain 
No. Tariffs are fixed 
by the pool 
Agroseguro SA. It 
must justify 
changes in rates to 
ENESA and the 
farmers’ 
organisations  
Yes on attention to 
the client and 
quality of service, 
but not on the 
guarantees offered 
nor on the 
damages 
estimation. 
Agroseguro is a pool of 
all the insurance 
companies which 
provide agricultural 
insurance (33 
companies) 
Agroseguro 100 % 
 
Mapfre holds the 
22.5 % of 
Agroseguro 
France Yes Yes Groupama 
Approx. 50 % to 
60 % (traditional 
policies) 
Italy 
Yes, but companies 
tend to tailor their 
tariffs to the 
subsidy reference 
parameter fixed by 
ISMEA 
Yes 
FATA Assicurazioni, 
which has belonged to 
Generali Group since 
2000 
Both in terms of 
sums insured and 
premiums collected, 
FATA 13 % 
Generali Group 22 %
Latvia (Yes) No priority 
IJSC Balta 
IJSC BTA 
50 % 
25 % 
Lithuania Not in crop insurance (Yes) 
1 crop insurer 
7 livestock insurers 
100 % 
One with 60 % 
Luxem-
bourg No No 
Vereinigte 
Hagelversicherung 
VVaG 
100 % 
Hungary Yes Yes 
Allianz-Hungaria 
Garancia 
Generali 
46.9 % 
26.6 % 
15.8 % 
Nether-
lands 
Yes for crops 
Not for livestock, 
fund financed by 
levies 
Yes for crops No - 
Austria No No 
Die Österreichische 
Hagelversicherung 
VVaG, founded by 17 
100 % 
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Country 
Is there 
competition on 
prices? 
Is there 
competition on 
quality of 
services? 
Is there a dominant 
company? 
Percentage of the 
market of the 
dominant 
company, if any 
insurance companies as 
a mutual organisation  
Poland Yes Yes The former State company, PZU SA About 67 % 
Portugal Yes Yes Yes 45 % 
Romania Yes Yes 
Agras 
Asirom 
Generali 
Allianz Tiriac 
25 % 
28 % 
19 % 
17 % 
Slovenia Yes Yes Yes Two thirds of premiums 
Slovakia Yes Yes 
Allianz Slovakia 
Uniqa 
Generali 
 
Finland Yes Yes 
Làhivakuutus 
Tapiola-group 
40 to 45 % 
40 to 45 % 
Sweden Theoretically yes Theoretically yes 
Agria (Lansforsakringar) 
 
75 % in crop 
insurance 
90 to 100 % 
livestock insurance 
United 
Kingdom Yes Yes 
National Farmers 
Mutual Insurance 
Society  
75 % 
(Croatia) Yes Yes Croatia Osiguranje 70 % 
(Turkey 
— since 
2006) 
No Yes 
Basak (part of the main 
agricultural credit bank) 
Guven 
50 % 
 
20 % 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets. 
 
The countries which do not have competition in prices but do have competition in 
services are few too, and of very different characteristics: Lithuania for crop 
insurance, Spain and Turkey. All the rest of the countries have a theoretically free 
and competitive agricultural insurance market. However, if we look in detail, we see 
that these markets are often in the hands of few companies. From the 22 cases in 
this situation, we find 10 cases where there is only one main company (including 
Croatia and the private insurance in Greece). There are four countries with two main 
companies, and three with three main companies; there are only five cases with more 
than three insurance companies in the market, the extreme cases being livestock 
insurance in Lithuania, with seven companies, and the Netherlands, where 
apparently there is no dominant company.  
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In conclusion, we can see a most diversified situation, with the common characteristic 
that in most countries there are few market players, with one or two dominant 
companies on this very specific sector of agricultural insurance.  
 
5.6. Technical aspects of agricultural insurance at product 
level 
In this section, we enter into more details about technical aspects of the individual 
insurance products. These technicalities will permit us to have an insight and 
understanding of the information provided in the fact sheets about the different 
insurance products existing in the different countries. The technical characteristics of 
agricultural insurances should aim to provide an actuarially sound system. Their 
proper use in insurance design can avoid moral hazard and adverse selection (51) 
problems. It can also make risks in agriculture — in particular systemic risks (52) — on 
the one hand insurable to the insurer and on the other hand affordable to the 
farmers.  
The most important technical aspects of agricultural insurance are: 
— risks covered by the insurance, 
— products that are included in the cover, 
— triggers and deductibles, 
— premium rates and rating system, 
— level of subsidies, 
— bonus/malus system, 
— loss assessment, 
— loss ratios, 
— reinsurance. 
 
5.6.1. Agricultural insurance products and insured risks in Europe 
Most of the insurance types have already been defined before. Single-risk insurance 
(especially hail insurance) has a long tradition and is well developed in Europe. Some 
insurance policies cover also against the risk of frost or against a limited number of 
meteorological events. These are known as combined-risk insurance or as pluri-risk 
insurance. Comprehensive cover insurance (multi-peril insurance or yield insurance) 
systems are developed only in a few countries. Usually, private companies insure 
                                            
(51) See the glossary for definitions of moral hazard and adverse selection. 
(52) See the glossary for a definition of systemic risk. 
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only hail and fire or a limited number of risks and, as the government involvement in 
insurance increases, more comprehensive cover against all climatic risks can be 
provided. The cover against drought, as one of the most difficult insurable climatic 
risks in agriculture (because a large area can be affected), is not usually included in 
combined-risk insurance, whereas it is usually included in the wide cover against all 
climatic risks of yield insurance. 
However, looking at the technical aspects, it seems necessary to clarify that, from a 
technical point of view, there are several type of insurance that have been classified 
under “yield insurance”. They are sometimes referred to as yield insurance but also 
as multi-peril insurance. The common characteristic to all of them is that they provide 
cover for the yield against all the main climatic hazards that can affect yields (plant 
diseases and plagues are not covered in most cases). These types of insurance work 
in a different way from the US multiple peril crop insurance (MPCI). MPCI is a yield 
insurance which provides cover against all possible natural risks that can cause a 
decrease in yields, including plagues and diseases. In MPCI damages are calculated 
simply as the difference between the guaranteed yield and the actual yield. In 
contrast, in the Spanish and in general the European yield insurances, to determine 
the losses it is necessary to ascertain which was the risk that caused the loss, that 
the damage has an area character (that is, that the risk has not affected only one 
individual farmer) and it is also necessary that the insured or guaranteed yield can be 
corrected according to the productive conditions of the insured farm. This difference 
is important: the European model has higher loss-adjustment costs, but it helps to 
avoid moral hazard, which constitutes one of the big problems for the US insurance 
system.  
Table 20 summarises the available information on a large number of insurance types 
in different countries of the EU, specifying the risks covered and for which products. 
The number of different insurance types is very high, for example in Spain there are 
nearly 150. Types have been grouped in order to make the information digestible (53). 
                                            
(53) For more details on the particular Member States’ insurance products, refer to the fact sheets, available from 
authors upon request.  
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Table 20. Insurance products and insured risks in Europe 
Country Insurance product name 
(type) 
Products covered Risks covered 
Belgium Fire group insurance (single-risk) Field crops, vegetables, vineyard, fruits 
and livestock farms 
Fire, windstorm, flood, earthquakes, theft, working conflicts 
 Hail insurance (single-risk) - Hail 
Bulgaria Crops (combined) Winter cereals, maize, sunflower, fruit 
trees and vineyards 
Hailstorm, thunderstorm, torrential rain, fire on roots, ground frost, 
flood (sludge, freezing and withdrawal for winter cereals) 
 Livestock (combined) Cows and buffalos, sheep, goats, poultry Death and compulsory slaughter from: fire and natural catastrophes; 
parasitic and infectious diseases (OIE list B and others) 
Czech Republic Crop insurance (single-risk) All crops Hail, fire 
 Crop insurance (combined) Crops except fruits Hail, fire, storm, flood, landslide, spring frost and frost 
 Livestock insurance Livestock Contagious diseases, death by electrical injury, flood, poisoning, 
overheating, individual losses (non-infectious) 
Denmark Aggregated insurance (single-
risk) 
Acreage and crops, livestock, operating 
equipment and buildings 
Crops: fire, theft, water and hail damages 
Livestock: fire, theft, water, operating losses, accident and a few 
diseases (such as botulism) 
Machines: fire, theft, water and operating losses (damage to running 
machinery as supplement) 
Germany Hail Arable crops, wine, fruits, vegetables Hail 
 Livestock n.a. n.a. 
Estonia Cattle insurance Cattle Fire and natural disaster, accident, theft, diseases 
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Country Insurance product name 
(type) 
Products covered Risks covered 
Ireland Farm insurance (single-risk) 
Farm dwelling, outbuilding and stock, 
employers, product and public liability 
(livestock in transit, pedigree livestock, 
growing trees, etc. optionally) 
Fire, lightning, storm, flood, attack of dogs on sheep 
Greece Public hail (combined cover, but 
is not insurance) 
All crops 
Hail, windstorm, frost, snow, excessive heat, rains, flood, seawater, 
bears and wild boars 
 Public livestock (is not insurance) 
All farm animals (voluntary for pigs and 
poultry) 
Climatic, wild animals, diseases (long list) 
 Private hail (single-risk) All crops Hail, complementary to the ELGA policy 
 Private livestock 
Bovines, poultry (also sheep/goats and 
pigs available) 
All-risk mortality 
 Private aquaculture 
All fish. Additional: for fish stock in transit, 
equipment, vessels, etc. 
All-risk mortality, theft, escape 
Spain Combined Almost all vegetal production: COP, fruits, 
olives, etc. 
Hail, fire, flood, rains, frost, wind and others 
 Yield geographic basis (yield) 
Winter cereals, proteins, grapes and 
Lanzarote onion 
Hail, fire, flood, rains, frost, wind, drought, heat 
 Yield individual basis (yield) 
COP, olives, wine grapes, almonds, sugar 
beet, some fruits 
Hail, fire, flood, rains, frost, wind, drought, heat 
 
Fixed costs for associations and 
cooperatives 
Fruits, citrus, grapes 
The same as those covered by the individual farmers’ insurance 
policies 
 Livestock farms 
Cattle, horses, sheep/goats 
Poultry 
Accidents 
Also: for cattle, epizooties 
for poultry, asphyxia and panic 
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Country Insurance product name 
(type) 
Products covered Risks covered 
 Dead animals disposal 
Cattle, horses, sheep/goats, pigs, poultry, 
rabbits 
All 
 Index insurance Cattle, horses, sheep/goats, apiculture 
Increase of feeding costs 
Apiculture: also fire, flood and rains 
 Aquaculture 
Meteorologic exceptional happenings, 
chemical pollution, lightning, sea storm, 
flood, oil spill. 
Additional guarantees: diseases 
Gilthead bream, bass, turbot, meagre, trout, mussel 
 Forest production 
All forest trees within projects for 
reforestation on agricultural land 
Fire, flood, torrential rain 
France A: Hail All vegetal productions Hail and wind 
 
B1: Hail and frost on fruits 
(combined) 
Revenue from fruit production Hail, wind and frost 
 
B2: Hail and frost on wine grapes 
(combined) 
Wine grapes Hail, wind and frost 
 
C: Combined on COP 
(combined) 
Cereal, oilseed and protein crops Hail, wind, frost, flood 
 
D: Combined on tobacco 
(combined) 
Tobacco Hail, wind, frost, flood 
 E1: Combined all crops (yield) All crops except forage land Hail, wind, frost, flood, drought, etc. 
 
E2: Whole-farm combined 
(whole-farm yield) 
All crops except forage land Hail, wind, frost, flood, drought, etc. 
Italy Crops single-risk All crops, fruit trees, shrubs and nurseries, 
trees for wood and seed plants 
Hail, wind, black and hoar frost, flood, excess rain, drought, plant 
diseases 
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Country Insurance product name 
(type) 
Products covered Risks covered 
 
Crops combined risks 
(combined) 
All crops, fruit trees, shrubs and nurseries, 
trees for wood and seed plants 
Two or more of the events covered by single-risk insurance 
 
Structures combined risks 
(combined) 
Greenhouses with metal framework, 
tunnels and anti-hail nets 
Hail, wind, black and hoar frost, flood, excess rain, drought, plant 
diseases 
 Crops multi-peril (yield) 
All crops, fruit trees, shrubs and nurseries, 
trees for wood and seed plants 
Hail, wind, black and hoar frost, flood, excess rain, drought, plant 
diseases 
 Stock farms (combined) 
Cattle and buffalo (value, cost of 
disposing of animals, lack of revenue for 
period of farm stoppage) 
FMD, brucellosis, pleuropneumonia, tuberculosis and enzootic 
leucosis 
Cyprus Crop insurance (combined) 
Fruits 
Citrus 
Grapes 
Cereals 
Potatoes 
Beans 
Artichokes 
Hail, frost, rain, windstorm 
Hail, frost windstorm, water spot, dry wind 
Hail, frost, heatwave, rain, windstorm, dry wind 
Hail, rust, drought 
Hail, frost, flood 
Hail, frost, flood, warm dry air 
Hail, frost 
Latvia Crop insurance (single-risk) Arable crops, flax, fruits - 
 Livestock insurance 
Cattle, sheep, goats, horses, pigs, fur 
animals, bees, poultry 
Disease, accidents, damages caused by natural disasters, fire, flash 
of lightning, explosion, illegal activities of third parties 
Lithuania Crop insurance (single-risk) Crops Hail, rainfall, storm (spring frost, winter killing optional) 
 Livestock insurance 
Livestock, horses, sheep, goats, pigs; 
several companies also include bees, 
birds, fish 
No communicable diseases, infectious diseases, natural forces or 
accidents, theft or vandalism 
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Country Insurance product name 
(type) 
Products covered Risks covered 
Luxembourg Hail Arable crops, wine, fruits, vegetables Hail 
 Frost (combined) Wine Hail, frost 
 MPCI (yield) Main arable crops 
Hail, winter kills, stagnant water, frost, storm, heavy rainfall, drought, 
outgrowth 
Hungary 
Crop insurance (yield) 
Individual insurance schemes 
tailored to the demands of 
customers are available, see the 
annex to the fact sheet 
Arable and horticultural crops including: 
autumn spicate crops, autumn feed 
mixture, autumn cole seed, string hemp, 
tobacco, sugar beet, feed beet seed, 
sunflower, some legumes, winter apple, 
winter pear, maize, forest 
Yield, quality, stock can be insured. 
There is one all-risk (MPCI) insurance, the ‘Yield insurance of arable 
crops’ 
Storm, hail, fire, snow break, ice break, drought, insects, sandblast, 
soil alligatoring, frost riving, sore, thunder stroke, landslip, flood, 
standing water, snow pressure 
 
Livestock insurance 
Individual insurance schemes 
tailored to the demands of 
customers are available, see the 
annex to the fact sheet 
Cattle, swine, sheep, goats, horses, 
geese, chicken/hens, turkeys, guinea fowl, 
pheasants, mallards 
Value of livestock is insured 
Disease and accident except for: 
— ‘Natural disaster and elemental loss livestock insurance’ where 
perils are fire, thunder stroke, storm, hail, flood, earthquake, 
landslip, stone fall, earth fall, cave of an unknown hole, 
breakdown of water and steam pipes 
— ‘Cost completive livestock insurance’ where extra costs deriving 
from diseases are covered 
— ‘Insurance of high value horses’ where the value is insured 
— Coverable diseases: BSE, foot-and-mouth disease, aphthous 
stomatitis, oriental rinderpest, cattle infectious lung inflammation, 
Rift Valley fever, blue-tongue disease, lyssa, SVD, African swine 
plague, infectious swine paralysis 
Netherlands Hail private insurance Crops Hail 
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Country Insurance product name 
(type) 
Products covered Risks covered 
Austria Hail All crops Hail 
 Multi-peril (yield) Arable crops Hail, storm, frost, flood, rain, drought, drift, sprouting, pests, etc. 
 Wine (combined and quality) Wine Hail, frost and additional expenditure after hail 
 Fruits (hail and quality) Fruits Hail 
 Grassland (combined) Grassland and silo foils Hail, flood 
 Livestock (combined) Cattle Stillbirth and death (epidemic disease excluded) 
Poland Hail Crops Hail 
 Livestock 
Cattle, horses, swine (separate insurance 
schemes also exist for fur-bearing 
animals, apiary and fish) 
Death and forced slaughter due to non-epidemic diseases, accidents 
and natural events 
Portugal Basic cover (single-risk) Almost all vegetal production Hail, fire, lightning and explosion 
 Complementary cover 
(combined) 
Almost all vegetal production Tornado, waterspout, frost, snow 
 Total cover (combined) Almost all vegetal production All risks in the other contracts (+ damages on cherry fruits + 
persistent rains on industry tomato) 
Romania Crop insurance Almost all vegetal production 
Standard risks: hail, heavy rain, storm, late spring frost, early autumn 
frost, land erosion, fire caused by natural forces 
Special risks: winter frost, flood, drought, excessive rain at harvesting 
 Livestock insurance Animals, birds, bees, fish Surgical diseases, obstetrics and internal diseases, wild animal 
attacks, fire, thunderstorm 
Slovenia Crop insurance (combined) All crops Hail, fire, thunderstorm (flood, spring frost, etc. optional) 
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Country Insurance product name 
(type) 
Products covered Risks covered 
 Animal insurance Animals Ruin from disease or accident, emergency slaughter, slaughter for 
economic reasons 
Slovakia Crop insurance Almost all vegetal production Hail, fire, storm, cold burst, flood 
Finland Salmonella insurance (group 
insurance) 
Pigs, poultry, hatcheries, milk and beef 
cattle 
Damages covered include costs due to eradication of salmonella and 
losses in production for a period of six months 
 Group insurance for pig diseases Pigs 
Salmonella, PRRS (porcine reproductive and respiratory disease 
syndrome), enzootic pneumonia, swine dysentery, scab and atrophic 
rhinitis 
 Livestock insurance Livestock 
— Death of an insured animal 
— Severe illness or accident, which according to a veterinary 
specialist, results in the inevitable and premature culling of the 
animal 
— Animal is lost or stolen for a longer time period than one month 
 Extra security: livestock 
insurance 
Livestock 
— Basic insurance compensates damages when an animal dies or 
it needs to be emergency slaughtered 
— Slaughter value insurance for cattle compensates damages 
when an animal dies or it needs to be emergency slaughtered 
— Slaughter value and business interruption insurance 
— Accident insurance for cows covers damages due to accident 
— Catastrophe insurance for production animals 
Sweden Crop insurance (combined) Arable crops, potatoes and various 
vegetables 
Hail and re-planting costs due to drought, crust formation or soil 
erosion 
 Animal insurance Cattle, sheep, pigs, deer 
Slaughter, death, theft (optional add-ins: veterinary treatment; milk 
production breakdown due to viral diarrhoea) 
United Kingdom Crop insurance (single-risk) Crops, fruits, hops Hail 
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Country Insurance product name 
(type) 
Products covered Risks covered 
 Livestock insurance Livestock 
Foot-and-mouth disease, tuberculosis, brucellosis, classical swine 
fever 
Crop insurance All crops Hail, fire 
(Croatia) 
Livestock insurance Livestock Death due illness or accident, emergency slaughtering, euthanasia 
(Turkey) Hail and fire insurance (until 
2005) 
Field crops, fruits and vegetables Hail and fire 
 Plant products insurance 
(combined) (2006) 
Field crops, fruits and vegetables Hail, fire, storm, tornado, landslide and frost 
 Greenhouse insurance (2006) Plastics- and glass-made greenhouses 
and the products grown within 
Hail, fire, storm, tornado and landslide 
 Livestock life insurance (2006) Dairy cows 
All types of accidents, natural disasters, fire or explosion and all 
diseases, pregnancy, birth or surgical operations. Contagious 
diseases compulsory to declare are excluded 
 Poultry life insurance Poultry produced in closed systems 
(chickens/hens, turkeys, ostriches) 
All types of accidents, natural disasters, fire or explosion and all types 
of poultry diseases. Contagious diseases compulsory to declare are 
excluded 
 Aquaculture   
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets. 
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5.6.2. Deductibles in agricultural insurances 
This section deals with some of the insurance characteristics in relation to cover and 
the avoidance of moral hazard problems. These are the cover level, the franchise 
deductible, threshold or trigger, and other deductibles (54). The cover level refers to 
the proportion of the insured value that is effectively covered by insurance. The 
threshold or trigger is the percentage of the insured value the losses must exceed in 
order to trigger the payment. Once this value is exceeded, the payment of the 
indemnity can take place for the entire loss or only for a part of it. The straight 
deductible is the fixed amount of the loss as a percentage of the sum insured that will 
always be assumed by the insured. In fact, a cover level of 80 % would have the 
same effect on insurance as a cover of 100 % plus a straight deductible of 20 %. The 
relative deductible is the percentage of the loss that is not covered by the insurer but 
is assumed by the insured. It can be observed that most insurance types have at 
least one of these characteristics, either a cover level lower than 100 %, or straight 
deductible or another type of deductible. This avoids moral hazard because this 
means than whenever there is a loss the insured will have to assume at least a part 
of it. In this way, there are fewer incentives for increasing the risk exposure due to 
insurance. 
 
Illustration of franchise and deductibles
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Figure 59.  Illustration of different deductibles 
 
Figure 59 illustrates the types of deductibles used in agricultural insurance schemes. 
The dotted line shows the indemnities or compensations provided by 100 % cover 
                                            
(54) See definitions of deductibles in the glossary. 
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insurance with no deductibles. The solid line corresponds to the same insurance 
when a trigger or threshold of 30 % exists. This means, if the loss exceeds the trigger 
of 30 % the entire loss is paid by the insurer. The short-dashed line shows a relative 
deductible of 30 % (30 % of the loss) without threshold. The long-dashed line shows 
a 30 % threshold plus a 30 % straight deductible. Lastly, we can see a combined 
straight-relative deductible additional to a trigger (threshold) represented by the dash-
dot line.  
The losses on which the different deductibles are to be applied can be evaluated per 
field, per crop (all fields with the same crops on the farm), or even per farm in whole-
farm insurance products. In some cases, mainly in single-risk insurance products 
such as hail insurance, the losses and deductibles are calculated per field. 
Looking at Table 21 we can see a variety of different deductibles with a range from 0 
to 40 % and more. But some generalities can be pointed out. 
— The higher the risk, the higher the deductibles. This can mean that the risk is high 
(high frequency in time or affecting a large area) or the covered products have a 
high sensitivity (e.g. fruits, vegetables). 
Examples:  
• Hail is a very local risk, different to drought which can affect a whole country in 
one growing season. 
• Table apples for instance are very sensitive against hail; they are only 
saleable to an apple-juice factory after even moderate hail. 
— To create individual insurance schemes tailored to the demands of customers, 
different deductibles are used, so it is on the farmers’ judgment to choose a 
higher deductible and pay a lower premium. 
— In general, new insurance products, for which there is low or no insuring 
experience, have higher deductibles. 
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Table 21. Deductibles 
Country Insurance product name (type) Cover Franchise or trigger Deductible (% of insured value) 
Belgium Fire group insurance (single-risk) 100 % - - 
 Hail insurance (single-risk) 100 % 5 % 5 % 
Bulgaria Crops (combined) 100 % 5 % 5 % 
 Livestock (combined) 100 % 
Infectious diseases: 10 % 
Non-infectious diseases: 30–
40 % 
Infectious diseases: 10 % 
Non-infectious disease: 30–40 % 
Czech Republic Crop insurance 100 % 8–10 % of sum insured per damaged field 
8–10 % of sum insured per damaged 
field 
Denmark Aggregated insurance - - - 
Germany Hail: arable crops, wine 100 % 8 % 8 % 
 Hail: fruits, vegetables 100 % 
Standard: 10 % 
Optional: 0–25 % depending on 
loss ratio 
Standard: 10 % 
Optional: 0–25 % depending on loss 
ratio 
Estonia Cattle insurance - - - 
Ireland Farm insurance (single-risk) 100 % EUR 100 EUR 100 
Greece 
Public hail 
(combined cover, but it is not 
insurance) 
75 % 
20 % 
(some exceptions) 
Straight deductible: 13.2 % 
+ relative deductible: 12 % (some 
exceptions) 
 Public livestock (is not insurance) 
80 % 
(100 % for damages caused by 
bears) 
0–12 % 
Straight deductible: 2.4–20 % 
+ relative deductible: 0–20 % 
 Private hail 25 % 15 % 15 % 
 Private livestock 100 % 1–2 % 1–2 % 
 Private aquaculture    
Spain Combined 100 % 10–30 % 10–30 % 
 Yield geographic basis (yield) 
Hail and fire: 100 % cover 
Other risks: 65 % cover 
Hail and fire: 10 % 
Other risks: 35 % 
Hail and fire: 10 % of loss relative 
deductible 
Other risks: 35 % straight deductible 
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Country Insurance product name (type) Cover Franchise or trigger Deductible (% of insured value) 
 Yield individual basis (yield) 
Hail and fire: 100 % cover 
 
Other risks: 70 % cover 
Hail and fire: 10 % 
 
Other risks: 35 % 
Hail and fire: 10 % deductible  
(% of loss) 
Other risks: 35 % straight deductible 
 Fixed costs for associations and cooperatives 100 % of fixed costs 20 % 20 % 
 Livestock farms 
100 % 
Fattening cattle: 90 % 
10 % 
10 % 
For some risks or for some farmers it 
can be up to 50 % 
 Dead animals disposal 100 % 0 % 0 % 
 Index insurance 100 % 0 % 0 % 
 Aquaculture 100 % Up to 20 % Up to 20 % 
 Forest production 100 % 10 % of surface 0 % 
France A: Hail 100 % 15 % average 15 % average 
 B1: Hail and frost on fruits (combined) 100 % 15 % average 15 % average 
 B2: Hail and frost on wine grapes (combined) 100 % 15 % average 15 % average 
 C: Combined on COP (combined) 100 % 15 % average 15 % average 
 D: Combined on tobacco (combined) 100 % 15 % average 15 % average 
 E1: Combined all crops (yield) 100 % 15 % average 15 % average straight deductible (25 % for subsidy) 
 E2: Whole-farm combined (whole-farm yield) 100 % 15 % average 
15 % average straight deductible (20 % 
for subsidy) 
Italy Crops single-risk 100 % 10–30 % 10–30 % 
 Crops combined risks (combined) 100 % 20 % 20–30 % 
 Structures combined risks (combined) 100 % - 10–30 % 
 Crops multi-peril (yield) 100 % 20 % 20–30 % 
 Stock farms (combined)  - - 
Cyprus Crop insurance (combined) - hail, frost, wind: 15 % 
rust, flood, heatwave, dry wind, 
hail, flood, drought: 12 % 
wind, heat, rain, water spot, dry wind, 
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Country Insurance product name (type) Cover Franchise or trigger Deductible (% of insured value) 
warm air: 20 % 
water spot: 35 % 
drought: 40 % 
warm air: 15 % 
rust: 25 % 
drought: 30 % 
 Livestock insurance - 0 % 0 % 
Latvia No information - - - 
Lithuania Crop insurance - 10–12 % (rape, flax) 
6–7 % (cereals) 
10–12 % (rape, flax) 
6–7 % (cereals) 
 Livestock insurance - 10–30 % 10–30 % 
Luxembourg Hail arable crops 100 % 8 % 8 % 
 Hail fruits, vegetables 100 % 10 % 10 % 
 Frost wine 100 % 10 % (min. 2 %, max. 5 % per farm) 
10 % 
(min. 2 %, max. 5 % per farm) 
 MPCI  
8 % frost, storm, flood 
Drought 20–40 % depending on 
loss ratio 
Outgrowth 20 % (fixed indemnity) 
8 % frost, storm, flood 
Drought 20–40 % depending on loss 
ratio 
Outgrowth 20 % (fixed indemnity) 
Hungary Crop insurance 100 % General 5 % 
Yield insurance 10 % 
General 5 % 
Yield insurance 10 % 
 Livestock  
General 0 % 
Specific products where the 
dying off of animals exceeds 1 % 
(cattle), 4 % (sheep) and 2 % 
(goats) of the quarterly average 
number of animals 
General 0 % 
Specific products where the dying off of 
animals exceeds 1 % (cattle), 4 % 
(sheep) and 2 % (goats) of the quarterly 
average number of animals 
Netherlands Hail private insurance  Depends on the insurance company Depends on the insurance company 
Austria Hail 100 % 8 % 8 % 
 Multi-peril (yield) 100 % 8 % hail, other risks fixed by crops (as yield/hectare) 
4 % hail, other risks fixed 
indemnities/hectare 
 Wine (combined and quality) 100 % 8 % for hail and 35 % for frost 8 % for hail and 35 % for frost 
 Fruits (hail and quality) 100 % From 10 % to 30 % depending on the last 10 years loss ratio 
From 10 % to 30 % depending on the 
last 10 years loss ratio 
 Grassland (combined) 100 % 
Hail: 8 % 
Flood: 0 % 
Hail: 8 % 
Fixed indemnity for flood 
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Country Insurance product name (type) Cover Franchise or trigger Deductible (% of insured value) 
(max. EUR 440/cut/ha) 
 Livestock (combined) 100 % 0 % 
From EUR 0 to EUR 15/cattle on farm, 
depending on farm loss ratio 
Fixed indemnities depending on the age 
of the animal 
Poland Hail 100 % 10 % 10 % 
 Multi-peril 100 % 10 % 10 % 
 Livestock  20 % 20 % 
Portugal All three types 100 % 0 Relative deductible: 20 % of loss 
Romania Crop insurance 
Livestock insurance 
- 10 % 10–15 % 
Slovenia Crop insurance - Mostly 5 % Mostly 5 % 
 Animal insurance - -  
No franchise for death from accident 
Death from illness: 15 % franchise 
Slaughter of irreproachable animal 
(accident): 50 % franchise 
Slaughter of irreproachable animal with 
minor restrictions: 40 % franchise 
Slaughter with total restriction: 15 % 
franchise 
Slaughter for economic reasons: 60 % 
franchise 
Finland Salmonella insurance (group insurance) - 
EUR 1 000 and 5–20 % of the 
amount of damage 
EUR 1 000 and 5–20 % of the amount 
of damage 
 Group insurance for pig diseases - EUR 1 000 and 5–20 % of the amount of damage 
EUR 1 000 and 5–20 % of the amount 
of damage 
 Livestock insurance - 
Variable 
e.g. 3 % of cows lost within 10 
days, EUR 200 per event 
Variable 
e.g. 3 % of cows lost within 10 days, 
EUR 200 per event 
 Extra security: livestock insurance - 
Variable 
0–50 % 
See annex to fact sheet 
Variable 
0–50 % 
See annex to fact sheet 
Sweden Crop insurance 100 % 0 % except: 
‘hail’ vegetables: 15 % 
0 % deductible except: 
‘hail’ various vegetables: 15 % 
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Country Insurance product name (type) Cover Franchise or trigger Deductible (% of insured value) 
‘re-planting’ carrots: 15 % ‘re-planting’ carrots: 15 % 
 Animal insurance - - 
- 
For milk production breakdown 
insurance: 10 % deductible (covers 
90 % of the loss due to viral diarrhoea) 
United Kingdom Hail: crops, hops 100 % 0 % 0 % 
 Hail: fruits 100 % 10 % applied to the whole production 10 % applied to the whole production 
 Livestock: foot-and-mouth disease, classical swine fever 
25 % of the government 
compensation to provide 
‘consequential loss’ cover to the 
farmer following compulsory 
slaughter; limited to GBP 250 000 
per farm 
0 % 0 % 
 Livestock: tuberculosis, brucellosis, 
25 % of the value of the animal to 
provide ‘consequential loss’ cover 
to the farmer following compulsory 
slaughter; limited to GBP 250 000 
per farm 
0 % 0 % 
(Croatia) Crop insurance 100 % 5 % 5–15 % 
(Turkey) Combined insurance (2006) 100 % 10–25 % 10–25 % 
 Greenhouse insurance (2006) 100 % Glass 2 % 
Plastic 5 % 
Straight deductible: 2 % glass and 5 % 
plastic 
Relative deductible: 10 % glass and 
20 % plastic 
 Livestock life insurance 100 % 2.5–5 % Straight deductible: 2.5–5 % 
Relative deductible: 20 % 
 Poultry life insurance 100 % 3 % (5 % ostrich) Straight deductible: 3 % (5 % ostrich) 
Relative deductible: 20 % 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets. 
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5.6.3. Premium rates at product level 
We have previously talked about premium rates, when referring to the country-level 
average rates. In this section, we analyse the premium rates specific to an insurance 
type or product. These premiums are presented in Table 24 for several countries, 
and are shown together with the granted subsidies and used deductibles. Amongst 
others, the altitude of premium rates in crop insurance generally depends on: 
— the frequency of risks in time and on area, 
— the type of risk (e.g. hail as a very local risk, drought as a large area risk), 
— the sensitiveness of crops, 
— the number of risks covered (single-risk, multi-risk insurance), 
— the number of insured, to spread the risks, 
— other technicalities like deductibles. 
Besides the geographical variability inside each country, there is a high variability of 
the insurance products across Europe, depending on the risks and products (type of 
crops) covered. So we find low premium rates for hail insurance (2.3 % in Greece) for 
some livestock insurance, depending on the risks that are covered (1 % for poultry in 
Greece) and for aquaculture (1.5 %). The insurance policies for hazards causing 
greater or more frequent losses can be of 7–8 % (Italian multi-peril or yield insurance) 
and of 8 % for livestock (cattle in Greece). The premium rates for hail in Austria are 
around 2.8 % for arable crops, 6.5 % for wine and on average 14 % for fruits. 
Unfortunately these rates have not been provided for Spain. Multi-peril (yield) 
insurance premiums in France are quite low. This is due to the fact that the main 
production insured under this policy are field crops (cereals and oilseeds). 
Table 22 and Table 23 are more summarised tables, grouped in types of crops. The 
premium rates vary a lot, depending on the insurance system and other 
technicalities, so it is only possible to give examples of them.  
Looking at the previous tables covering insurance products and covered risks in 
Europe, we can see high variability of insurance products, which explains the 
difficulties in comparison of premium rates on the one hand and in computing 
average premium rates on the other hand. But an approximate average level can be 
given, as shown in Table 22. 
 
Table 22. Average premium rates 
 Average premium rates 
Arable crops 1–3 % limited cover 
Arable crops 3–7 % wide cover 
Wine grapes 6–8 % 
Vegetables 5–9 % 
Fruits 8–14 % 
Source: Authors’ calculations from fact sheet data. 
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Table 23. Premium rates per insurance product 
Crop Covered risks Country Premium Deductible Subsidy 
Hail Austria 2.8 % 8 % 50 % 
Hail or frost or other Italy 2.6 % 10–30 % 65 % 
Hail, fire Portugal 2.2 % 20 % relative Average: 68 % 
Hail, storm, frost, flood, rain, drought, others Austria 3.6 % 
4 % hail 
Other risks: fixed 
indemnity (40 %) 
Hail and frost: 50 % 
Other risks: 0 % 
Arable crops 
Hail, wind, frost, flood, excess of water France 7 % 15 % average 0 % 
Hail, frost Austria 6.5 % 
8 % hail 
35 % frost 
50 % 
Hail, fire, flood, rain, frost, wind and others Spain 10 % 10–30 % 41 % Wine grapes 
Hail, wind, frost, flood, excess rain, drought, plant 
diseases Italy 6.5 % 10–30 % 78 % 
Hail, frost, wind France 8.6 % 15 % 0 % 
Hail, fire, flood, rain, frost, wind, others Spain 11 % 10–30 % 43 % 
Hail, fire Portugal 18 % 20 % 68 % 
Hail or frost Italy 13.8 % 10–30 % 54 % 
Fruits 
Hail (storm for protection net) Austria 14 % 10–30 % 50 % 
Olives for oil Two or three perils combined Italy 4.4 % 10 % 69 % 
Vegetables Hail, fire, flood, rain, frost, wind, others Spain 4.8 % 10–30 % 37 % 
Source: Authors’ calculations from fact sheet data. 
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Table 24. Premium rates and subsidies for some insurance products in selected countries 
Country Insurance product name 
(type) 
Products covered Risks covered Premium Subsidies 
Belgium Fire group insurance (single-risk) 
Field crops, vegetables, 
vineyard, fruits and livestock 
farms  
Fire, windstorm, floods, 
earthquakes, theft, working 
conflicts 
- 
0 % 
(Taxes but not personal 
income taxes: 15 %) 
 Hail insurance (single-risk) - Hail - 0 % 
Bulgaria Crops (combined) Field crops, fruit trees and 
vineyards 
Hailstorm, thunderstorm, torrential 
rain, fire on roots, ground frost, 
flood (sludge, freezing and 
withdrawal for winter cereals) 
4.8 % 0 % 
 Livestock (combined) Cows and buffalos, sheep, 
goats, poultry 
Death and compulsory slaughter 
from: fire and natural catastrophes; 
parasitic and infectious diseases 
(OIE list B & others) 
0.8 % 0 % 
Ireland Farm insurance (single-risk) 
Farm dwelling, outbuilding 
and stock, employers, 
product and public liability 
(livestock in transit, pedigree 
livestock, growing trees, etc. 
optionally) 
Fire, lightning, storms, floods, 
attack of dogs on sheep 
- 0 % 
Greece Private hail All crops Hail, complementary to the ELGA 
policy 
2.3 % 0 % 
 Private livestock 
Bovines 
Poultry (sheep/goats and 
pigs also available) 
All-risk mortality 
Cattle: 8.3 % 
Poultry: 1 % 
0 % 
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Country Insurance product name 
(type) 
Products covered Risks covered Premium Subsidies 
 Private aquaculture 
All fish.  
Additional: for fish stock in 
transit, equipment, vessels, 
etc. 
All-risk mortality, theft, escape over 1.5 % 0 % 
France A: Hail All vegetal productions Hail and wind 
Average: 2 % 
Fruits and 
vegetables: 
7.6 % 
0 % 
(Fruits and vegetables until 
2006: 7.5 %) 
 
B1: Hail and frost on fruits 
(combined) 
Revenue from fruit 
production 
Hail, wind and frost 8.6 % 
0 % 
(Until 2006: 25 %) 
 
B2: Hail and frost on wine grapes 
(combined) 
Wine grapes Hail, wind and frost 2.15 % 
0 % 
(Until 2006: 10 %) 
 
C: Combined on COP 
(combined) 
Cereal, oilseed and protein 
crops 
Hail, wind, frost, flood or too much 
water 
7 % 
0 % 
(Until 2006: 10 %) 
 E1: Combined all crops (yield) All crops except forage land 
Hail, wind, frost 
Flood or too much water, drought, 
etc. 
1.6 % 
35 % (young farmers 40 %) 
for a franchise of 25 % 
Italy Crops single-risk 
All crops, fruit trees, shrubs 
and nurseries, trees for 
wood and seed plants 
Hail, wind, black and hoar frost, 
floods, excess rain, drought, plant 
diseases 
7.7 % 
54 % 
(50 % of ministerial 
parameter) 
 
Crops combined risks 
(combined) 
All crops, fruit trees, shrubs 
and nurseries, trees for 
wood and seed plants 
Two or more of the events covered 
by single-risk insurance 
6.1 % 
59 % 
(80 % of ministerial 
parameter) 
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Country Insurance product name 
(type) 
Products covered Risks covered Premium Subsidies 
 Crops multi-peril (yield) 
All crops, fruit trees, shrubs 
and nurseries, trees for 
wood and seed plants 
Hail, wind, black and hoar frost, 
floods, excess rain, drought, plant 
diseases  
11.4 % 
64 % 
(80 % of ministerial 
parameter) 
 Stock farms (combined) 
Cattle and buffalo (value, 
cost of disposing of animals, 
lack of revenue for period of 
farm stoppage) 
FMD, brucellosis, 
pleuropneumonia, tuberculosis and 
enzootic leucosis  
- 
50 % of ministerial 
parameter 
Cyprus Crop insurance (combined) 
Fruits 
Citrus 
 
Grapes 
 
Cereals 
Potatoes 
Beans  
Artichokes 
Hail, frost, rain, windstorm 
Hail, frost, windstorm, water spot, 
dry wind 
Hail, frost, heatwave, rain, 
windstorm, dry wind 
Hail, rust, drought 
Hail, frost, flood 
Hail, frost, flood, warm dry air 
Hail, frost 
7.2 % 50 % 
Austria Hail Arable crops Hail 2.8 % 50 % 
 Multi-peril (yield)  Arable crops 
Hail, storm, frost, flood, rain, 
drought, others 
3.6 % 
Hail and frost: 50 % 
Other risks 0 % 
 Wine (combined and quality) Wine 
Hail, frost and additional 
expenditure after hail 
6.5 % 50 % 
 Fruits (hail and quality) Fruits Hail 14 % 50 % 
 Grassland (combined) Grassland and silo foils Hail, flood 1.5 % 
Hail: 50 % 
Flood: 0 % 
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Country Insurance product name 
(type) 
Products covered Risks covered Premium Subsidies 
 Livestock (combined) Cattle 
Stillbirth and death (epidemic 
disease excluded) 
0 % 
Portugal 
Average three products:  
Basic cover 
+ Complementary cover  
+ Total cover 
Almost all vegetal 
production 
Hail, fire, lightning and explosion 
+ Tornado, waterspout, frost, snow 
+ All risks in the other contracts 
(+ damages on cherry fruits 
+ persistent rains on industry 
tomato) 
Average: 
8.66 % 
Average: 67.7 % 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets, with own calculations. 
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5.6.4. Geographical level for rating  
From the information provided in the fact sheets, we could observe that the unit used 
for the calculation of the premiums in most cases is an area unit, like a commune, a 
zone or a typical agricultural production area. If the farms within this area are not very 
homogeneous, and are subject to different risks, then the premiums will not 
correspond to the average indemnities paid. The area-based rating means that most 
insurance policies are prone to have adverse selection problems, because the same 
premium rate applies for all the farmers within the same area, so those with higher 
relative risks will get insured, and those with lower risks will not. Only in the Spanish 
yield insurance product do we find the farm level as the basis for the premium rating. 
 
5.6.5. Bonus/malus system 
The bonus/malus system or system of deductions and penalties on the premiums 
due to former results is also used to avoid moral hazard and adverse selection 
problems. It is applied in Bulgaria, Germany, Estonia, Spain, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, Romania and Finland. In Greece this does not 
exist for the compulsory public insurance, but it does for private insurance. There is 
no bonus/malus system in Denmark, Ireland, Portugal and the United Kingdom, or in 
Turkey. In Belgium, there is no bonus/malus system applied by the Belgian 
companies, but it is applied by the Dutch company OFH, which is the main insurer for 
apples and pears. For France and Italy no information was provided about it, and in 
Poland Slovenia and Sweden it seems not to be applied in crop insurance but it is 
applied in livestock insurance.  
 
5.6.6. Compulsory insurance at crop level 
In most countries and for most insurance products, it is compulsory to insure all the 
fields with the same crop, so as to avoid that only those with higher risks are insured 
(another type of adverse selection). However, there are some exceptions, for 
example the French hail insurance and the Polish insurance products.  
 
5.6.7. Loss assessment 
Usually the loss assessment is done by loss adjusters in the field. To estimate the 
loss, standardised directives are used which have been developed for different crops. 
These directives are discussed at annual meetings organised by the AIAG 
(International Association of Hail Insurers). Thus it can be assumed, that loss 
assessment for single-risk insurance is internationally comparable.  
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Contrary to the classic insurance, the loss assessment in index insurances is not 
made in the field but is based on independent indices. These insurance products 
have not yet reached the operational stage in Europe. 
  
There are two different approaches for the assessment of loss. 
1. Based on loss: 
In single-risk (hail) insurance, the loss adjuster estimates a percentage of the 
loss. For the loss-adjusting procedure samples are taken in the field and 
standardised directives are used for different crops. Then, the estimated 
percentage reduced by the deductible, is applied to the insured value (sum 
insured) and the result is the indemnity.  
2. Based on yield: 
The loss adjuster estimates the yield by taking some samples in the field or in 
another way, for example in indirect index-based insurances where the yield is 
estimated by meteorological or vegetation indices. The estimated yield will be 
referred to an average yield at farm or area level. 
 
In the second case the loss refers to an average reference yield. In the first case the 
loss refers to the expected yield in the current year. This makes a difference, 
because a loss of 50 % in the second case always result in a yield of 3 000 kg, if the 
reference yield for instance is 6 000 kg, whereas a loss of 50 % can be a different 
yield from year to year in the first approach. 
The losses on which the different deductibles are to be applied can be evaluated per 
field, per crop (all fields with the same crops in the farm), or even per farm in whole-
farm insurance products.  
However, in other cases, mainly in combined and yield products, losses and 
deductibles are calculated per crop. Examples of this are the combined insurance 
products in France, or the yield insurance in Spain 
Lastly, the whole-farm insurance scheme in France evaluates the losses and 
deductibles at farm level (addition of all crops produced on the farm). A particular 
case is the insurance of ‘Fixed costs for associations and cooperatives’ in Spain, 
which calculates the deductibles on the losses of all the farmers in the association. 
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Table 25. Loss estimation 
Country Insurance Loss estimation 
Czech Republic Hail and combined Per field 
Germany Hail and combined Per field 
Greece Public and private hail Per field 
Spain Combined Per field 
  Yield Per crop 
 Fixed costs for farmers’ associations and 
cooperatives 
Per association 
France Hail Per field 
 Combined and yield Per crop 
  Whole-farm yield Per farm 
Austria Hail and combined Per field 
Poland Hail and combined Per field 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets. 
 
The payment of the indemnities is known to be much faster in insurance than in other 
ad hoc payments from the government, which often take several (two to four) years. 
Table 26 shows the time elapsed from the happening of the loss until the payment of 
the indemnity. 
 
Table 26. Indemnities payment delays 
Country Time from damage to payment Comments 
Greece public 
Maximum 3 months 
after harvest 
 
Greece private Average 1 month  
Spain Maximum 2 months For livestock, maximum 40 days 
France Average 1 month 
For whole-farm insurance, average 1 month after 
harvest of all insured crops 
For some types of insurance products, the 
indemnities have to wait for the availability of 
harvest declarations or farm accountancies. 
Austria Maximum 2 weeks after 
harvest 
 
Poland Average 1 month  
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets. 
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5.7. The role and cost of reinsurance 
5.7.1. Private or public reinsurance 
In most countries, reinsurance is undertaken by private companies. The main 
reinsurance companies throughout Europe are Munich Re, Swiss Re, Hannover Re, 
Partner Re, SCOR, Mapfre and some others. However, there are some exceptions in 
which insurance is partially or even totally managed by the government or public 
companies. This is the case for Portugal and to a minor extent Spain and Italy. 
In Portugal, the main part of reinsurance is made through a public reinsurance 
system. It undertakes 85 % of the losses above a certain threshold. The adhesion to 
this mechanism is voluntary but, until now, all the insurance companies selling crop 
insurance have adhered to this system. 
In Spain, there is compulsory public reinsurance, undertaken by the Consorcio de 
Compensacion de Seguros. The CCS is a public company but it functions as a 
reinsurance company from a financial point of view. This public company is itself 
reinsured by international private companies. Also, private companies can freely 
reinsure the share of risk they assume through the international reinsurance market. 
In the case of Italy, there is a public fund of reinsurance. It was introduced in order to 
help the development of the new multi-risk insurance products (and for pluri-risk with 
more than a couple of perils included); so it only works for these types of insurance. It 
appeared in the 2000 budget law, but its first year of implementation was 2004 (this 
delay was due to the notification to the EU). It works within the Reinsurance Plan 
(ministerial decree general for all reinsurance).  
 
5.7.2. Types of reinsurance: quota-share and stop-loss reinsurance 
There are two main types of reinsurance: non-proportional reinsurance and 
proportional or pro-rata reinsurance. 
1. Non-proportional reinsurance: The cover of the reinsurer is based on the loss. 
The reinsurer takes charge of the loss above a certain threshold of the loss. It is 
similar to insuring with a straight deductible.  
Stop-loss: The reinsurer takes charge of the losses above a fixed threshold of 
the annual balance (annual loss or loss ratio) of the insurance company. 
Loss excess: The reinsurer takes charge of the losses above a fixed amount of 
loss. It can be done per contract or cumulated, for all the contracts covering some 
hazard. 
2. Proportional reinsurance: The cover of the reinsurer is based on the sum 
insured. It is more similar to insuring with a relative deductible. There are four 
main types of proportional insurance structure: quota-share reinsurance, variable 
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quota-share reinsurance, surplus reinsurance and surplus reinsurance with a 
table of lines. Quota-share reinsurance is the most common in agricultural 
insurance. 
Quota-share reinsurance: The reinsurer assumes a set percentage of risk 
(covered sum insured) for the same percentage of the premium, minus an 
allowance for the ceding company's expenses. Or, giving a similar result, the 
reinsurer takes charge of a percentage of the loss of the company, and the same 
share on the profit.  
Quota-share reinsurance is also used to improve the capital ratio of the insurer 
(e.g. new or small insurance companies) because in this type of reinsurance the 
insurer quotes a more or less high amount of the covered sum insured to the 
reinsurer, that decreases the liable equity of the insurer. 
Stop-loss and quota-share reinsurance are the two most used systems in agricultural 
insurance schemes. Figure 60 illustrates stop-loss and quota-share as a proportion of 
the companies’ losses and profits, in a simplified way. Quota-share reinsurance at 
25 % means that when the premiums are bigger than indemnities, the reinsurance 
company gets 25 % of the gains. In years when the indemnities paid exceed the total 
premiums gathered, the reinsurance company pays 25 % of the excess of 
indemnities. For stop-loss reinsurance, different layers can be established and a 
different premium rate is calculated for each layer. Sometimes, for the first layer, a 
relative deductible is also used because the frequency of loss is higher. 
 
 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Figure 60. Quota-share and stop-loss reinsurance 
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5.7.3. Types of reinsurance in European countries 
The main reinsurance types and characteristics in European countries are shown in 
Table 27. We can go more in-depth in the explanation of the types of reinsurance 
agreements of a few countries for which we obtained more detailed information. One 
is an example of a completely private reinsurance system (Austria), two of them are 
mixed systems (Italy and Spain), and Portugal provides the example of a purely 
public reinsurance system.  
In Austria there is proportional reinsurance from the insurer companies founding the 
agricultural insurance as a mutual organisation. By this proportional reinsurance 
agreement, the founder companies get 25 % of the profits on the years when the loss 
ratio is lower than 1, and on those years when the loss ratio is above 1 they assume 
25 % of the losses exceeding 100 %. In all cases an additional provision (the 
premium that the insurer gets from the reinsurer for the administrative costs, around 
20 %) is to be considered (from the profit or from the losses). The annual loss ratios 
(including the expenses of damage survey) vary from 38 % in 2001 to 140 % in 2000. 
The average of the last 10 years is approximately 74 %. 
In Italy, there are both private and public stop-loss reinsurance schemes. Private 
stop-loss reinsurance applies to 40 % of the risks taken directly by the companies, 
that is, the share that is not passed over to the reinsurers as quota-share 
reinsurance. In a general way, companies pay indemnities every year up to a 
maximum of the money they get from premiums (which can be 110 %, so that the 
quantities over this 110 % are assumed by the stop-loss reinsurance). They also 
have an upper threshold of EUR 5 million for hail policies. Public reinsurance in Italy 
applies only to the new insurance products. It works in a different way for the multi-
peril and for the pluri-peril insurance products. The pluri-peril schemes have the right 
to stop-loss reinsurance and the multi-peril schemes to quota-share. But, in general, 
80 % of public reinsurance is stop-loss. The percentage reinsured is different for 
each company. In Spain, there is public stop-loss and quota-share reinsurance of the 
pool of insurance companies by CCS, and also private stop-loss reinsurance for the 
share of risk assumed directly by the companies. 
In Portugal, the companies pay to the government a percentage of their premiums as 
reinsurance premiums. Reinsurance is stop-loss with a relative deductible. The 
trigger for the stop-loss is a percentage of the premiums, which varies from 65 % to 
110 %, depending on the crops and regions. When the indemnities are above this 
percentage, the public reinsurance systems assume the 85 % of the indemnities 
above the trigger.  
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Table 27. Reinsurance in European countries: types and characteristics  
Country Private or public Main reinsurers Reinsurance type and 
rates 
Belgium Private Swiss Re and Munich Re - 
Bulgaria Private - Proportional and stop-loss 
Czech 
Republic 
Private Swiss Re, others - 
Denmark Private - - 
Germany Private Munich Re, Swiss Re 
Germany, Axa Re, Partner 
Re, GE Frankona, etc. 
Quota-share and stop-loss  
Estonia - - - 
Ireland - - - 
Greece Private for Agrotiki 
(ELGA not 
reinsured) 
Munich Re, Mapfre Hail stop-loss (rates around 
4.5 % until 2002, 14.5 % in 
2003) 
Spain Public by CCS 
+ Complementary 
insurance by 
international 
companies 
+ Private 
reinsurance of CCS 
CCS (Consorcio de 
compensación de seguros) 
+ Partner Re  
+ Swiss Re (reinsures CCS)  
CCS: 10 % quota-share and 
stop-loss (rates: special 
policies 23 % or 19 % and 
classic policies 14 % or 2 %) 
+ Complementary insurance 
stop-loss (rate 2 %) 
+ Stop-loss for Swiss Re 
(rate 6 %) 
France Private Swiss Re, Munich Re, Scor, 
etc. 
- 
Hungary Private - Stop-loss 
Italy Private 
+ Public for new 
insurance products 
?  
+ FRR (Risks Reinsurance 
Fund). 
A reinsurance consortium is 
in project 
60 % quota-share and stop-
loss  
+ Stop-loss for combined 
risks and quota-share for 
multi-peril (80 % is stop-loss) 
Cyprus - - No reinsurance  
Latvia - - - 
Lithuania Private International reinsurance - 
Luxem-
bourg 
Private Munich Re, Swiss Re 
Germany, Axa Re, Partner 
Re, GE Frankona, etc. 
Quota-share 
40 % for fruits 
20 % for wine and 
vegetables 
Stop-loss 
Nether-
lands 
Private for hail 
insurance (public 
for some pilot 
experience) 
Munich Re, Swiss Re, 
Hannover Re, Scor, Mapfre, 
Partner Re, GE Frankona, 
Lloyds, etc. 
- 
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Country Private or public Main reinsurers Reinsurance type and 
rates 
Austria Private 12 national companies  
+ International market: 
Munich Re, Scor Germany, 
Hannover Re, Swiss Re 
Germany, Sirius Re, etc. 
25 % proportional and stop-
loss (rates 5 % to 8 %) 
Poland Private Swiss Re, Partner Re - 
Portugal Public–private Government Stop-loss with deductible 
(rates 6.3 % to 10.8 % of the 
premiums)  
Romania Private International reinsurance   
Slovenia Private - Stop-loss 
Slovakia - - No information 
Finland Private - Group insurance 
Sweden Private - - 
UK Private - Stop-loss 
(Turkey) Private (possibility 
of public 
reinsurance since 
the 2005 law) 
Since 2004 only Milli Re 70 % proportional (more 
common) and stop-loss (total 
rates: approx. 5 % of the 
premiums) 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets. 
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6. Other risk management tools in Europe 
 
6.1. Chapter synthesis 
This chapter describes other risk management systems in general, including funds, 
public systems, ad hoc aid, and futures markets existing in Europe. This helps to 
better understand the evolution of the insurance systems in Europe. In fact, the 
development of the insurance system depends very strongly on the presence of other 
risk management tools or from the public role and its ad hoc aid measures.  
There are public compensation schemes through ad hoc aid or calamity funds in 
most countries (in Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK for livestock only). From the 
information received, it can be seen that public compensation through any of these 
forms total more than EUR 1 000 million as a yearly average in the EU-27. Of this, 
35 % corresponds to the UK for livestock diseases and the same approximate 
amount corresponds to France (25 %), Italy (10 %) and Germany (10 %) for different 
agricultural (and to a minor extent livestock) perils.  
Futures markets constitute a potentially useful private tool for managing price risks. 
However, they have not developed well in Europe, mainly among the farm sector, 
possibly due to several factors, among which the CAP and the lack of homogeneity in 
product prices. 
 
6.2. Ad hoc aid and funds 
When there are no market-based instruments available to manage risks such as 
futures markets, insurance or mutual funds, or even if complementary to these 
market instruments ad hoc aid is given from the public budget in order to help 
farmers in the event of calamities or natural catastrophes, in some countries, most of 
the risk management protection for crops is provided privately while there is most 
often government intervention for animal diseases (this is the case for the 
Netherlands, Ireland, the United Kingdom, etc.). The rest of the countries give all of 
their compensation to agricultural catastrophic losses by means of ad hoc aid or 
through calamity funds.  
Ad hoc aid or assistance in the case of a calamity or natural disaster usually cause 
big distortions in the national budget. For this reason, many countries create specific 
funds for risk management in agriculture. Usually these funds have the purpose of 
accumulating money every year to be prepared in case of unexpected situations in 
which it is necessary to provide assistance for a calamity or a natural disaster 
happening. Some countries feed the funds entirely from the public budget while 
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others have more ‘private’ funds, usually fed from levies on some products. Tables 
28, 29 and the map in Figure 61 show non-insurance schemes, such as calamity 
funds, stabilisation accounts and ad hoc aid.  
 
Table 28. Other risk management tools in the European Union 
Country Stabilisation accounts Calamities fund Ad hoc aid Date of information
Belgium - GF and GC - 2006 
Bulgaria - GF GF 2006 
Cyprus - - GF 2006  
Czech Republic - - GS? 2006 
Denmark - P+ GC GF 2006 
Germany  GC (1) GF 2006 
Estonia - - - 2006  
Ireland - - GF (1) 2006 
Greece - - GF 2006 
France - GS - 2006 
Italy - GF - 2006 
Latvia - GF GF 2006  
Lithuania - GF GF 2006  
Luxembourg - - GF (1) 2006 
Hungary - - GF 2006 
Netherlands - GC - 2006 
Austria - GF GF 2006 
Poland - GF GF 2006 
Portugal - GS - 2006 
Romania - - GF 2006 
Slovenia - - GF 2006 
Slovakia - ? ? 2006 
Spain S - GF 2005 
Finland PS - GF 2006  
Sweden S - GF 2000 
UK - - GF (1) 2006 
Legend: 
- Not existing (empty space means that there 
was no information about it) GC Public compulsory partially subsidised 
S Subsidised GF Public free 
PS Private partially subsidised ? Unknown 
GS Public partially subsidised   
Note: Malta is missing. 
(1) Livestock only. 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets. 
 
Table 29. Other risk management tools in other European countries 
Country Stabilisation accounts Calamities fund Ad hoc aid Date of information 
Croatia - - GF 2006  
Turkey - GF (1) GF 2006 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets. 
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Source: Authors’ elaboration from fact sheet information. 
Figure 61.  Calamity funds, stabilisation accounts and ad hoc aid in Europe 
  190 
 
As already presented in the previous chapter, in some countries, as an alternative or 
complementary to ad hoc aid or aid via funds, there is public participation either in:  
— the provision of subsidies to private insurance; 
— the direct provision of reinsurance; or 
— the provision of a security net (this is the case for Greece and Cyprus).  
Most often, support to agricultural insurance schemes comes directly from the 
national budget. In some of these countries, it is not directly the government by 
means of a ministry, but a public institution that manages the agricultural insurance-
related affairs. The names of these institutions are shown in Table 30. 
 
Table 30. Public institutions related with agricultural insurances 
Country Institutions 
Greece ELGA (Hellenic Agricultural Insurance), public insurer 
Spain ENESA (Entidad Estatal de Seguros Agrarios) — Ministry of Agriculture 
Italy ISMEA (Istituto di Servizi per il mercato agricolo alimentare), not only for insurance 
Cyprus AIO (Agricultural Insurance Organisation) 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets. 
 
However, in those countries that also have funds, the funds and insurance support 
are most often closely related, a part of the fund being used for subsidising insurance 
premiums (this is the case for Austria, Italy and the Czech Republic since 2004 and, 
to a minor extent, in France). 
 
Table 31. Funds related to subsidies and ex post aids 
Country Public/private Fund 
Belgium Public Caisse Nationale des Calamites (since 1976) 
 Mixed 
Fonds de mutualisation des animaux (since 1998) 
Fonds de mutualisation des végétaux (since 1993) — Potato 
Bulgaria Public Fund for insect pest control (against Moroccan locust) 
Czech 
Republic 
Public Support and Guarantee Fund for Farmers and Forestry (PGRLF) 
Germany Mixed Tierseuchenkassen (livestock diseases) 
Denmark Private Fund for floods, not agri-specific. Privately fed by charges on fire 
insurance premiums (1991). 
 Mixed Compensation scheme for slaughtering of animals in response to 
disease outbreaks. This compensation is, under certain 
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Country Public/private Fund 
circumstances, supplemented by compensation from funds 
established by the agricultural industry. 
Estonia - - 
Ireland Private Potato pool (potato producers fund) (ENESA 2004) 
 Mixed Fund for animal disease eradication (mixed 50 %) 
Greece - - 
Spain - - 
France Mixed Fonds National de Garantie des Calamites Agricoles (FNGCA) 
(50 %) 
Italy Public 
FSN (National Solidarity Fund) (since 1970) and 
FSNPA (National Solidarity Fund for Fisheries and Aquaculture) 
(since 2004) 
Cyprus - - 
Latvia - - 
Lithuania Public Calamity fund 
Luxembourg Public Vineyard solidarity fund 
Hungary - - 
Netherlands Mixed Compulsory livestock fund 
 Public Non-agri-specific fund (source: ENESA 2004) 
Austria Public Austrian catastrophe fund 
Poland Public Fund for epidemic diseases 
Portugal Mixed Fundo de Calamidades 
Romania - - 
Slovenia - - 
Slovakia - No information 
Finland - - 
Sweden Public (Programme for livestock infectious diseases) Swedish Board of 
Agriculture 
UK - - 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets. 
 
In Belgium there are three funds. The Caisse Nationale des Calamitées (calamities 
fund) is exclusively fed from the public budget. It gives aid in the case of calamities 
which are defined in the Law of 12 July 1976 (see Section 4.3 on ‘disaster’ and 
‘crises’ definitions). Besides this, there are two mutual funds: the budgetary fund for 
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the health and quality of animals and animal products (Fonds des animaux) since 
1998, and the budgetary fund for the production and protection of crops and crop 
products (Fonds des végétaux). The activity of the latter is limited to the potato 
sector. These two funds are co-financed on a basis of 50 % by the producers through 
compulsory levies and, after the recent crisis, up to 50 % by the European Union. 
However, besides these funds, ad hoc aid is given in very special cases, by the 
federal government (dioxin intervention 1999) and or by the administrative regional 
governments (avian flu 2005, by the Flemish Region). 
In the Czech Republic, insurable risks can only be covered by the private sector. 
Since 2004, the Support and Guarantee Fund for Farmers and Forestry (PGRLF) has 
offered premium subsidies for both crop and farm animal insurance.  
In Denmark, there is a compensation scheme for slaughtering animals in response to 
disease outbreaks. This compensation is, under certain circumstances, 
supplemented by compensation from funds established by the agricultural industry. 
Manufacturers are obliged to pay an amount to such schemes within the agricultural 
industry according to a percentage of their production or turnover. 
In Germany, there are special public programmes after natural disasters, but usually 
emergency aid is part of the federal states’ responsibility, as there is no public 
calamity fund. In cases of outbreaks of animal diseases, animal keepers are 
compensated under the Animal Disease Act in the version promulgated on 11 April 
2001. The Act lays down that a pecuniary compensation shall be paid for animals 
whose destruction has been officially ordered, as well as in cases in which animals 
have died after the destruction had been ordered or even for dead animals in which a 
notifiable disease has been detected post-mortem (Tierseuchenkassen, animal 
disease fund, institution under public law). 
In Ireland, the fund compensates farmers for the commercial value of compulsorily 
slaughtered animals. The farming community as a whole contributes to the farm in 
the form of a levy. These ‘disease eradication’ levies are imposed at the point of 
slaughter of all cattle and on milk products. The levies are adjusted regularly, with the 
objective of ensuring that 50 % of the cost of compensation is met from the levies.  
In France, the Fonds National de Garantie des Calamités Agricoles (FNGCA) covers 
non-insurable risks. The financing of FNGCA is granted by farmers and by the public 
budget on a parity base (50 %). The contribution of farmers arises from taxes levied 
on premiums paid to cover the whole set of farm risks (13 % in fire insurance 
premiums, 5 % in farmers’ car insurance premiums and 7 % in the rest of agricultural 
insurance premiums). At the same time, the FNGCA subsidises a small part of the 
insurance premiums, depending on the insurance product. After the official 
declaration of natural disaster, indemnities are paid to farmers that bought insurance 
on at least one insurable risk and that suffered losses above a certain threshold. 
In Cyprus, the public agricultural insurance organisation, the basic objective of which 
is the formation of a comprehensive system of agricultural insurance that will cover all 
agricultural crops against all natural hazards, provides subsidies (50 %) to the 
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compulsory insurance system. Complementarily, the system provides ad hoc 
government financial assistance to farmers who suffer loss of income from the perils 
caused by natural hazards to compensate the farmers’ damages which are not 
included in the insurance scheme or from crops which are not considered in the 
range of crops covered by the insurance scheme or when the reserves were not 
adequate to cover the claims. 
In Latvia, State-guaranteed compensation is given, particularly in animal epizooty 
cases, from the State funds intended for unforeseen events. There is compensation 
for losses caused by unfavourable weather conditions, natural disasters and animal 
diseases and similar, in compliance with the particular political resolutions. Subsidies 
are granted in the amount of 50 %, but limited per unit (hectare, livestock).  
In Lithuania, there is a calamity fund for loss of farm buildings, agricultural technique, 
animals and birds due to natural disasters, adverse weather conditions and animal 
epidemic diseases. Compensation of up to 60 % of losses is given to those who had 
insured the aggrieved assets and compensation of up to 20 % to those who had not. 
In the case of extraordinary disasters, the government approves ad hoc support for 
farmers. Compensation varies according to the extent of the loss, e.g. in 2005 those 
who suffered 100–80 % of losses got 50 % compensation, those who suffered 80–
50 % got 30 %, and those who suffered 50–30 % got 15 %. Usually the 
compensation was paid within the period of one year. There is also partial support for 
insurance premiums up to 50 %; this started in 1992. 
In Austria, the catastrophe fund is used mostly for preventive measures, and a small 
part is used for subsidies in crop insurance (25 % of the hail and frost insurance 
premiums). This subsidy is provided on the condition that the regional government 
also provides 25 % of the insurance premium. In the case of adverse weather 
conditions like hail or frost, no payments are allowed from the national fund because 
these events are caused by insurable risks. Sometimes the government makes 
additional ad hoc payments after natural disasters and non-insurable events. 
In Portugal, for the past 10 years, measures have been taken to face events caused 
by calamities not covered by crop insurance, in most cases, through the Fundo de 
Calamidades (calamity fund). The fund is financed through a contribution from the 
government budget and by a contribution from the farmers. Farmers have the right to 
get compensation from the fund only if they have bought a crop insurance policy 
during the campaign in which the calamity occurs. They also have to pay a 
contribution to the fund equal to 0.2 % of the insured value. The fund compensation 
is given, in most cases, as a bonus to credit interests and, exceptionally, as direct 
subsidies.  
In Romania, the agricultural producers benefit from the stipulation of Law 381/2002 if 
they are affected by natural phenomena and if they are located in a calamity area 
declared by governmental decision, and if their crops, plantations, animals, fowl or 
fish are insured by an insurance company approved by the Ministry of Agriculture. 
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Insurance premiums were subsidised initially by 20 % but in 2005 the level of subsidy 
rose to 50 %. There is no public fund for natural disasters. 
In Slovenia, there is a range of ad hoc measures applied in agriculture by the 
government to compensate for extraordinary disasters. Compensation of damage 
from natural disasters includes State aid in thee of drought, hail and frost. In the past 
decade (1994–2004) the average annual expenditure was EUR 8.2 million; however, 
after 2000 expenditure increased dramatically, as the average for 2000–04 was 
EUR 15.6 million. In terms of total budgetary expenditure, disaster aid to agriculture 
represents about one tenth in past five years (the average for 2000–04 is 10.5 %). 
Only in the 2006, for the first time, was a national programme available for insurance 
premium subsidies to crop producers. This seems to be an initiation to more 
systematic public–private cooperation in agricultural risk management in Slovenia. 
In Finland, cover is available free of charge for all farmers, given that they follow 
certain guidelines. The cover comes from the public crop damage compensation 
scheme (based on the Crop Damage Compensation Act) and compensation is also 
paid for the prevention of certain animal diseases (limited cover, based on the Animal 
Disease Act). Commercial insurance schemes are not subsidised in Finland. 
Insurance companies are generally not willing to offer insurance for such events 
(except livestock), because extreme damage is compensated for by the State.  
In Sweden, there is a public programme to combat and compensate damages from 
infectious diseases, while for other disasters in agriculture, such as contaminated 
feed, plant pests or radioactive fall-out, compensation is made on a rather ad hoc 
basis. In the infectious diseases programme, farmers do not have to pay a premium 
but are obliged to take certain measures (such as slaughter or decontamination) in 
the case of an outbreak of any of the regulated diseases. In the case of epizootic 
disease, farmers are fully compensated (100 %) for the value of animals and costs of 
decontamination, and by 50 % for production losses. In the case of zoonoses 
(salmonellosis), farmers are compensated for up to 70 % of the costs in connection 
with the disease. 
In the United Kingdom, ad hoc payments are given from the government for 
compensation in the case of an ‘Order’ for slaughtered animals (this was notable in 
2001 with around EUR 1 640 million for foot-and-mouth disease). 
 
As can be seen in Table 32, in the case of France ad hoc payments are very high 
(2000–05) compared with Spain (2000–05). Instead, in Spain, the subsidies for 
insurance are higher (see Table 16). This example demonstrates a different 
approach for the use of public payments (see Table 3). 
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Table 32. Ad hoc and funds payments in the recent years 
Country Years available 
Total 
payment 
(million 
EUR) 
Average 
payments 
/year 
(million EUR)
Comments 
Belgium 1985–2002 29.4 1.6 Frost, drought, rain, pests 
Belgium 1999 280 - Livestock: dioxin 
Bulgaria 2000–04 2 0.4 Insect pest control fund and others 
Czech Rep. 1995–2004 369.3 36.9 Flood, drought, frost 
Denmark - - - Storm and forest storm damage 
Germany 2004–06 337 112.3 
Flood 2004 more than EUR 240 million; 
livestock diseases including preventive 
measures 
Estonia - 0 0 No payments 
Ireland 1999–2004 400.6 (
1) 66.8 (1) Livestock disease 
Greece 1995–2004 701.0 70.1 - 
Spain 2000–05 22.2 3.7 Frost, drought, rain 
France 1996–2005 1 555.8 (
1) 155.6 (1) Drought 67 %, frost 19 %, rain 13 % 
Italy 2001–06 680.0 113.3 Drought and others not covered by insurance 
Cyprus 2001–04 28.6 7.2 - 
Latvia 2000–05 19.3 3.2 Frost, drought, rain 
Lithuania 2000–05 15.7 2.6 Frost, drought, rain 
Luxembourg - - - No ad hoc aid for crops. No other data 
Hungary 1999–2002 48.8 12.2 Frost, drought 
Netherlands 1998 250.0 - Excessive rain. No longer allowed 
Austria 1995–2004 55.9 5.6 Frost, drought, flood 
Poland - 10.0 10.0 Epidemic diseases 
Portugal Last 10 years 30.0 (
2) 3.0 (2) - 
Romania Last 5 years 56.8 11.4 Drought, frost, floods 
Slovenia 1995–2004 97.8 9.8 Drought, hail, frost 
Slovakia - - - No data 
Finland 1996–2005 114.2 11.4 Crop damage compensation scheme 
Sweden - - - Infectious diseases 
UK 2001–05 1 897.7 379.5 Livestock disease 
Total   1.062.3  
(Croatia) 1997–2004 - 2.5 EUR 54 million in 2003 for drought 
(Turkey) (3) 1996–2005 52.67 5.26 Animal disease control aids not included 
Notes: 
(1) 50 % of this amount comes from private contributions from the sector, either through taxes on agricultural 
insurances (France) or from levies on the commercialisation of the products (Ireland).  
(2) Portuguese farmers also contribute to the calamities fund but the amount refers to government contributions. 
(3) Exchange rate considered: EUR 1.674.000 = TRL 1 (former Turkish lira, 2005) 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets and own calculations. 
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Table 33. Average annual public payments in Spain and France 
Country 
Subsidies to 
insurance (million 
EUR) 
Ad hoc payments 
(million EUR) 
Spain 230 
4 
drought, frost, rain 
France 5 156 
drought, frost, rain 
Source: Authors’ compilation from fact sheets, and own calculations. 
 
6.3. Ad hoc aid versus insurance: law barriers  
A key point for the development of agricultural insurance schemes is whether or not 
the law forbids that ad hoc measures or disaster funds to compensate for damages 
which could have been insured. In Greece, Spain, Austria, Portugal and Sweden 
there are no payments from a public fund if there is insurance available. In France, 
payments include those damages for which there is no insurance at all or that 
insurance has not reached yet a significant diffusion level. In Italy, only subsidised 
risks are excluded from public ad hoc payments after natural disasters. In Romania, 
payments from the public budget are only given to farmers in the case of natural 
disasters if they have insured risks called ‘standard risks’ like hail. In other countries it 
seems that there are no explicit regulations. 
 
Table 34. Law barriers to aid 
Country Law barrier 
Belgium 
The definition of the phenomena that can be covered by the calamities fund 
implies that the usually insurable risks cannot perceive aids from the fund. 
According to the Law of 1976, only hail is considered as normally insurable and 
so cannot be covered by the fund.  
Bulgaria There are no law barriers for payments from public funds for natural disasters 
which could be covered by insurance. 
Czech 
Republic 
The law does not forbid ad hoc measures and disaster funds compensating 
insurable damages. But changes are taking place regarding the condition for 
State compensation, so farmers have to insure against these risks. 
Denmark No, there are no limitations. 
Germany There are no law barriers for ad hoc measures to compensate damages that 
could have been insured. 
Estonia No barriers, because insurance is not developed. 
Ireland The law does not forbid compensation for losses which could have been 
insured. 
Greece 
In Article 4 (‘exclusions’) of the 2006 regulation, it is stated that ad hoc 
compensation is not paid:  
‘9. To the owners of agricultural (crop, livestock or aquaculture) exploitations 
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Country Law barrier 
they have not insured with an insurance body (all or some of the) main 
components of their exploitation for at least one insurable risk.’  
(It is not clear what is meant by ‘insurance body’ but it is understood that, in 
practice, the ELGA services tend to consider both ELGA and private insurers as 
‘insurance bodies’). 
‘11. For losses covered partially or totally by insurance programmes of the legal 
entities providing protection services for the agricultural activity in the 
framework of the system “Hesiodus” …’ 
(The legal entities providing ‘protection services for the agricultural activity’ in 
the framework of the system ‘Hesiodus’ are, according to L.2945/01, ELGA as 
well as the insurance companies and the farmers’ mutual organisations 
participating in the ‘annual programme of agricultural insurance’. At present, no 
such programmes are offered by private insurers and mutual organisations. 
Therefore, paragraph 11 above should be read: ‘For losses covered by ELGA’.) 
France 
The new 2006 legal dispositions establish that the agricultural calamity regime 
can only include those damages for which there is no insurance at all or that 
insurance has not yet reached a significant diffusion level. In this latter case of 
partial diffusion of insurance, only those farmers that are not insured yet can 
profit form the indemnities regime. The legal framework also establishes that, 
once a particular insurance product has reached a certain diffusion threshold (in 
terms of insured surface in relation to the national surface) all farmers, whether 
they are insured or not, will be excluded from the public regime for the particular 
damage. 
Italy 
Damages to production and structures eligible for subsidised insurance are 
excluded from the compensation intervention (Legislative Decree of 29 March 
2004, No 102, Art. 5.4). For that reason, every year, the specific regions will 
specify, limited to their own territory, the guarantees, the products and the 
municipalities that they intend to include in the subsidised insurance system 
and, so, to exclude from eventual compensation intervention. 
Cyprus 
The insuring of the crops and the perils specified in the basic law and the 
subsequent amendment of the Agricultural Insurance Law in Cyprus is 
compulsory. Consequently all crops and perils which were considered by law as 
insured now have to be insured.  
The crops which cannot be insured or are not covered for all perils rely on the 
government to compensate them when they suffer damages. Usually the 
compensation is given to farmers belonging to an organisation. 
Latvia 
There is no specified law, but under certain circumstances losses caused by 
any risk may be recompensed from State funds, which diminishes the 
motivation for farmers to have their risks insured and delays development of the 
insurance market.  
Lithuania 
The State compensates damage to all aggrieved farms, but the compensation 
rate for those insured is different to that for those who are uninsured. 
Compensation of up to 60 % of losses is given for those who had insured the 
aggrieved assets and compensation of up to 20 % for those who had not.  
Luxembourg No ad hoc aid is given for climatic damages. Insurance is subsidised. 
Hungary 
In the case of subsidies which can be accessed based on natural disasters, 
losses have to meet the criteria laid down in Article 7 of Act LXXIX of 1991 on 
land taxation. There are ad hoc payments for insurable risks. 
Netherlands There are no ad hoc measures for crops, and for animals there is no private 
insurance, but a compulsory fund system fed by the sector.  
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Country Law barrier 
Austria 
Sometimes, the national or regional governments take ad hoc measures. These 
measures are forbidden for insurable risks but sometimes ad hoc payments are 
made for uninsurable risks. 
Poland An ad hoc measure is granted regardless of whether the given farmer is insured 
or not. 
Portugal 
Within the SIPAC framework (Sistema Integrado de Protecção contra 
Aleatoriedades Climáticas — DL 20/96, 19 March and DL 23/2000, 2 March), 
the calamities fund compensates the farmers for damages produced by risks 
exclusively not covered by crop insurance 
Romania 
In a case where the loss is caused by calamities stipulated in Law 381/2002, 
the agricultural producer is compensated by the State (when the calamity status 
is declared by GD), but only if the producer has insured the ‘standard’ risks 
(insurable risks).  
Slovenia 
There is no legal inhibition to eligibility for any kind of support from disaster aid 
in Slovenia on conditions of insurability, although the State aid compensation 
level is higher for claimants who prove compensation for the same loss from a 
commercial insurance company that exceeds a specified level of officially 
evaluated loss (Board of Evaluators). In the case of State aid for damage on 
agricultural production, the level of compensation is increased by 20 percentage 
points (from 40 % to 60 %) if payments from insurance exceed 30 % of total 
damage. 
Slovakia No information 
Spain 
The legal frame is composed by the Law 87/1978 of 28 December and the 
Royal Decree 2329/1979 of 14 September. Also, every year there is a legal 
yearly farm insurance plan. This plan includes the explicit compromise from the 
government of not granting extraordinary aid to farmers affected by insurable 
risks. 
Finland 
There are no law barriers for ad hoc measures to compensate damages that 
could have been insured. Ad hoc measures like the public crop damage 
compensation scheme is the most used system. 
Sweden There is no aid for insurable risks; the government considers there are no 
obvious market failures in insurance, except in the case of salmonella. 
UK 
The Animal Health Act 1981 provides for the introduction of ‘Orders’ under the 
Act, which can provide for or amend compensation payments for slaughtered 
animals. Insurance is also available for these direct losses. 
(Turkey) Article 17 of the 2005 law states that disaster aid shall not be given for insurable 
risks. 
 
6.4. Derivatives markets 
Derivatives markets were introduced in the second chapter. Organised trading in 
agricultural derivatives markets dates back to the mid-1860s with the opening of the 
Chicago Board of Trade in the USA. Since then, the trading volume as well as the 
variety of futures contracts available for trading has increased dramatically.  
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A list of the major exchanges offering agricultural futures contracts worldwide is 
presented in Table 35. 
 
Table 35. World futures and options markets in agricultural commodities 
Exchanges Location and date of 
establishment 
Agricultural products offered 
Euronext.liffe London, Paris, 
Amsterdam, Lisbon and 
Brussels; 2000 
Cocoa, Robusta coffee, white sugar, feed 
wheat, milling wheat, rapeseed, corn, 
potatoes 
Warenterminborse Hanover 
AG (WTB). 
Hanover; 1998 Hogs, piglets, potatoes, wheat, brewing barley 
Budapest Commodity 
Exchange (BCE) 
Budapest; 1989 Corn, wheat, feed barley, rapeseed, soybean, 
sunflower seed 
Poznan Commodity 
Exchange 
Poznan, Poland; 1991 Corn, wheat, sugar 
Chicago Board of Trade 
(CBOT) 
Chicago; 1848 Corn, soybeans, soybean oil, soybean meal, 
wheat, oats, rough rice, mini corn, mini 
soybeans, mini wheat, Dow AIG Index (1) 
Chicago Mercantile 
Exchange (CME) 
Chicago; 1874 Beef, dairy, e-livestock, fertiliser, hogs, lumber 
New York Board of Trade 
(NYBOT) 
New York; 1998(3) Cocoa, coffee, cotton, FCOJ, sugar 
Kansas City Board of Trade 
(KCBOT) 
Kansas; 1856 Wheat 
Minneapolis Grain Exchange 
(MGE) 
Minneapolis; 1881 Wheat, three classes of wheat indices (2), 
national corn index (NCI), national soybean 
index (NSI) 
South African Futures 
Exchange (SAFEX) 
Sandown; 1988 White maize, yellow maize, wheat, sunflower 
seed, soybeans 
Sydney Futures Exchange 
(SFE) 
Sydney; 1960 Wool, New Zealand broad wool, MLA/SFE 
cattle 
Winnipeg Commodities 
Exchange 
Winnipeg; 1972 Canola, barley, flaxseed, feed wheat 
(1) Dow Jones AIG Commodity Index Futures (AI) 
(2) Hard winter wheat index (HWI), soft red winter wheat index (SRI) and spring wheat index (SWI). 
(3) It originated in 1870 as the New York Cotton Exchange (NYCE). In 1998, the New York Board of Trade 
became the parent company of both the New York Cotton Exchange and the Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa 
Exchange (CSCE) (founded in 1882). 
Source: Battley (1999). 
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In the European markets, agricultural derivatives have been traded since 1929 with 
the establishment of the London Commodity Exchange (LCE) (55). Recently, there 
have been considerable efforts in Europe to develop agricultural futures and options 
markets. At least four new commodity exchanges that offer futures and options based 
on agricultural commodities have been established since 1988. Some examples of 
these are: the olive oil futures market of Jaén (Spain); the Blagovna Borza maize and 
barley futures of Ljubljana (Slovenia); the cereals, sunflower, beans, timber, rice and 
sugar futures in the Sofia Commodity Exchange (Bulgaria); the maize, wheat and 
sunflower options and futures contracts and feed barley futures contracts in the 
Budapest Commodity Exchange (Hungary), since 1989; the wheat and cotton futures 
exchanges in Turkey (since 2005).  
Although many of the new European agricultural futures and options markets are not 
actively traded, changes in economic and agricultural policies over the past 10 to 15 
years appear to have created more favourable conditions for the development of 
futures and options markets. In particular, many of the new agricultural derivatives 
markets were introduced after the implementation of reductions in price supports for 
major commodities due to the 1992 and Agenda 2000 reforms, as well as 
implementation of the 1995 WTO Agreement on Agriculture. This has resulted in the 
launch of a number of new commodity and agricultural exchanges in central and 
eastern Europe as well as the introduction of at least 38 new agricultural futures and 
options contracts. These new contracts include futures and/or options for wheat, 
maize, live hogs, rapeseed, rapeseed meal and rapeseed oil. On the whole, it seems 
that, consistent with the trends in European agricultural policy towards reduced 
market intervention, most new European agricultural futures contracts have been 
designed to reflect the needs of producers and are more in line with agricultural 
commodities produced and consumed within Europe. 
 
Evaluation of derivatives markets 
The growth in derivatives trading over recent years reflects the increased economic 
benefits (56) which futures markets provide to market agents. These benefits are 
mainly price discovery, market transparency and risk management through hedging. 
Price discovery is the process of revealing information about current and expected 
spot prices through the futures and forward markets. Risk management refers to 
hedgers using derivatives contracts to control their spot price risk. The dual roles of 
price discovery and hedging provide benefits that cannot be offered in the spot 
market alone and are often presented as the justification for futures trading. Futures 
market prices are used as the reference for all the US revenue insurance products. 
                                            
(55) The London International Financial Futures Exchange (LIFFE) merged with London Commodity Exchange 
(LCE) in 1996. Later in 2001, Euronext acquired LIFFE and was renamed to Euronext.liffe. 
(56) For further information see FOA 2005. 
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Besides these benefits, there is a basic benefit from the policy perspective: if farmers 
can manage market risks effectively by using derivatives markets, there will be less 
pressure for taxpayer-funded support prices or emergency aid packages.  
 
In summary, derivatives markets could provide a theoretically sound agricultural risk 
management method for farmers (as well as processor, merchandiser or others). Yet 
European agri-businesses were slow in the uptake of derivatives products; for 
instance, only about 11 % of UK grain producers have been reported to employ 
agricultural derivatives products. The low participation in the market can also by 
judged by the number of futures contracts traded relative to the physical base. In the 
UK for instance, the volume in the futures market is equivalent to the level of physical 
activity. In contrast, in the USA, futures volume is on average 10 times the level of 
physical activity while, in South Africa, the ratio in 2003 was at about the same level 
as in the USA. Lack of correlation and basis risk, the presence of the common 
agricultural policy, inadequate information and training, liquidity risk, transaction costs 
and affordability, and availability of other risk management tools may have 
contributed to the low participation of agricultural producers in the European 
derivatives markets (57).  
 
 
                                            
(57) For further information see FOA 2005. 
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7. Livestock sanitary risks and crises  
 
7.1. Chapter synthesis 
This chapter is a collection of ideas developed in several studies made during the 
past few years with the intention of analysing the costs and impacts of recent 
livestock epidemic outbreaks in Europe. Furthermore, it aims to analyse different 
methods of addressing the economic impacts of animal disease in the Member 
States. The objectives of this chapter are: 
(i) to summarise scientific work carried out recently and in the past on animal 
disease; 
(ii) to provide a framework to show the complexity of defining impacts; 
(iii) to present some potential synergies for integrating work done in various fields 
and at different levels; 
(iv) to provide richer findings.  
 
7.2. Literature survey on sanitary risks and crises in EU 
livestock 
The coming pages review a recent publication entitled The economics of livestock 
disease insurance (Koontz et al.,. 2006). The content of the book is the result of two 
conferences: ‘The livestock insurance products international conference and forum: 
discovery of ideas and issues’, which was held in November 2002 in Colorado, and 
‘The economics of animal health’, held in July 2003 during the Western Agricultural 
Economics Association meeting in Denver, Colorado. A huge number of experts in 
animal disease management, insurance and public policy contributed to this book. 
A report made in 2003 by the Institute for Risk Management in Agriculture (IRMA) 
from Wageningen University in the Netherlands for the European Commission is also 
analysed (Asseldonk et al. 2003). Livestock epidemics can result in substantial 
losses for governments, farmers and all the other participants of the livestock 
production chain involved. The EU and national governments generally support the 
largest part of the direct losses, such as the value of destroyed animals and 
organisational costs. Consequential losses, such as losses resulting from empty 
buildings and movement standstills, are almost always completely borne by the 
farmers themselves if not insured privately.  
Due to various developments (enlargement of the European Union with acceding 
countries, budgetary constraints, interest of farmers to have consequential losses 
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covered by means of insurance), however, the current risk financing system for 
livestock epidemics is being reconsidered due to various developments. Let us list 
and analyse the existing risk financing systems in the Member States.  
 
7.2.1. Direct losses 
As shown in Table 37, some Member States finance the non-EU-compensated part 
of the direct losses (58) entirely from the national budget. Other Member States have 
set up some form of statutory system to co-finance the direct losses. These public–
private financing schemes have a compulsory fund structure in which all farmers pay 
a tax. In the case of co-financing to complement the public part, the amount that is 
financed by the sector is either proportional or non-proportional. Only a limited 
number of countries apply free public disaster assistance. 
In some countries the government compensates above the value of the animals 
which are forcibly slaughtered, to cover part of the consequential losses. The current 
applied consequential loss cover can be based on the actual losses incurred or an 
estimation of the loss based on the period with business interruption (59) or a fixed 
amount (60).Not all the cases are eligible for compensation; there are some 
parameters to respond to.  
 
 
 
 
                                            
(58) Direct losses due to disease: direct financial loss due to mortality or morbidity of livestock or crop plants can 
vary from insignificant to catastrophic. In many cases the direct losses would be modest and would fall on a 
small number of farms. One of the major determinants of the magnitude of the direct losses will be the 
rapidity with which the disease is noticed and diagnosed.  
(59) I.e. fixed sum per day times the duration. 
(60) I.e. 10 % of the animal value. 
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Table 36. Classification of animal diseases 
Multiple species disease 
Anthrax 
Aujeszky's disease 
Bluetongue 
Brucellosis (Brucella 
abortus)  
Brucellosis (Brucella 
melitensis)  
Brucellosis (Brucella suis)  
Crimean Congo 
haemorrhagic fever  
Echinococcosis/hydatidosis  
Foot-and-mouth disease  
Heartwater  
Japanese encephalitis  
Leptospirosis  
New world screwworm 
(Cochliomyia hominivorax) 
Old world screwworm 
(Chrysomya bezziana) 
Paratuberculosis  
Q fever  
Rabies 
Rift Valley fever 
Rinderpest 
Trichinellosis 
Tularemia  
Vesicular stomatitis 
West Nile fever 
Cattle diseases 
Bovine anaplasmosis 
Bovine babesiosis 
Bovine genital 
campylobacteriosis 
Bovine spongiform 
encephalopathy  
Bovine tuberculosis 
Bovine viral diarrhoea 
Contagious bovine 
pleuropneumonia  
Enzootic bovine leukosis 
Haemorrhagic septicaemia 
Infectious bovine  
rhinotracheitis/infectious 
pustular vulvovaginitis 
Lumpy skin disease 
Malignant catarrhal fever  
Theileriosis 
Trichomonosis 
Trypanosomosis (tsetse-
transmitted) 
Sheep and goat diseases 
Caprine arthritis/encephalitis 
Contagious agalactia 
Contagious caprine 
pleuropneumonia 
Enzootic abortion of ewes 
(ovine chlamydiosis) 
Maedi-visna 
Nairobi sheep disease 
Ovine epididymitis (Brucella 
ovis) 
Peste des petits ruminants 
Salmonellosis (S. 
abortusovis) 
Scrapie 
Sheep pox and goat pox 
 
Swine diseases 
African swine fever 
Classical swine fever 
Nipah virus encephalitis  
Porcine cysticercosis 
Porcine reproductive and 
respiratory syndrome 
Swine vesicular disease 
Transmissible 
gastroenteritis 
 
Avian diseases 
Avian chlamydiosis 
Avian infectious bronchitis  
Avian infectious 
laryngotracheitis 
Avian mycoplasmosis (M. 
gallisepticum) 
Avian mycoplasmosis (M. 
synoviae) 
Duck virus hepatitis  
Fowl cholera 
Fowl typhoid 
Highly pathogenic avian 
influenza and low 
pathogenic avian influenza 
in poultry 
Infectious bursal disease 
(Gumboro disease) 
Marek's disease 
Newcastle disease 
Pullorum disease 
Turkey rhinotracheitis 
 
 
 
 
Source: OIE. 
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Member States are obliged to apply the control measures established in EU 
directives (61) if an outbreak arises of former ‘List A diseases’ (Office International des 
Epizooties, 1998). Table 36 shows the former list A diseases. They concern 
transmittable diseases which have a very serious and rapid spread potential, 
irrespective of national borders. 
After obtaining EU approval, countries may take additional control measures. These 
livestock epidemics can have large economic consequences not only for farmers but 
also for other various parties of the production chain in terms of direct or 
consequential losses. 
Direct losses comprise the value of animals destroyed under depopulation and 
welfare control measures and the costs of organisational aspects, such as the 
monitoring of farms in restriction zones. 
The veterinary budget of the European Union refunds 50 % of the costs of 
compulsory and pre-emptive slaughter, 70 % of the costs of welfare slaughter and 
50 % of the organisational costs (62) (Asseldonk et al. 2006). 
As has already been said, certain Member States finance entirely the direct losses 
using the national funds. In contrast, others have set up a kind of statutory system to 
co-finance what is considered the non-EU subsidised part of direct losses (Belgium, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Austria). In this case all the farmers have to pay a 
compulsory tax. The levy system is based on pooling over time within the sector. 
Payments to the fund can be organised through up-front payments (deposits) or 
through payments after an outbreak, or both. Belgium, Germany and Austria have a 
proportional levy system to establish emergency funds. 
 
                                            
(61) The basis for these measures originates from EU Council Directives 85/511/EEC and 80/217/EEC 
respectively. Measures include: (i) stamping-out of infected herds; (ii) pre-emptive slaughter of contact herds; 
(iii) the immediate establishment of surveillance zones around such herds. In these zones, animal 
movements are restricted and to a large extent prohibited. 
(62) Council Decision 90/424/EEC of 26 June 1990 on expenditure in the veterinary field (OJ No. L 224, 18.08.90) 
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Table 37. Contribution of the sector to schemes covering direct losses resulting 
from livestock epidemics 
Contribution 
 
No levy (Partly) levy or compulsory 
insurance scheme 
Austria  x 
Belgium  x 
Denmark x  
Finland x  
France  x  
Germany  x 
Greece  x 
Ireland x  
Italy x  
Luxembourg x  
Netherlands  x 
Portugal x  
Spain x  
Sweden x  
United Kingdom x  
Source: Asseldonk et al. (2006). 
 
Let us examine Table 37. 
Austria: There is a proportional levy system to establish an emergency fund. 
Belgium: The government has set up a fund that is used to finance various 
animal health and quality improvement measures. The levy can vary 
depending on the level set by the government. The levy is differentiated 
according to species and farm size.  
Denmark: The government pays only for the value of the animals which are 
compulsorily slaughtered. If a whole herd is slaughtered, a further 20 % 
is paid to cover the loss of income from the herd. No statutory or 
voluntary levies are operated to establish an emergency fund. 
Germany: There is a national framework but each Bundesland is responsible for 
running the programme with own rules of application. The scheme is 
compulsory. The administrative council is made up of farmer and 
ministry representatives and decides the size of the levy. The 
compensation payments are made from the available funds and the 
Ministry of Agriculture pays for the costs if the fund runs out of money. 
To pay back the loan to the ministry the levy increases over the 
following years after an outbreak. 
No compensation is paid to farmers in the surveillance zones. 
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Greece:  The government operates a compulsory agricultural insurance scheme 
via the Greek Agricultural Insurance Organisation (ELGA). ELGA 
organises and implements programmes of proactive protection and 
insures the production. ELGA is funded by an ‘income from special 
insurance contributions’ (of which the fee is 0.5 % of the value of the 
sold livestock production) and this constitutes one of the major financial 
sources. 
Spain: No government compensation is available other than for slaughtered 
animals. No statutory or voluntary levies exist. 
Italy:  No government compensation is available other than for slaughtered 
animals. No statutory or voluntary levies exist. As for Spain: cover is not 
as complete as for other countries such as the UK. 
Luxembourg: The Luxembourg government pays compensation when animals are 
compulsorily slaughtered. No levy for farmers. 
Netherlands: The producers and the Ministry of Agriculture have agreed on a system 
where a bank guarantee is supplied and producers will have to pay the 
levy mainly after the epidemic. The amount of the levy will depend on 
the actual cost of the epidemic. 
Finland: No statutory or voluntary levies are operated to establish an emergency 
fund. The government reimburses farmers. 
Sweden: If a ‘production unit’ is closed during an epidemic of a notifiable disease 
the government can compensate the farmer for the destruction of the 
animals, animal value, decontamination and for production losses. 
Compensation for certain notifiable diseases can cover up to 100 % for 
both animal value and decontamination costs. Veterinary costs caused 
by an outbreak are not compensated. There is no levy for farmers. 
UK:  For FMD in cattle, sheep and pigs and for CSF and swine vesicular 
disease (SVD) in pigs the government compensates destructed animals 
at 100 % of the market value. There is no levy for farmers. The UK 
government also pays some compensation for animals slaughtered due 
to bovine tuberculosis, brucellosis and BSE in cattle. As far as poultry 
diseases are concerned, such as avian influenza and Newcastle 
disease, the government only pays compensation for birds slaughtered 
which are non-diseased (at 100 % of their market value). For Aujeszky's 
disease in pigs the government will also pay 100 % of the animal's 
market value (63).  
 
                                            
(63) The only difference with Aujeszky's disease is that when the disease was in the country a levy was paid on all 
pigs at slaughter to cover the compensation costs. This levy is no longer collected but the legislation is in 
place to collect it again should the disease come in to the country again. 
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Thus, in conclusion, direct losses are (partly) compensated by the EU or national 
governments and there are mainly three types of financing schemes adopted by the 
Member States; let us visualise them in Table 38. 
 
Table 38. Financing schemes covering direct losses in livestock epidemics in the 
EU 
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Source: Asseldonk et al. (2006). 
 
 
7.2.2. Indirect or consequential losses 
In insurance contracts, consequential losses are indirect losses — a reduction in the 
value of property that is a result of a direct damage loss. They are usually associated 
with a time element or other remote or indemnification type losses. Consequential 
losses are different from ensuing losses since consequential losses are indirect 
losses, not direct damage losses, whereas following losses are further or additional 
direct damage losses that have been initiated by the original direct damage cause of 
loss.  
 
Consequential losses that arise at farm level can be due to one or more categories: 
— business interruption, 
— losses related to establishing restriction zones, 
— additional repopulation, 
— losses from emergency vaccination, 
— price effect. 
Consequential losses are almost always completely supported by the farmers 
themselves. In some EU Member States, the absence of public assistance has led to 
the creation of private insurance schemes for some types of livestock production. In 
fact, we can say that in some Member States, the consequential loss risk is 
transferred by means of private insurance systems.  
There is also sort of public–private partnership in which the government can play the 
role of the insurer or of the reinsurer for the subsidised consequential loss policy. In 
such a partnership, the government functions either as an insurer or as a reinsurer. 
Another option is that the government subsidises the insurance premium directly. In 
the case of a public–private partnership with governmental reinsurance, the private 
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insurer both retails and services the insurance policy, while retaining a part of the 
loss risk (Meuwissen et al., 2003).  
However, the policies are reinsured not solely through the reinsurance market but 
also or only by the government, either as a quota-share or stop-loss provision. 
Quota-share provisions specify which percentage of premiums and loss exposure the 
private company will retain. Stop-loss provisions specify the maximum amount of loss 
that the company will have to cover before the reinsurer covers the additional losses 
(Skees and Barnet, 1999). 
Governments can also financially assist farmers for consequential losses. This kind 
of programme can be formalised by a public insurance scheme or by ad hoc relief 
payments. In the case of a public insurance scheme, risk covered is decided a priori; 
in the case of a relief programme, it generally functions after the outbreaks.  
Many standard livestock insurance policies in Europe indemnify farmers for animal 
losses as a result of a number of perils, but some have been extended, sometimes 
as an option, to cover at least a part of consequential losses. 
The indemnity of additional consequential loss cover is based on:  
(i) a percentage of the insured sum (for example 10 % of the value of the livestock); 
(ii) duration of business interruption; 
(iii) actual losses. 
In most cases the farmer chooses, within a certain range, the value of the livestock 
and the daily gross margin. All private insurance policies exclude direct losses that 
are met by the public sector. Additional constraints include a probationary period, a 
maximum cover period, a multi-year policy term, a maximum insured amount, a 
maximum indemnification amount and a deductible. 
Few private insurance schemes exist on the European market to cover the risk of 
consequential losses from livestock epidemics. 
The current EU financing schemes covering losses resulting from livestock diseases 
are reviewed in Table 39. The results are obtained from literature and from a survey 
among members of the Comité Européen des Assurances (CEA), the Agricultural 
Risks Insurance Committee (CEA 2005a, 2005d). The private and public–private 
financing systems refer to insurance and the public system to ad hoc aid. 
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Table 39. EU financing schemes covering (part of) consequential livestock losses 
resulting from livestock epidemics 
 Financing system 
 Private Public–private Public 
Belgium - - - 
Denmark - - + 
Germany + - - 
Ireland - - - 
Greece - + - 
Spain - + - 
France  - - + 
Italy +/- - - 
Luxembourg - - - 
Netherlands + - - 
Austria  - - - 
Portugal - - - 
Finland - - + 
Sweden + - + 
United Kingdom + - - 
Legend:  
- not available +/ it depends from the disease and from 
species bred 
+ 
(partly) cover and 1 % maximum 
participation (head insured/head 
registered) 
  
Source: Asseldonk et al. (2006) 
 
Let us analyse briefly the situation in these Member States regarding the 
consequential losses cover. 
Denmark: The government supports a further 20 % to cover the loss of income 
from the compulsory slaughter of a herd. 
Germany: The private Ertragsschadenversicherung indemnifies farmers against 
the full range of consequential losses as one of the cover options. 
Spain: Farmers can insure against disease outbreaks, although only for cattle, 
sheep and goats (Agroseguro). The insurance covers the difference 
between the actual level of aid farmers receive when an animal is 
slaughtered and its real value (which is another approach to direct loss 
compensation). These policies are government subsidised. 
France:  There is no insurance to cover epidemic losses. When an outbreak 
occurs the losses are paid by public authorities following a certain 
priorities scheme. 
Italy:  The additional cover is only available for dairy cows and sheep. The 
level of participation is very limited (< 5 %). 
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Netherlands: The additional cover (only for cattle) can be a proportion of the insured 
sum of the culled animals (ranging from 10 % to 30 %) or be based on 
the duration of business interruption. In certain specific cases a mutual 
insurance scheme also covers the consequential losses. 
Finland:  The government is authorised to compensate consequential losses (via 
ad hoc payments) for farmers who suffer substantial income losses. 
There are no commercial insurance companies offering insurance 
programmes for consequential losses caused by epizootic diseases.  
Sweden: The compensation that a farmer receives from the government is 
calculated as the difference between the actual profit and the expected 
profit if the farm was still engaged in production. Compensation for 
consequential losses can vary from 50 % up to 100 % in the case of 
certain defined diseases.  
UK: There are insurance schemes which would pay consequential losses, 
but they are not set as typical business interruption covers and merely 
pay a selected percentage (usually 25 %) of the direct loss 
compensation. This means they only pay out when animals are 
slaughtered and do not cover losses in restricted zones or price effects.  
Only a few private insurance systems exist in Europe to cover the consequential 
losses due to livestock epidemics (e.g. in Germany, Italy, Sweden, the Netherlands 
and the UK). 
Most general livestock insurance schemes cover death and emergency slaughter 
because of the illness. 
 
7.2.3. Main conclusions on the current financing schemes 
The main conclusions arising from the IRMA report (Asseldonk et al., 2003) with 
respect to the current applied risk financing schemes currently applied are those 
listed below. 
— Direct losses: Only the value of the animals that are compulsorily slaughtered of 
the non-EU compensated part is compensated by means of a public or statutory 
private financing scheme. The amount that is payable by the farmer depends 
mainly on whether or not there have been major outbreaks in previous years. Risk 
is shared between the national government and the sector for proportional as well 
as non-proportional schemes. 
— Consequential losses: Livestock producers in Europe can currently obtain only 
limited cover (private, public–private or public) for consequential losses as a result 
of an epidemic. A widely adopted EU insurance scheme covering all epidemic 
diseases for all types of livestock is absent. In some countries the government 
compensates above the value of the animals that are compulsorily slaughtered, to 
cover part of the consequential losses.  
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Other EU Member States partly compensate consequential losses on the basis of 
actual incurred losses (a form of ad hoc relief programme also exists). The 
currently applied consequential loss cover can be based on the losses incurred or 
an estimation of the loss based on the period with business interruption (64) or a 
fixed amount. In general, farms that are confronted with losses as a result of 
decreased market value of their products but are not infected with an epidemic 
disease or are not in a movement standstill zone are not eligible for 
compensation. In some other EU Member States the absence of public 
assistance has led to the creation of private insurance schemes for some types of 
livestock production.  
— Producers do not commonly take up private policies that are specifically designed 
to cover sequential losses. Only the German Ertragsschadenversicherung has a 
relatively high level of participation. 
 
Perspective for financial schemes 
Given the characteristics of the risk under analysis, a mandatory system to finance 
direct losses will facilitate alertness and rapid action in the case of an outbreak of an 
epidemic. In contrast, a consequential loss compensation scheme might be voluntary 
(producers can cope with this business risk in alternative ways).  
Compensation for direct losses can be based on either a pre-set animal value or 
actual market value at the moment of culling. Compensation for consequential losses 
can ideally be based on actual losses incurred. However, basing the indemnity on a 
fixed sum per day times the duration of business interruption is probably a more 
feasible solution (for example for those countries joining the EU in the near future and 
those with inaccurate farm records). 
Farms that are confronted with losses as a result of decreased market value of their 
products but are not infected with an epidemic disease or are not in a movement 
standstill zone should not be eligible for compensation. 
The largest involvement of farmers is likely to be achieved by a levy system that is 
organised (partly) by the farmers themselves and a mutual insurance scheme. 
The (prospective) schemes should as far as possible: 
(i) not disturbance of markets;  
(ii) be compatible with WTO agreements;  
(iii) be run by the private market, without official EU participation; 
(iii) be applicable to the whole of the EU. 
The IRMA study concludes by stating that the schemes should be applicable to the 
whole of the EU. A levy scheme and an insurance scheme can be implemented in all 
EU Member States. 
                                            
(64) Fixed sum per day times the duration. 
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7.3. The expert workshop on options for harmonised cost-
sharing schemes for epidemic livestock diseases  
This section of the chapter summarises the output of an expert workshop (65) on the 
outcomes of a study, requested by the European Commission and conducted by the 
Community Animal Health Policy (CAHP) and the Food Chain Evaluation Consortium 
(FCEC66). The content of the study focuses on a pre-feasibility investigation on cost-
sharing schemes for epidemic livestock diseases. The aim of the Commission is to 
further increase the level of responsibility of stakeholders regarding the prevention, 
detection and control of major epidemic animal diseases. The Commission 
suggested that the potential of different options should be assessed to replace 
current ad hoc emergency measures, including support to private insurance 
schemes.  
 
7.3.1. Criteria for harmonised cost-sharing schemes 
I. Categorisation of animal diseases: Cost-sharing schemes have to take into 
account that the public interest in managing risks associated with a particular disease 
depends on the possible impacts on public health, animal health and/or the economic 
impacts of the disease. 
II. Incentive compatibility: Incentives provided by cost-sharing schemes, in 
particular by their monetary flows, have to encourage efficient risk-reducing 
behaviour of all parties involved, in particular through preventive measures. 
Incentives for preventive measures to reduce risks and avert crises, and to minimise 
their effects, must be provided. 
III. Balancing costs and responsibilities: The financing of cost-sharing schemes 
has to reflect the responsibilities of the parties involved.  
The costs of disease control, eradication and prevention should be shared.  
IV. Prevention of distortion of competition: State intervention should not lead to a 
distortion of competition between Member States. 
V. Compatibility with EU financial instruments and ongoing initiatives: Cost-
sharing schemes should operate within a framework for State support that takes into 
account EU financial instruments (including use of funds from modulation, if 
                                            
(65) The workshop was held the17th March 2006, Brussels and brought together experts from insurers, 
stakeholder organization, costs sharing schemes, the Commission, the European Parliament and the 
evaluation team. 
66 The FCEC consist of Civic Consulting, Bureau van Dijk, Arcadia International and Agra CEAS 
  
 215 
appropriate), cross-compliance requirements and WTO requirements. Cost-sharing 
schemes have to be seen in the ongoing discussion on risk and crisis management in 
the agricultural sector and the ongoing CAHP evaluation. 
VI. Harmonisation and flexibility of implementation: Cost-sharing schemes 
should be harmonised to the extent necessary to fulfil the above criteria, while taking 
into account existing systems. 
 
7.3.2. Main alternatives for cost-sharing schemes 
Four main alternatives are available to finance prevention, the detection and control 
of outbreaks of major epidemic animal diseases at the Community/Member State 
levels in the future. 
 
A. Continuation of the current system of expenditure in the veterinary field 
The current financing of control measures in case of a disease outbreak is focused 
on the compensation of direct losses (67) (mainly related to the slaughter of animals 
and their destruction). This provides adverse incentives under certain circumstances 
(and therefore could be not fully in line with criterion II). Also, the current level of 
financial responsibility of the parties involved (criterion III) is very different in Member 
States. 
In some Member States the compensation of direct losses is fully paid by the 
government (in combination with EU co-financing) — no cost-sharing scheme exists. 
In other Member States stakeholders have to finance compulsory cost-sharing 
schemes that cover a part of or even the whole national contribution (up to a certain 
limit). This lack of harmonisation might lead to a distortion of competition between 
Member States (criterion IV) (68).  
 
B. Financing costs of disease control through ad hoc measures in the case of 
a disease outbreak 
Ad hoc compensation rules are usually developed after a disease outbreak, either at 
national or Community level or both. This involves, however, uncertainty for farmers 
regarding how much compensation is being paid to them, if any.  
No incentives are provided to encourage efficient risk-reducing behaviour of all 
parties involved (criterion II); on the contrary, it could motivate risk-increasing 
behaviour in certain cases because compensation in the case of a disease outbreak 
is taken for granted. This also could imply adverse incentives to inflate aggregate 
losses. 
                                            
(67) See the glossary for a definition of direct losses.  
(68) Cross reference: Chapter 4, paragraphs 4.1.1 and 4.1.2 of the report. 
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C. Setting up a unified cost-sharing scheme at the European level 
A possibility for providing compensation in the case of a disease outbreak that fulfils 
most of the above listed criteria could be to set up a European cost-sharing scheme, 
following as a possible example an existing national model such as a public animal 
health fund (NL), to which every farmer would have to contribute. A unified cost-
sharing scheme at the European level would per definition not allow flexibility of 
implementation by the Member States and would also not take into account existing 
systems (criterion VI). Thus setting up an EU-wide cost-sharing organisation could be 
out of line.  
 
D. Defining a harmonised Community framework for national or regional cost-
sharing schemes  
The initial analysis of the evaluation team indicates that this is the preferred 
alternative that can be brought into line with the above criteria. The main element of 
this alternative is to resort to existing national schemes, and to require other Member 
States to set up similar systems. National cost-sharing schemes could have a 
different institutional set-up but would have to function according to common rules. 
This would allow for flexibility of implementation by the Member States and at the 
same time be likely to increase acceptance by stakeholders, as participation 
mechanisms are easier to implement at the national or regional level. Harmonisation 
at the EU level should cover: 
— the obligation of Member States to introduce a cost-sharing scheme at the 
national or regional level; 
— the objective of the different schemes, i.e. providing efficient transfer of animal 
health risk from farmers to a cost-sharing scheme; and  
— the basic principles for efficient schemes, involving organisational principles like 
the responsibility for certain diseases only, and operating principles like conditions 
for incentive compatibility and covered risks. 
This last proposal seems to be the favourite. Let us go further, studying the details of 
the document we are summarising. 
 
7.3.3. Categorisation of animal diseases (criterion I) 
Epidemic livestock diseases may involve large externalities, i.e. costs resulting for 
third parties. An animal health standard is efficient if it not only accounts for the 
losses of the individual farmer but takes into account losses that may result for third 
parties such as farmers in the neighbourhood.  
When an efficient standard is implemented, the total costs of disease over time are 
minimised. When efficient standards are lower than legal standards, this has no 
effect on prevailing animal health standards, because legal standards have to be 
met. When efficient standards are higher than legal standards, however, a cost-
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sharing scheme should require the implementation of these standards as a pre-
requisite. For example, it might be efficient to have regular health checks of farm 
animals for all farmers (not required by law) instead of indemnifying the costs of 
large-scale disease outbreaks that could possibly have been prevented by such 
checks.  
 
Certain animal diseases require significant public involvement in a cost-
sharing scheme and participation of farmers in a scheme needs to be 
compulsory 
Some diseases are a large potential hazard to the economy and/or to the health of 
the population and are therefore normally covered by legislation.  
The diseases involving large externalities are mainly extremely contagious diseases 
like FMD or avian influenza, which are referred to hereafter as diseases with high 
externalities (DHE).  
Efficient animal health standards to manage the risk of these diseases are relatively 
high and an efficient cost-sharing scheme has to consider an effective mechanism 
that ensures implementation of these standards. Extremely contagious diseases are 
very difficult to be covered on unregulated private insurance markets because of their 
loss accumulation potential.  
There is a public interest to cover diseases of this type in a cost-sharing scheme. A 
cost-sharing scheme for diseases with high externalities (DHE scheme) should be 
compulsory (with a compulsory levy, as already exist in some Member States (69)).  
 
Some diseases require only limited public involvement 
These diseases will hereafter be referred to as diseases with low externalities (DLE). 
They are mostly only moderately infectious (e.g. brucellosis, bovine tuberculosis). 
The main reason for public concern is that under specific conditions they may pose 
some hazard to the economy and/or to the health of the population and therefore are 
mostly covered by legislation.  
Also, if a DLE is notifiable according to Community or OIE rules, an outbreak may 
lead to additional externalities through potentially affecting trade in animals and 
products of animal origin. 
 
Main points 
(a) Also in the case of diseases with low externalities (DLE), participation in a cost-
sharing scheme could be compulsory, as is the case for DHE.  
(b) Participation in a cost-sharing scheme for DLE could be voluntary. 
(c) DLE diseases could be left to private insurance markets (similar to DNE, see 
below). 
                                            
(69) Cross reference: Chapter 4: see Tables 25 and 26 of the report.  
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Other diseases do not require public involvement and related risks should be 
left to private insurance markets 
These diseases will hereafter be referred to as diseases with no externalities (DNE). 
Similar to DLE, a spread to other farms is not usually to be expected, and a large-
scale epidemic is almost impossible. They are mostly not covered by relevant 
legislation. Cost-sharing solutions for DNE can be left to private insurance markets, 
since there is no public interest to restrict freedom of farmers’ production 
management decisions; governments should support the development of private 
insurance markets to cover these risks. 
 
Disease categorisation could take into account regional differences 
Whether a disease poses a potentially large hazard to an economy and/or population 
(i.e. whether it is a DHE) may depend on the infectiousness and other characteristics 
of the disease, but also on regional factors like climatic and other environmental 
conditions, prevailing farming practices, farming density and others. 
Disease categorisation could therefore differ by region. On the other hand, having 
different categories of diseases may also affect the free circulation of goods and 
animals. 
 
Main points 
(a) Disease categorisation should be carried out at the Community level. 
(b) Disease categorisation should be carried out by each cost-sharing scheme 
according to harmonised criteria. 
(c) Disease categorisation should be carried out by each cost-sharing scheme 
according to criteria defined by each scheme. 
 
7.3.4. Incentive compatibility (criterion II) 
Contributions of farmers to a cost-sharing scheme have to reflect their 
individual risks 
Whenever a cost-sharing organisation observes risk-relevant production 
circumstances or decisions (location, degree of vertical integration of the production 
chain, the intensity of livestock contacts with other farms, etc.) the contributions to a 
cost-sharing scheme have to be differentiated according to the effect of these risk-
relevant factors on expected losses. At minimum, the contributions to a cost-sharing 
scheme should reflect regional differences in risk, caused by e.g. differences in 
livestock density. 
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Main points 
(a) A cost-sharing organisation should be required to differentiate contributions of 
farmers according to the individual risk of the farmer. 
(b) A cost-sharing organisation should be required to provide a bonus (reduction of 
contribution) for farmers that take specific measures to decrease their individual 
risk. 
(c) A cost-sharing organisation should be required to differentiate contributions by 
taking into account regional differences in risk. 
 
The compensation payment made by the cost-sharing scheme to a farmer for 
losses in the case of disease outbreak has to involve a deductible 
There are costly production management decisions which are not observable and 
verifiable for a cost-sharing organisation at reasonable cost. Many of these decisions 
influence the probability of losses caused by epidemic livestock diseases (e.g. 
hygienic and bio-security measures). In order to provide incentives for risk-reducing 
measures, loss risk should not be completely transferred to a cost-sharing 
organisation. Thus, a farmer has to bear some financial consequences of a disease 
outbreak up to a deductible, which could be defined as a share of the sum assured 
(e.g. 10 % of herd value). Losses exceeding the deductible will be indemnified. 
 
The compensation payment made by the cost-sharing scheme to a farmer for 
losses in the case of disease outbreak has to depend on the time of reporting 
the suspicion 
There are also costly production management decisions that affect loss size, which 
are mainly emergency reaction decisions after disease outbreak. In order to provide 
incentives for loss reduction, the compensation should not indemnify high losses 
completely (e.g. through a proportional coinsurance rate for high losses). The most 
important loss size-reducing measure is early reporting of (suspected) disease 
outbreaks so that control measures can be applied in good time. The number of 
diseased or dead animals can serve as a signal for the interval between the time 
when first symptoms could have been detected and the time of reporting (70).  
 
Main points 
(a) A cost-sharing organisation should apply current best practices and compensate 
only 50 % of the value of diseased animals at the time of reporting, and not at all 
dead animals. 
                                            
(70) For example, the Dutch Animal Health Fund generally compensates only 50 % of the value of diseased 
animals. Dead animals at the time of reporting are not compensated at all. Animals that are diseased or die 
after the outbreak is reported to the authorities are compensated fully. 
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(b) A cost-sharing organisation should further differentiate compensation rules for 
diseased and dead animals at the time of reporting depending on the 
characteristics of the disease, to take into account differences in morbidity and 
mortality. 
(c) A cost-sharing organisation should apply other compensation rules that provide 
incentives for early reporting. 
 
The cost-sharing scheme has to cover all production risks to avoid providing 
adverse incentives  
Existing cost-sharing schemes mainly indemnify direct losses such as the value of 
compulsory, pre-emptive and welfare slaughtered animals and organisational costs 
related to destruction, and monitoring. Consequential losses such as production 
losses directly related to regulatory measures (e.g. movement restrictions) are not 
covered. In some countries private insurance covers consequential losses, but in 
most countries the market is not well developed and demand is low.  
The main disadvantage of compensating direct losses at a higher rate than 
consequential losses is that farmers may have the possibility to partly shift 
consequential into direct losses (71). 
 
Some losses may be indemnified fully without providing adverse incentives 
Losses that cannot be influenced by farmers at all should be fully indemnified in a 
cost-sharing scheme that aims at providing the highest possible risk transfer to 
farmers. This consideration is mainly relevant for losses which are directly related to 
regulatory measures (e.g. costs of emergency vaccination). 
However, if a highest possible risk transfer to farmers is not intended, it is also 
possible to only partially indemnify this type of loss without affecting incentive 
compatibility. 
 
Main point: 
A cost-sharing organisation could fully compensate losses which are directly related 
to regulatory measures and cannot be influenced by farmers (e.g. costs of 
emergency vaccination). 
 
Price risks should not be covered by a cost-sharing scheme  
Farmers have to bear severe price risks, as market prices for animals can drop 
significantly following a serious livestock epidemic. However, price risks can be 
adequately managed on futures markets (make a note with the text already in the 
                                            
(71) For example a farmer facing production losses due to movement restrictions that are not compensated could 
theoretically shift these losses, through intentional infection of his livestock, into losses caused by compulsory 
slaughtered animals that are compensated. 
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report) or other similar instruments and would therefore not have to be covered by a 
compulsory cost-sharing scheme. 
 
Losses of animal value have to be indemnified not according to pre-crisis 
market prices, but according to replacement values 
This loss assessment rule applies to total losses of animal value due to compulsory, 
pre-emptive and welfare slaughtering. Also losses from a drop in value due to 
regulatory measures (e.g. resulting from emergency vaccination) have to be 
assessed according to replacement values. The currently used value assessment 
rule for compensation, the market value of the animal before the disease outbreak, 
could lead to similar adverse incentives such as higher compensation rates for direct 
losses than for consequential losses. Some production losses that are hard to 
quantify can be compensated with flat rates; business interruption and other costs 
related to movement restrictions may be hard to quantify, as they often manifest in 
work or opportunity costs. These can be indemnified through daily rates for the time 
period when restrictions are in place. These rates should be negotiated ex ante 
between farmer and cost-sharing organisation. 
 
Balancing costs and responsibilities, compatibility with Community 
requirements (criteria III to V) 
A harmonisation of cost-sharing schemes in the EU must avoid a distortion of 
competition.  
Current compensation schemes for direct losses of certain diseases differ 
significantly between Member States with respect to farmers’ contributions (with 
cover by farmers of 100 % of the national share up to a certain threshold to no farmer 
contribution at all). This may distort competition. 
Therefore any public contribution (Community and Member State national/regional 
contribution) to a cost-sharing scheme should be designed to avoid a distortion of 
competition. Guidelines on State aids have to be taken into account. 
The level of public financial support to cost-sharing schemes and the risk transfer 
between regions is a political decision.  
The specific design of the proposed rules is not related to the degree to which public 
contributions are provided to cost-sharing schemes. An efficiency condition of a cost-
sharing scheme is that it has to demand risk-adjusted contributions. This implies that 
the expected compensation payments of a cost-sharing scheme should be ideally 
covered fully by farmers’ contributions (ex ante or ex post). On the other hand, public 
intervention may be required to safeguard that, in the case of disease outbreak, 
adequate action is taken immediately. Additionally, a cost-sharing scheme has to 
incur additional expenses for determining and implementing efficient safety standards 
(including prevention measures), which could be easier implemented with public 
support. Any approach taken has to balance these aspects. 
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7.3.5. Flexibility of implementation at the national/regional level (criterion 
VI) 
Public involvement does not determine institutional arrangements of a cost-
sharing scheme 
Any cost-sharing scheme has to fulfil three tasks. 
1.  Efficient animal health standards have to be developed. 
2. These standards have to be implemented. 
3. A cost-sharing scheme has to compensate losses.  
These tasks can be fulfilled through one or more institutions. They can be realised in 
a variety of institutional arrangements, each of which involves assets and 
disadvantage.  
Likely options that mainly build upon institutional models already existing in some 
Member States include funds and public or private insurance.  
 
Option A1 — Public fund 
A fund administered through a public authority could perform all tasks of an efficient 
cost-sharing scheme. A public fund could be expected to be accepted among 
farmers. It would, however, require additional effort for the authority to perform all the 
tasks associated with an efficient cost-sharing scheme, in particular related to risk-
adjustment of farmers’ contributions. A public fund can be financed through ex ante 
levies, ex post levies or a combination of both.  
 
Option A2 — Mutual fund 
A mutual fund is owned by the participating farmers, it works like a private risk pool of 
the farming industry. This may lead to a high acceptance among farmers. 
Due to its ownership structure, a mutual fund is expected by the members to act in 
the interest of the farmers. A mutual fund would have similar problems like a public 
fund regarding risk adjustment of contributions.  
 
Option B — Public insurer 
A public insurer is an independent organisation that implements safety standards and 
undertakes insurance functions. Its status as an independent organisation makes a 
public insurer to some extent autonomous of elected governments. 
A public insurer could possibly provide better incentives for risk-adjusted farm 
management than a fund solution. 
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Option C1 — Competitive insurance market 
Farmers have to obtain a contract with one of a number of competing insurers. As 
DHE risks pose a severe loss accumulation potential, private insurers would demand 
high safety loadings. In order to establish an insurance market with reasonable 
prices, State-run reinsurance is necessary. Also, this option requires thorough control 
of the efficiency of the animal health standards, determined in the insurance 
contracts with farmers, through the public authorities. 
 
Option C2 — Private insurers’ pool 
A private insurers’ pool is cooperation among private insurers who jointly establish 
and own the pool company that operates the cost-sharing scheme. Through 
establishing a private insurers’ pool, existing underwriting awareness of insurance 
companies can be used directly. The pool would demand risk-adjusted premiums, 
thus providing incentives for considering risk in farm management decisions. As with 
the previous scheme, a State-run reinsurance and/or other forms of public support 
(e.g. financial contribution towards the premiums paid by farmers) may be required. 
 
Observations 
This collection of information gives us some tool to observe that for DHE (diseases 
with high externalities) it is not worth and even not possible to design a cost-sharing 
scheme at a private level. These epidemic livestock diseases can be a large potential 
hazard to the economy and, in the worse case, to the health of the population. 
Therefore, DHE are covered by legislation. Assuming that public interest in managing 
risks associated with these particular DHE is very strong; it seems impractical to 
discuss whether a private insurance scheme can be implemented. Besides, the 
possibility of forecasting these high-risk events is very difficult; at least would be 
possible to predict, or better say prevent, if an efficient risk-reducing behaviour, in 
particular through preventive measures, took place systematically.  
On the other hand, from the outcome of the Health and Consumer Protection DG 
workshop (17 March 2006, Brussels) it seems clear that it can be possible to build a 
cost-sharing scheme for DLE (diseases with low externalities) or DNE (diseases with 
no externalities).  
The intent of this section is to follow up a more detailed analysis of livestock sanitary 
risks, exploring the determining factors of those epidemic risks.  
 
Point of view: role of the public policy in controlling animal diseases 
‘The role of public policy in controlling animal disease’ is explained in a paper of that 
name by Sumner et al. (in Koontz et al. 2006). The authors support the theory that 
the general economic concepts that apply to public policy in other areas also apply to 
animal diseases.  
The most important of these concepts is the idea that for some goods or services, 
private firms will provide socially insufficient quantities due to insufficient private 
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economic incentives. The lack of sufficient private incentives may be attributed to 
‘public good’ characteristics or to the occurrence of external costs or benefits 
(Sumner et al. 2006). 
What they stress most is this concept of considering the management of infectious 
diseases as a public good and the closely related idea of externalities related to the 
costs and benefits of private efforts to control infectious diseases. 
In fact, they analyse if many producers may find that there is sufficient private 
incentive to vaccinate their animals against a serious contagious disease. Together, 
they may largely solve the public good problem by vaccinating against a disease. 
However, if there are still a few individuals for whom the private incentive is 
insufficient, they may not vaccinate and thus a reservoir of infection may remain and 
be capable of infecting other animals. 
That reservoir will require vaccine producers to continue to vaccinate, at significant 
cost, rather than to be able to cease vaccinating, as would occur if the disease could 
be eradicated in the region. There is a reason for government animal disease control, 
either by requiring vaccinations or by directly carrying out the vaccinations required to 
eliminate the reservoir.  
Private agents have adequate incentives to carry out most of the expenditures that 
are made for the management of animal diseases. In fact, animal disease 
management frequently has some externalities and/or public good characteristics, 
and government frequently has a role in disease management. 
It has been observed that the nature of externalities and public good characteristics, 
particularly whether they are large and thus warrant concern, is determined by 
geography and biology. Both of these affect the natural habitat for specific diseases 
and so the probability that a disease will spread from one region to another.  
The probability of spread is a crucial consideration in government intervention, 
whether regarding efforts to exclude, to control or to eradicate the disease from a 
region. A further aspect to be considered is the distributional effects of disease 
outbreaks and how forward pricing, or the use of futures markets, may mitigate risks 
(Sumner et al. 2006). Compensation for animals destroyed during eradication or 
control efforts may also reduce direct losses. 
 
Animal diseases economic impacts: a survey of literature and typology of 
research approaches 
A survey of literature and typology of research approaches was carried out in 2005 
by the International Food and Agribusiness Management Association 
(IAMA) (Pritchett et al., 2005). 
Animal diseases can create strong economic impacts on: 
— production, 
— market and price, 
— trade, 
— impacts on food security and nutrition, 
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— human health, 
— environment, 
— financial costs. 
Disease impacts are generally easy to identify but may be difficult to quantify (UN-
FAO, 2001). 
An accurate assessment of losses due to animal disease is useful for policymakers 
who may consider these potential losses against the costs of disease prevention and 
mitigation; and models that provide the most comprehensive assessment of potential 
losses are most useful to decision-makers (Pritchett et al. 2005). 
Table 40 summarises the economic approaches to quantify economic loss ranging 
from individual agent impacts (producers, consumers, businesses) to broader, inter-
sector impacts (sector, regional and national/international studies) to provide the 
reader a baseline of information on what is already discovered. Several directions 
exist for animal disease studies at each of the various market levels, which can 
subsequently feed better baseline data to broader sector, regional and national 
analyses.  
Potential economic losses include higher prices or diminished satisfaction for 
consumers and producers. But, some individuals actually charge better after an 
animal disease outbreak, such as producers who are not quarantined, or consumers 
who are uninfluenced by animal disease outbreaks (and who are able to buy at lower 
prices), an issue for future researchers to consider. 
Too often data limitations prevent analysis of spatial economics when evaluating 
outbreak scenarios. Finally, market structure plays an important part in determining 
the distribution of losses associated with an animal disease outbreak. 
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Table 40. Economics of animal disease typology matrix 
Scope of analysis Research objectives Policy instruments Research opportunity 
Producer impacts 
Business loss 
Incentives for control 
Compensation 
Testing 
Epidemiological and economic 
models 
Catastrophic insurance 
Agribusiness 
Suppliers and 
supporting 
activities 
Business loss 
Shareholders’ 
welfare loss  
Production practices 
Certification 
Traceability 
Economic geography 
Market structure 
Consumer 
Welfare loss 
Risk assessment 
Education 
Certification 
Information 
Substitution 
Sector Industry losses 
Traceability 
Certification 
Epidemiological links 
Market structure 
Distribution 
Regional 
Welfare impact 
Industry loss 
Travel restrictions 
Compensation 
Prescribed cull 
Economic geography 
Mitigation and prevention costs 
National 
International 
Welfare impact 
Distribution of loss 
Regionalisation 
Tariffs/non-tariff 
Barriers 
Restrictions 
Economic geography 
Distribution of impacts 
Source: Pritchett et al. (2005). 
 
7.4. GIS in veterinary activities 
7.4.1. First OIE international conference on the use of GIS in veterinary 
activities 
The first OIE (World Organisation for Animal Health) international conference on the 
use of GIS (geographic information system) was organised in Abruzzo (Italy) in 
October 2006.  
The exponential growth of GIS in recent years has tremendously expanded the 
capacities of analysis in epidemiological studies and led to the development of new 
powerful tools in the surveillance of animal diseases. GIS, spatial analysis and 
remote sensing allow precious epidemiological investigations and data collection, 
correlating diseases' trends with climatic and environmental information, thus 
increasing understanding of the links between disease processes and explanatory 
spatial variables.  
Until recently, the use of these tools in veterinary public health were underexploited, 
due to the prohibitive cost of hardware and the great complexity of GIS software that 
required very specialised personnel.  
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In the past decade, thanks to the revolutionary change in the area of computerised 
technology, the reduction of prices and the availability of new simple web-based 
software, GIS tools have become more widely accessible by veterinary services at all 
levels. At the same time, the increased awareness of the possibilities offered by 
these tools has created new opportunities for decision-makers to enhance their 
planning, analysis and monitoring capabilities. The new technologies, furthermore, 
offer a new way of sharing and accessing spatial and non-spatial data across groups 
and institutions. It seems necessary, at this point, to take a picture of the state of the 
art in the use of GIS in veterinary activities, in order to identify priority needs in the 
development of new GIS tools at international level for the surveillance of animal 
diseases and zoonoses and in the definition of proposals for their implementation. 
 
7.4.2. Forage pastures insurance in Spain 
Another kind of risk for livestock production is the productivity reduction for pastures 
and fodders (see Section 3.3.4). 
Recently, a new livestock insurance product was introduced in Spain with the aim of 
preventing the effects of the possible decrease of pasture forage availability in the 
case of adverse climate conditions. With this type of insurance farmers get a 
reimbursement when, due to bad climatic conditions (e.g. drought), the forage 
present on the pasture is reduced compared with the normal production average in 
the correspondent area. 
The aim of this kind of guarantee is to indemnify the farmer for the increase of his/her 
production price, due to the necessity of feeding the animals with different modalities. 
This insurance system has a specific evaluation of damage; in fact it is done by 
means of satellite images which are able to measure the level of forage that a 
determined area should produce in favourable conditions. 
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8. Feasibility of an EU-wide system of agricultural 
insurance  
 
8.1. Chapter synthesis 
The wide range of risk management tools available in the Member States could be 
developed further to help improve competitiveness and the economic sustainability of 
farm enterprises. However, these tools cannot and are not intended to offer the kind 
of guarantees provided by the former CAP, but would rather help the farm business 
withstand temporary shocks and improve its access to finance for the development of 
its activities. It is in this perspective that the development and availability of risk 
management instruments might usefully be encouraged. 
The Commission (72) has looked at a number of options for encouraging the 
development of risk management tools and providing an improved response in the 
event of crisis (see Section 4.8). 
 
8.2. An EU-wide system of agricultural insurances or an 
alternative solution?  
Given the many differences observed in EU countries, not only in their agricultural 
risks but also in their legal, social and economic backgrounds, an EU-wide system of 
agricultural insurances can be discussed. A series of alternatives to a common 
system can be proposed and analysed. In any case, any of these alternatives should 
be simple to manage by the EU administration and easy to control.  
Some alternatives to a proper EU-wide scheme can be a set of actions to foster 
national systems by:  
— facilitating/subsidising the composition of databases, preferably at the farm level; 
— reinsuring; 
— clarifying the framework; and 
— partially subsidising national systems which are within the framework. 
 
                                            
(72) Communication from the Commission from the Commission to the Council on risk and crisis management in 
agriculture, COM(2005) 74 final of  9 March 2005, Brussels (http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/ 
LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2005:0074:FIN:EN:PDF). 
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8.2.1. Facilitating/subsidising the composition of databases, at a detailed 
level 
A balanced agricultural insurance system needs reliable and detailed databases in 
order to limit, to the minimum possible level, malfunction due to asymmetric 
information that leads to adverse selection and, to some extent, moral hazard: if 
premium rates are determined with a coarse geographic detail, only farmers with a 
high risk level will buy the insurance. This will push the insurer to raise the premium 
and the insurance will become uninteresting for most farmers. This danger can be 
reduced with a bonus/malus system, but it takes a long time to tune the system, and 
in the meantime the existence of the insurance product itself is jeopardised.  
The public sector has developed several databases (IACS, FADN, LPIS, LUCAS, 
agricultural census, FSS, soil maps, interpolated meteorological data) for the 
management of the CAP that could provide a basis for fine-tuning premium rates. 
The use of some of these databases poses serious problems of principle. In other 
cases the approach could be debated more easily.  
— FADN provides the type of data that could theoretically be more useful, although 
the geographic location accuracy is missing. However, its content (detailed 
accountancy by farm) is extremely sensitive and the confidentiality is essential. A 
hypothesis of using FADN for fine-tuning of premium rates might endanger the 
reliability of the data.  
— Individual data in the agricultural census and FSS (farm structure survey) are also 
under statistical secret, but they are less sensitive than FADN data. Their use by 
an official body to derive geographically fine-tuned variability indicators useful for 
insurances might not be impossible.  
— IACS (integrated agricultural control system), LPIS (land parcel identification 
system) and LUCAS (land use/cover area-frame survey) contain very detailed 
geographic information, but no data on yield. They could be considered as a basis 
for building a database for insurance purposes, but they are not directly usable.  
— Soil maps and raw meteorological observations have copyright restrictions, but 
interpolated products elaborated in the framework of agrometeorological models 
are often free and potentially usable for insurances. Their use for yield forecasting 
at national level is now fully operational, but their local accuracy to estimate yield 
variability would still need a large volume of validation and calibration work based 
on field observations.  
The US Risk Management Agency (RMA) determines the premium rates to be 
applied by companies in each county. Their approach is based on a very consistent 
network of field experts in the territory and is difficult to apply in Europe. A role of 
European institutions similar to the role of RMA in the USA is difficult to conceive, 
also because some national bodies (in Spain, Italy and Greece) already fulfil similar 
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tasks. However, some support role of the European institutions to encourage other 
national public–private partnerships could be the object of a reflection process.  
 
8.2.2. Reinsuring 
Many agricultural risks are considered non-insurable in most countries because they 
are too systemic, i.e. a potential damage hits a high proportion of farmers 
simultaneously. Insurers and reinsurers are not willing to take this type of risk. The 
situation changes if there is a strong public participation in the reinsurance scheme 
(Spain and USA). If we consider the issue from the EU perspective, a major question 
is can EU institutions act as reinsurer?  
Let us imagine that the EU acts as reinsurer and suppose that an extreme 
catastrophic event hits the whole EU, reducing by 40 % the crop output of the EU. 
We would have a loss of around EUR 68 billion; if we assume a deductible of 30 % of 
the production value this would correspond to EUR 17 billion compensation. 
Assuming that the premiums paid by farmers were 6 % of the insured capital (so, 
approximately EUR 10 billion) and that the EU provides stop-loss cover above the 
100 % of the premiums, the liability of the EU as reinsurer might be approximately 
EUR 7 billion. This extreme example is highly unlikely to happen, but it illustrates the 
budgetary uncertainty that this type of role would introduce under major events. This 
uncertainty is difficult to conciliate with a policy of budget stabilisation and the likely 
need of some tool to limit the expenditure.  
Alternative solutions might be creating a fund regularly fed, or enlarging the role of 
existing institutions, such as the European Investment Bank, in charge of this 
reinsurance role.  
 
8.2.3. Clarifying the legal framework  
The European Union is already defining a common framework for national support 
given to agricultural insurance, currently through the agricultural guidelines, and for 
the future, through the guidelines and the regulation currently being discussed (see 
Section 4.5). This regulation is made in compliance with WTO agreements, and with 
European Treaty principles.  
If this framework was to be made more constraining, in order to achieve a greater 
homogeneity of the national systems, it could include some reference to the 
compatibility of ad hoc aid with subsidies to insurance. This could be either to forbid 
ad hoc aid on insurable risks (they do not seem to be justified if the private market 
can cover the risk), either to require the exigency of having bought some kind of 
insurance for being eligible for ad hoc aid (financial cooperation of the farmers in their 
own risk management) or both. Currently, these measures exist in some countries, 
but as we saw in Section 6.3, there is great divergence between countries.  
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8.2.4. Partially subsidising national systems which are within the 
framework  
An alternative to establishing a common insurance system could be to support 
national risk management systems. These could be either insurance models, funds 
or other risk management tools. In any case, they should be within a common legal 
framework, establishing some criteria as discussed in the previous section, and a 
common financing framework. The advantages of this option are that the different 
models could be adapted to the criteria, uses and needs of every country, permitting 
some flexibility. 
 
EUROPEAN COMISSIONEUR PEAN C ISSI N MEMBER STATEE BER STATE
Establishment of a 
financing 
framework
Definition, by 
sectors, of the 
protection standards 
(risks, deductibles, 
price, etc.)
Public 
Administration 
(Government)
(Insurance 
companies)
Farmers 
Unions
Study and eventual 
validation of the risk 
management model 
proposed
Authorisation for 
the use of the 
financing framework
Definition, by sectors, of 
the risk management model 
more adequate to the 
conditions and possibilities 
of the SM
Control
Periodical reports 
on the results 
obtained
Development and 
application of the 
risk management 
model
Sour
ce: Authors’ elaboration. 
Figure 62. Support to national risk management systems under a common 
framework — possible organisational scheme 
 
In Section 8.5.2 we discuss the possible financing sources for this support, and their 
compatibility with the CAP. Figure 62 gives a general overview of which could be the 
role of the European Commission and of the Member States. The Commission, 
besides establishing a general framework, should settle the protection standards for 
the different agricultural subsectors. This would consist of technical criteria: eligible 
risks, minimum deductibles, reference prices allowed, etc. The Member States would 
have to adapt their tools to this framework and develop their own model. The 
Commission would also have a control role. 
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8.3. The role of the public sector  
There are examples of totally private insurance in agriculture, covering in particular 
hail damage. Most other insurance schemes are provided under subsidised 
governmental schemes because the risks being covered are, in fact, not insurable in 
the sense that a market determined premium would be too high (Moreddu (), OECD, 
2001).  
EU Member States providing insurance systems on the private sector with strong 
public support have integrated their systems as an essential agricultural policy 
instrument for the stabilisation of agricultural income. In these countries such as 
Spain, Italy and Austria with a high level of public support, insurance systems are 
well developed and most risks affecting agricultural yield are covered. Risks 
mentioned as not insurable in the private sector become insurable through the 
involvement of the public sector. On the other hand, public ad hoc payments are 
lower in these countries. 
From an economical point of view it seems that it is easier to plan financial support to 
insurance premiums on a balanced annual altitude, than make public ex post 
payments for the compensation after unforeseen natural disasters.  
Also we have to point out that a private–public partnership increases the farmer’s 
participation on the risk management tools and farmers take a higher level of 
responsibility to manage the risks affecting agricultural production. 
 
8.4. Possible options of an EU-wide system of agricultural 
insurances  
— Single-risk or combined insurances (hail, drought, frost kill, excessive rain) 
— Yield insurance (climatic cause of losses has to be identified, evaluation of the 
losses), similar to combined insurance 
— Yield insurance (no identification of climatic cause of losses, losses calculated 
as a difference in yields) 
— Whole-farm yield insurance 
— Income/revenue insurance  
— Area index insurance 
— Indirect index insurance (meteorological indexes, satellite images) 
— Public reinsurance 
— Flexible system (supporting Member States’ systems) 
 
These options will be analysed first in a general assessment (Section 8.5) and then 
on a one-by-one basis (Section 8.6).  
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8.5. General assessment of the different options 
 
8.5.1. Criteria to assess the feasibility  
A feasible EU-wide insurance scheme should ideally meet several conditions. Some 
of these conditions, which we can call political criteria, relate to decisions of the 
policymakers. Other conditions (socioeconomic) relate to decisions of the private 
sector (insurers, reinsurers and farmers). A third category of conditions have a more 
technical nature.  
— Political criteria: 
• Long-term financial perspective (linked with cost) 
• Compatibility with the WTO  
• Compatibility with European legislation and the CAP  
• Compatibility with EU financial regulations (reinsurance)  
— Behaviour of the private sector 
• Percentage of farmers who would buy the insurance 
• Acceptation by insurers/reinsurers 
— Technical criteria 
• Meeting the needs of farmers  
— Is there a need? How unstable is the income of farmers?  
— Will there be a need with changing circumstances?  
• Cost/affordability 
• How feasible/simple is the control to avoid fraud/malfunctioning?  
• Technical feasibility and base information availability (need of databases for 
insurance types with little or no tradition) 
• Asymmetric information: potential adverse selection, moral hazard or other 
problems 
• Advantages compared with alternative tools  
 
8.5.2. General assessment 
The assessment related to some of these criteria is more or less common for any of 
the possible types of insurance (general assessment). For other criteria the 
assessment depends strongly on the type of option chosen.  
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Political criteria  
 
— Compatibility with the WTO and European legislation 
In general, compatibility with the WTO and with European legislation could be 
guaranteed for most risk management tools if they meet the criteria of the 30 % 
threshold and deductibles and if there was a declaration of calamity by the 
government for the single- or multi-peril or yield-oriented products. The 30 % 
thresholds and deductibles would not be a big problem for income products and 
for peril/yield-based products with high risks. It would be enough to leave to the 
private market the cover of field crops and others with low risks, and support 
those products with higher risks when losses are above 30 %. However, for the 
support of crop insurance products, the need of an official declaration would be a 
hindering constraint, so, while the green box definitions remain as they are, crop 
insurance would not be compatible with the green box.  
 
— Compatibility with the CAP and long-term financial perspective 
The Fischler reform, as already mentioned in Section 4.2.1, changes the 
framework of the ‘old CAP’, shaking it and preparing a good basis for its evolution 
towards a modern agricultural policy. The pillars on which the CAP is standing 
now are two: the decoupled payment and the rural development funds reinforced 
by the modulation. 
— The direct payment (single farm payment) represents a farmer’s income 
stabilisation tool.  
— The modulation is intended to give a certain priority to rural development 
programmes. 
Designed as a mechanism to strengthen pillar 2 of the CAP, modulation reduces 
direct payments and shifts the funds saved into rural development. Using the 
modulation of the direct payment (pillar 1) to collect funds and using them for the 
setting up of rural development plans (RDP) (pillar 2) could also be carried out for 
the creation of ‘risk management programmes’ subordinated to rural development 
programmes.  
Let us assume that the objective is to introduce a risk management system within 
the current CAP framework, and not having to wait for a future CAP reform. One 
possibility that has been already considered by the European Commission (EC, 
2005a) could be to include risk management among the measures of rural 
development in the second pillar. Discussion could take place on how additional 
risk and crisis management measures could be co-financed by one percentage 
point of modulation. 
The single farm payment (SFP) falls within the green box. Modulation is an 
instrument which provides a means of ensuring the transfer of CAP funds from 
direct aids to farmers — more specifically from SFPs — to rural development 
measures; also in the green box. Community law states that all the funds released 
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by modulation can only be used in the context of rural development programmes 
— including the amount that could possibly be used for risk and crisis 
management measures (73). It means that those funds could be used for risk 
management programmes under the name of RDP (pillar 2) whenever they do not 
run into WTO agreements. 
New risk management measures co-financed from the one percentage point of 
modulation would aim to improve the competitiveness of the agricultural sector by 
strengthening the economic sustainability of agricultural holdings. It is in this 
context that Member States would have the choice of introducing new risk and 
crisis management measures into their rural development programmes. 
Under the new financial regulation, and in particular the ‘Principle of annuality’, 
the new regime of compulsory modulation no longer allows Member States to 
retain funds in view of their redistribution in later years. 
Using modulation to finance new risk and crisis management instruments would 
not require additional Community expenditure; it would simply make it possible for 
Member States to use a maximum amount of rural development funds for these 
purposes.  
In this context, in all cases, the amounts used for risk and crisis management 
shall be limited to one percentage point of modulation in the Member States 
where modulation is applied. For the Member States where modulation does not 
yet apply, an equivalent method could be applied to set the maximum level of 
rural development funds that could be allocated to these measures (EC, 2005a). 
Another instrument also introduced in the new CAP was cross-compliance. It sets 
certain conditions for farmers to get the direct payment (in its totality). Farmers 
must safeguard the environment and accomplish other requirements set up at EU 
and national levels. Given that cross-compliance was created as a condition to 
get the payment, a risk assessment plan for farms, made by public or private 
insurance companies, could be required as a condition to use the modulation 
funds, or even to get the direct payment. 
An additional advantage of this approach is that it would favour a risk information 
process which appears to be needed. After a number of years, it would be 
possible to have enough information (regarding climatic/sanitary risks in specific 
regions/areas) to set up a more developed ‘risk management 
programme/insurance scheme’. 
 
                                            
(73) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1954/2005 of 29 November 2005 amending Regulation (EC) No 796/2004 
laying down detailed rules for the implementation of cross-compliance, modulation and the integrated 
administration and control system provided for in Council Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 establishing 
common rules for direct support schemes under the common agricultural policy and establishing certain 
support schemes for farmers and derogating from Regulation (EC) No 1782/2003 as regards payment of the 
aid. 
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— Compatibility with EU financial regulations (reinsurance) 
See Section 8.2.2 ‘Reinsuring’. 
 
Behaviour of the private sector 
 
— Percentage of farmers that would buy the insurance 
Any a priori feasibility assessment of a hypothetical EU-wide scheme of 
agricultural insurance has a large uncertainty. The most important source of 
uncertainty is probably the farmers’ behaviour. Some studies report that farmers’ 
behaviour does not always conform to theory and that there is a need to better 
understand farmers’ attitudes toward risk and the way they adjust their farm 
operations (Moreddu (13), OECD, 2001; Meuwissen et al. 1999b; McCarthy, 
1998).  
The evolution of farmers’ acceptance of insurance possibilities is slow. In the USA 
the system started in 1938 and only in recent years it has reached a high level of 
penetration. In Spain (law approved in 1978), the system offers a wide range of 
subsidised options, but the market penetration is still less than 30 %.  
 
— Acceptation by insurers/reinsurers 
Support to the insurance systems should be always welcome by the insurance 
sector. But there are two important points to take into account. Some insurance 
products that could be developed (index insurance, yield insurance, revenue 
insurance) have not already been developed by the private sector because of the 
systemic character of the risks involved. In these cases, there is a need for public 
support for reinsurance. Second, if a common system was to be developed, there 
would be a cost for the companies to adapt to it, and in some cases it might not 
be worthwhile for them. For these reasons, the private insurance sector seems to 
back up the idea of the coexistence of national systems rather than the 
implementation of a single EU system (see Section 4.8.2 on the position of the 
insurance sector)  
 
Technical criteria 
 
— Meeting the needs of farmers  
• Section 3.6 gives an analysis of the types of farms and regions for which the 
income has a higher or lower level of instability. The quantitative analysis in 
this chapter generally underestimates the variability at farm level because of 
the smoothing effect of considering regional averages. However, the reported 
maps give a geographic picture of the existing needs in income stabilisation 
that are not concentrated in restricted geographical areas. 
• Changing circumstances suggest that the needs of income stabilisation tools 
for farmers will be growing in the coming years. Market liberalisation, climate 
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change and the increasing concentration of retailers are growing factors of the 
instability of farmers’ income.  
 
— Cost/affordability 
A most important criterion is the eventual cost of the programme. In general 
terms, the implementation of a risk management programme should never imply 
exceeding the current agricultural budget. So, as was discussed above, any cost 
would have to be taken from other agricultural expenses.  
Some coarse assessments of the cost of different insurance programmes have 
been made. Their results are shown in Section 8.7. These examples are an 
income-based insurance on averages per type of farming, arable crops yield 
insurance, an area index (regional) yield insurance for cereals and an EU-wide 
insurance for fruits and vegetables. However, the cost of these programmes 
would depend on the percentage of the premiums that is to be subsidised. The 
cost would always be reduced by reducing the subsidy rate, but the subsidy 
should be large enough to make the product interesting for the farmers. This will 
be discussed in Section 8.7. 
 
— How feasible/simple is the control to avoid fraud/malfunctioning?  
We can differentiate two types of control: 
1. the general control/management of the system;  
2. the audits/last controls that could be done in the field. 
 
1. In this case, we should differentiate whether the system is an insurance 
system by private companies or whether it is a public scheme. In the case of a 
private insurance system, it seems clearly in the interests of the private 
insurance companies to follow and control the farmers’ declarations of losses. 
So, in the case where subsidies are given directly to the companies, the 
control should be performed on the companies. These are usually quite 
transparent, as they yield annual reports to public organisms in each country. 
They are usually under the survey of the government in those countries where 
agricultural insurance is subsidised, meaning that it is a realistic assumption. 
So, the last step to be undertaken is how the governments are controlled by 
the EU. In a case where the system is not private but a public scheme, control 
would have to be carried out entirely on the governments.  
In both cases, the control on the government can be made within the 
framework of the CAP, and with the tools introduced by the Fischler reform. As 
the main administrators of the CAP, Member States currently play the leading 
role in applying the CAP’s management tools. Taking cross-compliance as an 
example, the Member States’ responsibilities include establishing the definition 
of good agricultural and environmental conditions for their agricultural 
circumstances (at national or regional level) and taking into account the 
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specific characteristics of the areas concerned, including soil and climatic 
conditions, existing farming systems, land use, crop rotation, farming practices 
and farm structures. Member States must inform farmers of the definition, 
provide them with the list of statutory management requirements and set up 
management controls and sanction systems for all cross-compliance. Due to 
the introduction of this condition a ‘farm advisory system’ had to be set up as 
an obligatory instrument and further on, a formal audit programme as well. 
Transferring this example to the hypothetical introduction of risk management 
programmes, it can be supposed that risk management programmes can be 
run and controlled by the public or private insurance companies.  
Summarising, if a risk management programme were introduced (parallelism 
with the cross-compliance), Member States would probably be responsible for 
creating the right risk information programmes and supporting a private or 
public insurance company in the development of tools and offers for the 
market. The insurance companies then would be responsible for the 
management of the sector, avoiding frauds or the malfunctioning of it. 
 
2. Regarding the audits or controls that could be carried out in the field, it 
appears rather difficult to take direct control of insurance systems like single, 
combined or yield insurance at a European level because the loss assessment 
is generally carried out at farm or field level. However, this control does not 
seem particularly necessary if the insurance is in the hands of private 
companies, because they would not permit abuse by farmers. So, it could 
possibly only be made in a proper way on the insurance companies. 
Regarding other types of products, like index- and area-based insurance 
schemes, even if they are not yet developed in Europe, it could be possible to 
control them at an EU level through the use of agrometeorological indicators 
and satellite images. 
 
— Technical feasibility and database information availability  
The technical feasibility of insurance products is not always possible. In theory, all 
that exists in one country could always be applied in others. However, there are 
some characteristics of some insurance products that could make them 
unfeasible in some countries. 
One of the most important things for insurance feasibility is the availability of 
databases. The lack of historical yields data at the farm level can hinder the 
apparition of yield insurance as it is in the USA. For revenue insurance, there is 
the need for one or several markets which can provide a transparent price 
accepted by insurers and farmers and that cannot be manipulated. In the USA, 
revenue insurance products are based on futures markets prices. This would not 
be easy in many regions in Europe, because of the lack of futures markets and 
because the prices of those that exist are not particularly representative of 
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farmers’ prices in many regions. Income products in Canada are based on 
farmers’ fiscal declarations. In European countries, agricultural fiscal systems may 
not be adequate to base an insurance product on their reports.  
 
— Asymmetric information: potential adverse selection, moral hazard or other 
problems 
Adverse selection is a problem which appears due to the asymmetry of 
information between insurers and insured. In order to fix the premiums of 
insurance types with little or no tradition, and mainly for such insurance types as 
yield insurance or income insurance, it is necessary to have adequate databases 
with records at the farm level. Is it feasible that public databases (LPIS, soil maps 
etc.) are used to adjust premium rates which will be applied by private 
companies? In the USA, rates are fixed by the government (RMA) and applied by 
insurance companies. In Spain, sometimes it is ENESA that calculates the 
premiums which will then be agreed by Agroseguro. 
Launching new insurance systems often requires a test period in pilot areas. This 
can also apply to the application of systems that have been tested in areas with 
very different agricultural characteristics. Many insurance systems are difficult to 
apply because asymmetry in information leads to an adverse selection behaviour 
that undermines the system. Each individual farmer knows better the own risk 
level than the insurance company, and it can happen that only farmers with a high 
level of risk buy the insurance. Consequently the risk in the insured population is 
higher than the average. 
 
— Advantages compared with alternative tools 
There are several advantages of insurance over other risk management tools. 
One of them is that in the case of insurance the farmers have a legal title to get 
compensation compared to ad hoc payments from the public sector. Insurance 
provides a quicker payment of compensation, that is, when the farmers need it 
more. The average time of payment could be around two months in the private 
option and one to two years in the public one. Another advantage for farmers is 
that private insurance gives indemnities more adjusted to the farmers’ real losses 
on an individual basis. An advantage for the government is that the premiums 
subsidies constitute a regular and foreseeable expense, so they are easier to 
programme than ad hoc compensation, which can be very irregular from one year 
to another. Some also attribute insurance an advantage on general economic 
rationality terms: via the amount of the premiums, it delivers to farmers 
information on the risks inherent to their production choices, so it can lead to a 
rationalisation of the latter. 
However, critical views support the theory that the global cost is higher because 
of the higher cost of loss adjustment, and that subsidising agricultural insurances 
means subsidising insurance companies. But subsidising agricultural insurance 
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means supporting a system in which what the farmer participates on the premium 
minimises the budgetary impact on the public sector. Both, the farmer and the 
government are able to calculate their budget. Also we can point out that in 
developed schemes, such as those in Spain and Austria, behind the public 
involvement there is also a high level on the involvement of the farmers’ union to 
represent their interests. However, another point of view holds that with a public 
system (ad hoc aid), the administration (government) is in charge of damage 
assessment etc. Supporting an insurance system transfers this responsibility to 
the companies that have a profit in compensation of this service. For example, in 
the USA, the profit of companies ranges from USD – 30 million to USD 400 
million/year with an average of around USD 200 million/year in a programme with 
a total cost of approximately USD 4 000 million/year. The question is whether this 
compensation is fair. Lastly, there is also a cost in political image. 
The development of agricultural insurance systems reduces the public 
expenditure in ad hoc aid. This reduction is difficult to estimate but should be 
considered when total cost is computed.  
 
8.6. Specific assessment of each option 
 
— Single-risk or combined insurances  
• Single-risk (hail) and combined risk insurance schemes already exist in all 
Member States, sometimes subsidised at national level 
• The availability of a long history of data makes it easier to calculate. 
• Control: high level of experience in loss assessment and very similar in the 
countries, but high loss expenses 
• Moderate risk of moral hazard  
• Higher adverse selection in single-risk insurance 
• Support at EU level is doubtful 
  
— Yield insurance (climatic cause of losses has to be identified) 
• Similar to combined insurance but more comprehensive 
• Meets farmers’ needs better  
• Probably more expensive 
• Need of higher deductibles for systemic risk (drought) 
• Lower adverse selection because more attractive in different regions 
• Loss assessment more difficult 
• Need of public support for development in private sector  
• Support at EU level useful 
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— Yield insurance (no identification of climatic cause of losses) 
• High risk of moral hazard  
• Lower acceptance by insurance and reinsurance  
• Lower costs for loss assessment 
  
— Whole-farm yield insurance 
• Addresses a bit better the target (income stabilisation)  
—  Heavier to control 
 
— Income/revenue insurance 
•Addresses much better the target (income stabilisation)  
— Difficult to control, unless on area index basis 
— Very systemic risks (prices): difficult to accept by insurers unless strong 
public support 
— Difficult to give a reference price 
— High risk of moral hazard to undermine the system 
 
— Area index insurance 
• Little risk of moral hazard and adverse selection 
• Relatively easy to control 
• Does not take into account the differences of damage inside each ‘presumed 
homogeneous’ area 
• Who is competent to give the official reference yield?  
 
— Indirect index insurance (meteorological indexes, satellite images) 
• Objective criteria, but some are difficult for farmers to understand (NDVI) 
• Only useful for cover with high deductibles 
• Risk of overcompensation or contrary effect  
 
— Public reinsurance:  
• Difficult to guarantee that the expenditure will be kept within a certain level 
(compatible with EU financial regulations?) 
• Partial public support to reinsurance as an option 
• Could make insurable risks that have been mentioned as not insurable 
 
— Flexible system: supporting Member States’ systems 
• Meets better different demands at national level 
• Breaking the difficulties in case of different systems in Member States 
• Could be a first step to harmonise the systems, depending on the regulations 
(see Section 8.2.4). 
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The previous chapters have highlighted how heterogeneous the situation of 
agricultural insurance schemes in the EU is, ranging from countries or agricultural 
sectors with a very strong presence of insurance schemes to countries/sectors in 
which their presence is marginal or non-existent.  
Pressure in the framework of the WTO negotiations raises the question of whether 
the CAP has a role to play in risk management and in particular on agricultural 
insurance. Several questions can be considered. 
— What can be the budgetary impact of a hypothetical CAP subsidy to agricultural 
insurances?  
— What can be the benefits of such support?  
— Which would be the geographical distribution of the benefits?  
— How would the distribution of the benefits for different sectors or farm sizes be 
carried out?  
— Which type of insurance can be supported: single-risk, combined, yield or 
income insurance?  
— To what extent can risk management policies replace income support policies?  
— Are the existing tools for risk reduction sufficient for income stabilisation?  
— Would Community action provide value added, compared with national or 
regional initiatives/action? 
 
8.7. Possible cost of some of the options  
Let us make an attempt to tackle the question of the budgetary impact or cost of a 
hypothetical CAP support to agricultural insurance. For this purpose we can start 
defining a set of scenarios for specific sectors and insurance types.  
The definition of a scenario involves a number of choices. It is not always possible to 
support such choices on the basis of objective considerations. Ideally, each scenario 
should be defined by some assumptions on:  
— the items covered (crops, livestock, assets, income); 
— the risks covered; 
— the proportion of farms/production insured; 
— the technical characteristics of the insurance, in particular the franchise; 
— the average rates that can be applied; 
— the possible subsidy rate to the premiums.  
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Table 41. Premiums per crop for single-risk insurance 
Crop Perils Country Premium (%) 
Deductible 
(%) 
Subsidy 
(%) 
Arable crops Hail Austria 2.8 8 50 
Field crops Hail or frost or other Italy 2.6 10–30 65 
Cereals, protein 
and oil crops 
Hail or fire or lightning or explosion Portugal (1) 2.2 20 (relative) 68 (average) 
Fruits Hail or quality Austria 14 10–30 50 
 Hail or frost Italy 13.8 10–30 54 (average) 
 Hail or fire or lightning or explosion Portugal (1) 18 20 (relative) 68 (average) 
Olives for oil Hail or frost or other Italy 4 10–30 63 
Vegetables and 
flowers 
Hail or frost or other Italy 5.6 10–30 54 (average) 
Potatoes Hail or fire or lightning or explosion Portugal (1) 4 20 (relative) 68 (average) 
Wine grapes Hail or frost or other Italy 6.2 10–30 63 
 Hail or fire or lightning or explosion Portugal (1) 8 20 (relative) 68 (average) 
(1) The premium can also include a complementary cover (frost, snow, tornado and waterspout) that would make it combined insurance. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table 42. Premiums per crop for combined insurance 
Crop Perils Country Premium (%) 
Deductible 
(%) 
Subsidy 
(%) 
Arable crops Hail, wind, frost, flood, excess of water France 7 15 (average) 0 
 Two or three perils combined Italy 2.6 10–30 75 
Citrus Hail, fire, flood, rain, frost, wind and others Spain 8.5 10–30 43 
Fruits Hail, frost, wind France 8.6 15 0 
 Hail, fire, flood, rain, frost, wind and others Spain 11 10–30 43 
Olives for oil Two or three perils combined Italy 4.4 10 69 
Vegetables and 
flowers 
Hail, fire, flood, rain, frost, wind and others Spain 4.8 10–30 37 
Wine grapes Hail, frost, additional expenditures after hail Austria 6.5 
Hail: 8 
Frost: 35 
50 
 Hail, frost, wind France 2.15 15 0 
 Two or three perils combined Italy 4.8 10–30 71 
 Hail, fire, flood, rain, frost, wind and others Spain 10 10–30 41 
Grassland Hail, flood Austria 1.5 
Hail: 8 
Flood: max. 
EUR 440/cut/ha 
Hail: 50 
Flood: 0 
 
Drought etc. affecting pastures (index 
insurance) 
Spain 6 0 35 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Table 43. Premiums per crop for yield insurance 
Crop Perils Country Premium (%) 
Deductible 
(%) 
Subsidy 
(%) 
Arable crops Hail, storm, frost, flood, rain, drought, others Austria 3.6 
Hail: 4 
Other risks: max. 
indemnity/ha 
Hail and frost: 50 
Other risks: 0 
 
Hail, wind, frost, flood, excess rain, drought, 
plant diseases 
Italy 2.6 10–30 77 
Wine grapes 
Hail, wind, frost, flood, excess rain, drought, 
plant diseases 
Italy 6.5 10–30 78 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
Table 44. Premiums for livestock insurance 
Animal Perils Country Premium (%) 
Deductible 
(%) 
Subsidy 
(%) 
Cattle 
Stillbirth and death (epidemic disease 
excluded) 
Austria 1.5 EUR 0–15/head 0 
 All-risk mortality Greece 8.3 1–2 0 
 Accidents and epizooties Spain 4.7 10 44 
Sheep and goats Accidents Spain 0.6 10 39 
Poultry All-risk mortality Greece 1 1–2 0 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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For a first and rough analysis of the approximate cost of the difference scenarios, 
data from existing insurance systems can be used and extrapolated to other 
European countries or to the EU as a whole. Table 41 to Table 44 show some of the 
data on premiums for different types of crops and insurance types which could be 
used to estimate average values of premium rates. The risks covered and the 
deductibles in each case are also shown, in order to account for the differences in 
premium rates. The subsidy rates are shown just as reference information. 
Once the cost of the insurance (the value of the premiums) is known, it comes to 
analysing how much would be the cost for the public sector. This cost would depend 
on the percentage of the premiums that is to be subsidised. This should be a political 
decision, but some discussion must take place on that subject.  
The cost would always be reduced by reducing the subsidy rate, but the subsidy 
should be large enough to make the product interesting for the farmers. This 
equilibrium should be found. Looking at the current subsidy rates in Europe and the 
USA, we can find subsidy rates ranging from 0 % in some European countries to 
72 % in the USA. The European guidelines allow subsidies of up to 80 % only for 
catastrophic risks, and up to 50 % when also other risks are covered. We could think 
that 50 % would be the maximum reasonable subsidy and not negligible for the 
farmers; 40 % being a more moderate one. 
Currently, many countries already subsidise crop and livestock insurance. A possible 
strategy could be a co-financing of the subsidies by the EU and the Member States. 
Examples of this are Austria and Canada, where insurance premiums are 50 % co-
financed by national and provincial governments. In Austria, the national subsidy is 
conditioned to the existence of the regional subsidy. In Spain, in contrast, regional 
governments freely subsidise insurance at the percentage they choose, 
independently from the national subsidy. 
An issue to take into consideration is the amount of the subsidies that falls on the 
farmers and not on the insurance companies’ expenses. Let us make the hypothesis 
of a 50 % subsidisation of insurance, and an average loss ratio for the insurance 
companies of 70 %. This would mean that for a EUR 100 premium, the farmer pays 
EUR 50, EUR 50 are subsidised, and he gets back EUR 70 in average indemnities. 
So, the net subsidy received by the farmer would be EUR 20/EUR 70, that is, 28.6 % 
of his losses. 
Next, we present a first, global and rough approach to a definition and analysis of 
several different scenarios.  
 
8.7.1. A possible option on income insurance  
Let us consider a hypothetical income stabilisation tool of this type. 
— If the average income/AWU of a given type of farm in a given region is less than 
the long-term trend by a percentage above a given threshold (deductible), all the 
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farms that have bought the insurance are compensated in a quantity equal to the 
loss minus the deductible.  
 
If we think about the FADN typology of farms in eight farm types and the FADN 
regions, with a straight deductible of 10 %, we have estimated the risk (expected 
average payment by the insurer, that is, the risk premium or actuarially fair premium) 
to be around EUR 3.5 billion for the FADN observation field, i.e. excluding small 
producers (see Section 7.3 for more details on the approach). The economic weight 
of farms outside the FADN observation field is small, but we can assume that the risk 
premium would grow to around EUR 4 billion/year when they are included.  
The average loss ratio (for companies) of insurances that involve individual loss 
adjustment is generally around 60 to 70 %, with administrative costs (mainly 
adjustment costs) at around 20 to 25 % of the premiums. This type of insurance 
would have low adjustment costs; therefore a loss ratio of 80 % would be reasonable. 
The total amount of premiums of less than 100 % cover would be around EUR 5 
billion; but we know that it takes a long time for farmers to accept insurance 
schemes, and it is difficult to think of more than 40 % to 60 % of market penetration. 
This makes a total premium amount of EUR 2 billion to EUR 3 billion. If we assume a 
subsidy of 50 %, we would be talking of a budgetary impact of EUR 1 billion to 
EUR 1.5 billion.  
This type of income insurance can be seen as an income support tool decoupled 
from production and, therefore, might match with the WTO green box. If this was 
included in pillar 1 from the current CAP scheme, a part of direct payments being 
shifted to provide subsidisation to this insurance, it would result in a regular income 
loss for farmers in normal years and an additional income support in crisis situations.  
Notice that this type of option does not necessarily involve the participation of 
insurance companies and can be managed by mutual funds or stabilisation accounts.  
 
8.7.2. Yield insurance on cereals: simplified quantification on arable 
crops  
For the analysis of production cover for winter–spring cereals, we could assume that 
the yield of wheat is a good indicator of the variability of yield of cereals in general. 
We consider a general insurance on yield with all climatic risks covered.  
The percentage of production insured is likely to depend on the variability of the 
potential yield: a well developed scenario can assume that 90 % of the production is 
insured in areas with very high variability of the potential yield, while only 30 % of the 
production is insured in areas in which the variability is low.  
The franchise could be 30 % of the ‘normal’ yield. The compensation to the farmer 
will be the percentage of loss compared with the ‘normal’ yield — 30 % (straight 
deductible).  
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The premium rates applied depend on the yield variability as well, but also on the 
penetration level of the insurance products: if it is low, it is likely that the insured 
farmers are those with the highest yield variability and therefore the insurance rates 
will be higher. The premiums could be subsidised by 50 % in less-favoured areas and 
30 % in other areas. The public support to the reinsurance is similar to the support 
currently provided in Spain, where the public–private partnership on agricultural 
insurances is particularly developed.  
The yield variability is a key parameter for the assessment of this type of scenario: 
the higher the yield variability the higher should be the demand for insurance and the 
higher the rates applied by the insurance companies. 
Currently, the data we have are not detailed enough for a proper analysis of this 
scenario, but we can make a quantification of a more simplified scenario on arable 
crops. The premium rates for yield insurance on arable crops ranges from 2.8 % to 
7 % depending on the region, the risks included in the cover and mostly on the used 
deductible. If we consider an EU-wide system on yield insurance for arable crops, 
covering most risks like hail, storm, frost, drought, flood and excessive rain and a 
deductible of 30 % at farm level for specific crops and that in an EU-wide system the 
risks are widespread, an average premium rate of 3.5 to 5 % for arable crops seems 
suitable.  
The production value on arable crops in the EU-25 is about EUR 67 300 million. If we 
assume for insurance a market penetration of about 40 %, we are talking about an 
insured value of EUR 20 million. A higher penetration level seems improbable in a 
first period of an EU-wide system that is not compulsory. This assumption results in a 
total premium amount of about EUR 940 million to EUR 1 350 million. If we assume a 
premium support of 50 %, we would be talking of a budgetary impact of EUR 470 
million to EUR 675 million. 
 
8.7.3. Area index yield insurance for cereals 
Let us consider an insurance policy using the regional average yield of a given cereal 
as a trigger for all the farmers having bought insurance in that region. An indication of 
the total premium volume involved can be computed from Eurostat data, as analysed 
in Section 7.3. The geographical scale of available Eurostat data is generally coarse, 
especially in some countries. This aggregation effect produces a smoothing in the 
variability of the yield time series. To make reasonable assumptions with this 
geographic level, we have made quantifications under two scenarios: with straight 
deductibles of 10 % and 20 %. The average risk level (expected payment due to the 
farmers) is 2.6 % (with a 10 % deductible) and 1.45 % (with a 20 % deductible) using 
the historical average production of each region as weight. It may happen that the 
acceptance of the insurance is higher in the areas with the higher risk level. This 
would modify the weights for the average risk level, which would become higher, 
  250 
maybe around 2 % and 3 % for both scenarios. The average premium rates might 
range between 3 % and 5 %.  
The yearly production value of cereals in the EU is slightly above EUR 35 billion. The 
acceptance level at medium term is difficult to estimate on an objective basis, but the 
experience in countries such as Austria, Italy, Spain and the USA suggest that it 
would reach, at most, 40 %. In this case the insured production would be around 
EUR 15 billion and the amount of premiums between EUR 450 million and EUR 750 
million.  
 
8.7.4. Fruits and vegetables 
In the case study on fruits and vegetables reported in Section 8.3, we estimate, 
under certain assumptions, that the volume of premiums for an EU-wide insurance 
system might range between EUR 500 million and EUR 900 million for fruits and 
another EUR 500 million to EUR 800 million for vegetables. The most important 
source of uncertainty in these estimates is the acceptance rate by farmers, which we 
have assumed to be 50 % for fruits and 15 % for vegetables, a sector in which the 
acceptance is low, even in Spain, a country with a well developed (and subsidised) 
set of insurance products available.  
Table 45 summarises the estimations of the four analysed scenarios. 
 
Table 45. Coarse estimation of quantitative costs for some options 
Option Premium rate(%) 
Penetration 
level 
(%) 
Premium 
(billion EUR) 
Subsidies if 50 % of 
premiums 
(billion EUR) 
1. Income insurance – 40–60 2–3 1–1.5 
2. Yield insurance on 
arable crops 
3.5–5 40 0.95–1.35 0.47–0.67 
3. Area index insurance for 
cereals 
3–5 40 0.45–0.75 0.23–0.37 
4. Yield insurance on fruits 
and vegetables 
9–15 
Fruits: 50  
Vegetables: 
15 
Fruits: 0.5–0.9 
Vegetables: 0.5–
0.8 
Fruits: 0.25–0.45 
Vegetables: 0.25–0.4 
Source: Authors calculation 
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8.8. A case study: insurance schemes for fruits and 
vegetables 
We consider here data on the current situation of insurance schemes for four 
countries: Spain, France, Italy and Austria. The main types of insurance for fruits and 
vegetables we have identified are:  
— single-risk, for example: hail, frost, flood, damage by strong rain or wind; 
— combined: covering two or more risks; 
— yield insurance for one product: covering any climatic risk; 
— whole farm insurance.  
In the case of Austria, frost on fruits is considered non-insurable, and this is probably 
also the case in many countries of central Europe, probably because the rates would 
be too high and reinsurers are reluctant to take such a systemic risk. This might 
change if there is a support from the public sector, in particular for the reinsurance, 
but this needs to be discussed with the private sector.  
 
8.8.1. Data on production and value of fruits and vegetables 
Production and value data used below have been obtained from datasets 
downloaded from the Eurostat intracomm site (http://europa.eu.int/estatref/download/ 
everybody/). The data may need some corrections, partly because of the possible 
inconsistencies on nomenclature concepts, but such corrections should not be a 
major source of inaccuracy compared with other sources of uncertainty.  
The production data we consider are obtained from the Eurostat table ‘Pvfrulea’ as 
an average of the available data between 2000 and 2004 (the averaged years can 
vary from country to country). The production value data come from the Eurostat 
table ‘A2acct97’ (Agricultural accounts with the 1997 nomenclature) as an average of 
the available data between 2000 and 2003.  
The relative weight of each of the four considered countries in each of the sectors 
(vegetables, citrus and other fruits) is similar in both tables, except for France. This 
suggests a more in-depth consistency analysis of the data for France. 
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Table 46. Production of fruits and vegetables 
  Vegetables Fruits  (excl. citrus) Citrus fruits 
EU-27 1 000 tonnes 64 105 24 513 10 429 
1 000 tonnes 12 751 4 097 5872 
ES 
% 19.9 16.7 56.3 
1 000 tonnes 6 226 3 571 27 
FR 
% 9.7 14.6 0.3 
1 000 tonnes 14 125 5 724 2 980 
IT 
% 22.0 23.4 28.6 
1 000 tonnes 528 719  
AT 
% 0.8 2.9  
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
Table 47. Value of the production of fruits and vegetables  
  Vegetables Fruits  (excl. citrus) Citrus fruits 
EU-25 Million EUR 23 354 11 293 3 329 
Million EUR 4 852 2 319 1 913 
ES 
% 20.8 20.5 57.5 
Million EUR 3 212 2 743  
FR 
% 13.8 24.3 0.0 
Million EUR 5 082 2 273 1 011 
IT 
% 21.8 20.1 30.4 
Million EUR 163 258  
AT 
% 0.7 2.3  
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
 
 
8.8.2. The possible order of magnitude of an EU-wide system 
The order of magnitude of a possible EU-wide insurance system for fruits and 
vegetables can be measured by the amount of production insured, the total amount 
of premiums or the cost for the public sector if the system is subsidised. The 
assumptions to make an estimate on such order of magnitude have to be based on 
the data available for European countries in which the system is developed. However 
the systems existing in different countries are generally not comparable and the 
climatic conditions and risk level are also strongly heterogeneous. The mentality of 
farmers and their possible reaction to a system that has never been applied in the 
country is another unknown factor that cannot be forecast on an objective basis. 
Therefore we need to accept a large amount of assumptions. Consequently any 
forecast that can be made has a very large degree of uncertainty.  
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We can give some indications of the order of magnitude of an EU-wide system. Let 
us assume that we consider a European system similar to the ‘whole farm insurance’ 
used in Spain for fruits (excluding citrus). The average cost in Spain has been 
EUR 6.17/100 kg. The total production in the EU-25 + 2 is around 25 million tonnes. 
A multiplication gives approximately EUR 1 500 million. Assuming that a political 
priority to this type of insurance leads to a 50 % cover with this type of insurance (or 
similarly, to a penetration level of 50 % of this type of insurance), we would get a 
figure of EUR 750 million for the total of the premiums. This involves some additional 
assumptions that are not easy to accept, in particular that the level of risk in Spain is 
approximately the average level of risk in the EU. Additional considerations need to 
be integrated in this coarse computation, such as the insurability of frost in many 
countries. An extrapolation of the Spanish data assuming a combined option with 
frost (indicatively an average of EUR 6 to EUR 7/100 kg) would result in a total of 
EUR 730 million to EUR 860 million, while an option without (roughly about 
EUR 4/100 kg) would give a figure of about EUR 500 million, always with the 
assumption of 50 % cover.  
Data for Italy are available in terms of average price of the premium compared with 
the insured value at a certain reference price. The average price has ranged in recent 
years between 13 % and 15 %; we consider 14 % as indicator. This rate applied to 
the EU-25 figure for the production value (~ EUR 11 300 million) gives EUR 1 580 
million, i.e. EUR 790 million for the total of premiums, assuming always a penetration 
level of 50 %. However, we have to take into account that more than 70 % of 
insurance for fruits in Italy is single risk (hail or frost). Therefore the apparent 
coherence of this figure with the extrapolation of the data from Spain comes with a 
question mark.  
In the case of vegetables, the penetration rate is generally lower and the fares are 
also lower than for fruits, but the global value of the production is significantly higher 
than for fruits. The market penetration figure provided by ENESA is 30 %, although 
the insured production (EUR 973 million) corresponds to 20 % of the Eurostat 
production figure. The difference is probably due to the denominator used: insurable 
production or total production. In Italy the market penetration is around 8 % to 9 % of 
the production (Eurostat figures). A hypothesis of a 15 % penetration level for a 
hypothetical EU-wide system seems reasonable. This would mean an insured 
production value of the order of EUR 10 000 million. Since the average premium rate 
ranges between 5 % and 8 %, the amount of premiums would be around EUR 500 
million to EUR 800 million. Figures are lower for citrus, although we do not have at 
the moment sufficient data on premium rates.  
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8.8.3. Cost for the public sector  
A major question on this issue is the possible cost of subsidising insurance schemes 
for fruits and vegetables at EU level. The answer obviously depends on several 
factors, including the type of insurance, proportion of production insured and the 
percentage subsidised.  
A simplified computation of the cost for the public sector would be:  
 
C= ProdVal × Degpen × Mrate × SubsP + PReins  
 
Where  
ProdVal = total value of the (insurable) production, 
Degpen = degree of market penetration of the insurance, i.e. part of the 
(insurable) production that is actually insured, 
Mrate = mean premium rate applied by the insurers, 
SubsP = subsidy proportion for the premium, 
PReins = public participation on the reinsurance. 
 
The concept of insurable production is not necessarily harmonised across Member 
States. Therefore it may be preferable to refer ProdVal and Degpen to the total 
production.  
 
A similar alternative formula would be: 
 
C= ProdW × DegpenW × MrateW × SubsP + PReins  
 
Where: 
ProdW = the production in weight, 
DegpenW = the degree of penetration in weight (it can be identified with Degpen),  
MrateW = the premium rate in EUR/tonne. 
The strongest source of indetermination is probably the degree of penetration 
Degpen. It is likely to depend on two main factors: the risk level (that can be 
represented by the variability of yield) and the existence of subsidies on the 
premiums. In a first approach we consider the effect of the subsidies, assuming that 
an EU support system would lead to an average degree of penetration comparable to 
the current one in countries with a national support system. Since the information we 
have on it is not precise because it is based on the conjecture that certain national 
values can be extrapolated, we will not make a difference between Degpen and 
DegpenW.  
The mean premium rate Mrate should depend on the type(s) of insurance and the 
risk of yield reduction above the franchise.  
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The interest of using one or the other formula depends on the available data. We 
should use statistical data for the production (weight or monetary value). At the 
moment we have data for production (weight), but not for value. 
 
8.8.4. Available data in selected countries 
Currently we only have data for a few countries in the specific field of insurance for 
fruits and vegetables. The type of data available for each country is quite 
heterogeneous and the extrapolation to the possible behaviour in the EU-25 from 
these data becomes difficult. 
Spain  
For fruits in Spain there are three possible insurance modes:  
— combined per species, covering hail, frost and other risks like flood, damage by 
strong rain or wind; 
— combined, excluding frost; 
— whole farm insurance: combined for all types of fruits in the farm. This includes 
hail, frost and other weather risks and the missed conversion of flowers into fruits 
for climatic reasons. For hail the indemnities are paid by parcel, but the rest of the 
damages are calculated for the whole farm.  
Deductibles: depend on the product and type of insurance, but are generally from 
10 % to 15 % for hail and from 15 % to 30 % for the options including frost.  
 
Table 48. Average cost of insurance in 2005 for fruits 
Fruit options  
 With frost 
(EUR/100 kg) 
Without frost 
(EUR/100 kg) 
Peaches 7.63 4.38 
Apricot 7.81 3.69 
Plums 6.56 4.68 
Cherry 26.71 18.83 
Table apples (excl. cider) 4.81 3.41 
Pear 5.36 3.12 
Whole farm 6.17  
Source: Authors’ elaboration from ENESA data (2005). 
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Table 49. Average cost of insurance in 2005 for vegetables 
 Cost (EUR/100 kg) 
Onion 0.70 
Melon  1.34 
Pepperoni  2.59 
Winter tomato  1.40 
Summer tomato  0.49 
Tomato Canary Islands  4.11 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from ENESA data (2005). 
 
Table 50. Insurance for fruits and vegetables in Spain  
 
Fruits 
(excluding 
citrus) 
Citrus 
Vegetables 
and 
flowers 
Degree of penetration    
Combined cover 65 37 30 
Yield insurance 6   
Insurance through producers’ organisations 4   
Insured production (multi-risk)    
Area (1 000 ha)  128 207 112 
Value (million EUR)  1 197 645 973 
Insured production (yield)    
Area (1 000 ha) 35 0 0 
Value (million EUR)  21 0 0 
Insured production (producers’ organisations)    
Area (1 000 ha) 3.4 0 0 
Value (million EUR)  3.9 0 0 
Source: Authors’ elaboration from ENESA data (2005). 
 
Italy 
The Italian data presented in this section are obtained from a provisional report on 
the insurance campaign 2005 and from the risk management data base ‘Sicuragro’ 
elaborated by the Institute of Services for the Agricultural and Food Market (ISMEA). 
In the agricultural insurance system, ISMEA’s role is to manage the public 
reinsurance fund and to run and keep updated the database on agricultural risks. 
ISMEA conducts research and experimentation for new agricultural risk management 
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tools. It supports the Ministry for Agricultural Policies (MAP) in preparing the annual 
report. 
In the 2005 campaign 74.98 % of the insured value relates to three sectors: cereals 
(EUR 958.8 million of the insured value), vineyards (EUR 876.6 million) and fruits 
(EUR 725.8 million). The higher costs borne to insure the fruit sector (13.83 % 
medium fare in 2005) show a rise equal to 6.17 % compared with those of 2004.  
Table 51 provides the possibility to compare and observe the trends and the 
evolution of the insurance market during the past few years. We can observe that the 
insured volume in the 2004 campaign was especially high (EUR 915 million of 
insured value). The fruit sector in 2005 suffered a significant reduction compared with 
2004, but the data are similar to those of the previous years. 
 
Table 51. Fruits — evolution of the insurance market (2001–05) 
Fruits Unit 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Variation
2005/04
(%) 
Contracts Number 58 903 64 365 59 728 60 375 51 107 – 15.35 
Insured value 
1 000 
EUR 
717 357 783.48 779 055 918 847 725 847 – 21 
Insured surface ha 147 236 100 596 121 028 114.88 110 675 – 3.66 
Insured quantity 
1 000 
tonnes 
2 086 2 141 1 961 2 073 1 507 – 27.28 
Insured quantity 1 000 6 137 5 186 4 717 5 957 7 422 – 24.59 
Total premium 
1 000 
EUR 
94 134 115 214 108 499 119 681 100 375 – 16.13 
Fare % 13.12 14.71 13.93 13.03 13.83 6.17 
Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from the Sicuragro database. 
 
Almost all the insurance contracts for the products of this specific sector are 
characterised by a 20 % to 30 % threshold (franchise). 
Table 52 gives the insured value per product.  
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Table 52. Product with the higher insured volumes and medium fares (2005) 
Products with the higher insured value Million EUR Medium fare 
Apple 208.8 18.66 
Pear 166.5 16.38 
Nectarine 81.2 14.29 
Kiwi 60.1  
Peach 46.9  
Table grapes 39.3  
Early nectarine 29.4 11.34 
Plum 25.4 12.04 
Breadfruit plants 22.9  
Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from the Sicuragro database. 
 
The insurance schemes can be:  
1. single-risk (hail and frost), which absorbs 71.74 % of the total insured value; 
2. combined on yield, to which is attributed 3.64 % of the total value; 
3. pluri-risk, to which belongs 24 % of the total insured value for this sector, and 
those guaranties are on: 
(i) hail and wind, 
(ii) hail and frost, 
(iii) hail, wind and frost, 
(iv) hail, wind, frost and drought. 
 
At a regional level we can observe that the insured volumes are concentrated in the 
Emilia Romagna region which absorbs 40.33 % of the whole insured value for the 
fruits sector (79.63 % of the pear insured value belongs to this region). Another 
region which presents high volumes is the Province of Bolzano and the Province of 
Trento, formerly the Trentino Alto Adige region (19.78 % of the fruits sector and 
67.60 % only for apples).  
In 2005 (see Table 53) the insured volumes for the vegetables and potatoes sector 
were decreased in comparison with the previous insurance campaign; in terms of 
value (– 10 %), surface (– 16.45 %) and quantity (– 9.73 tonnes). This kind of market 
evolution shows a decrease of the insurance demand. 
Almost all the subscribed policies of 2005, 98.87 % in terms of insured value, are 
characterised by the threshold fixed at 20 % to 30 %. Only a few crops were covered 
by insurance contracts without a threshold. The vegetables and fruits sectors adopt 
the same type of insurance schemes as those listed above. 
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Table 53. Vegetables and potatoes — evolution of the insurance market (2001–05) 
Vegetables and 
potatoes Unit 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Variation
2005/2004
(%) 
Contracts number 11 185 11 344 12 505 12 179 11 344 – 6.86
Insured value 1 000 EUR 390.48 378 244 419 511 496 686 446 949 – 10
Insured surface ha 66 025 61 688 68 809 78 499 65 588 – 16.45
Insured 
quantity 
1 000 
tonnes 
3 196 3 421 4 313 4 578 4 132 – 9.73
Insured 
quantity 
1 000 EUR 71 977 84 198 111 898 102 456  
Total premium 1 000 28 921 29 437 32 875 32 864 24 971 – 24.02
Fare % 7.41 7.78 7.84 6.62 5.59 – 15.56
Source: Authors’ elaboration with data from the Sicuragro database. 
 
France  
Most of the data we have at the moment are aggregated for fruits and vegetables 
together. The types of insurance that exist are listed below. 
— Mono-peril for all crops: this offers cover against fire, lightning, theft and hail. The 
risk of strong wind or small storm (tempête) seems not to be included for fruits 
and vegetables. 
— Hail and frost: this cover has been available for vineyards and fruit trees since 
2002. The insured surface for fruits and vegetables is 2 % to 3 %. 
— Multi-peril (hail, storm, frost, drought, flood or excess of humidity, snow and ice 
weight, ravine/gully erosion): This resulted in a very low demand in the first year 
(2005) for fruits and vegetables. From 2007 on, demand can be expected to 
increase as the subsidy for fruits and vegetables will be higher than for other 
crops because premiums for fruits and vegetables are far more expensive. 
 
Premiums: it depends on the extent of the guarantee, on the culture insured and on 
the location. 
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Table 54. Premiums and production insured for fruits and vegetables 
 
Premiums 
(million EUR) 
Production insured 
 (million EUR) 
1999 44.5 747.0 
2000 33.0 520.0 
2001 43.9 801.0 
2002 39.0 730.0 
2003 35.0 709.0 
2004 37.0 705.0 
Source: Authors calculations. 
 
Deductibles: The deductibles are usually 10 % of the damages for hail/storm 
insurance. It is variable for the other contracts. The deductibles for multi-peril for all 
crops depend on the type of contract: the whole-farm contract has a deductible of 
20 % and the specific crop contract 25 %. (These are the minimum deductibles in 
order to be eligible for subsidies. Lower deductibles assume a higher premium, and 
the premium difference is not subsidised.) 
 
Level of subsidies (2005): 
Mono-peril: hail and storm for fruit trees and groceries: 7.5 % 
Hail and frost for fruit trees: 25 % (for vineyards: 10 %) 
Multi-peril ‘hard blow’: 35 %.  
Austria 
Insurance for fruits and vegetables in Austria covers hail. Table 55 and Table 56 
show the main data concerning hail insurance in Austria, for fruits and vegetables 
respectively. Two geographical areas are differentiated, depending on the likelihood 
of hail events: highly and middle endangered.  
 
Table 55. Main data for fruits insurance in Austria 
 Average  
Number of contracts  3 075 
Average premium rate (hail) middle endangered area 
(33 %) 
9 % 
Average premium rate (hail) highly endangered area 
(67 %) 
15 % 
18 % 
Insured area (ha)   7 021 
Insured value (million EUR)   59.1 
Amount of premium (million EUR)   7.54 
Annual average loss (million EUR)  6.5 
Subsidies (percentage and million EUR)  50 % 3.77 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
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Table 56. Premium rates for vegetables hail insurance in Austria  
Vegetable category Middle endangered 
Highly 
endangered
Asparagus, carrots, parsley root, radishes, (beer-)radish, 
beetroots, wild horseradish 
2.1 3.4 
Broccoli, Chinese cabbage, fennel, green beans, peas, beetle 
beans, cauliflower, garlic, brassica, cabbage turnip, Brussels 
sprouts, white cabbage, industrial cabbage, red cabbage, 
parsley green, celery, spinach, sweet corn 
5.1 9 
Gherkins, field cucumber, aubergines, melons, hot peppers, 
leeks, rhubarb, courgettes 
6.8 12 
Peppers, tomatoes, lettuce, marrow, onions 8.5 18 
Source: Authors’ elaboration 
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9. Conclusions 
 
Farm income has always experienced a strong variability due to several factors. 
Some of them correspond to traditional concerns and others have started more 
recently to become an issue.  
— Short-term climatic variability: drought, hailstorms, frost, excessive rain (this is the 
main factor covered by existing insurance schemes and this report is mainly 
focused on this source of risk); 
— policy reforms: trade agreements and market liberalisation (reduction of prices); 
— an unbalanced relationship with retailers, who are better organised to put 
pressure on prices; 
— the risk of animal diseases; 
— long-term climate change: there is a general perception that the frequency and 
intensity of extreme meteorological events is growing. The IPCC report (2007) 
confirms some of these fears.  
The communication from the Commission to the Council (EC, 2005a) sets a basis for 
the debate on the inclusion of agricultural risk management in the CAP. An example 
of the presence of this concern in the political debate is the declaration of the French 
President, Nicolas Sarkozy, on 11 September 2007 (http://www.ambafrance-
uk.org/President-Sarkozy-s-speech-at.html): ‘Our environment is changing. We need 
to give the company heads that you are the means to protect yourselves against the 
disastrous consequences of climate and health risks. To do this, I am asking the 
European Commission to immediately set up a proficient risk and hazard 
management system. At the same time, I have asked Michel Barnier to work with 
Christine Lagarde to define, by the end of the year, the conditions for making the risk 
management mechanisms available to all our farms on the basis of the crop 
insurance experiment.’ 
This study constitutes a basis to analyse strategies to integrate risk management 
tools within the CAP. It provides a collection of mostly unpublished information on risk 
management tools and experiences at Member State level that should be useful for 
the future political debate. 
 
9.1. Risk maps 
Several sources of data have been used to give a geographical picture of the level of 
risk in the EU agriculture: yield data from the Eurostat REGIO database, the farm 
accountancy data network (FADN), agrometeorological models and satellite images. 
Data from the Eurostat REGIO database have been used to map the risk of regional 
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average yield reduction beyond a certain level (deductible) for main field crops 
(wheat, barley, field beans, grain maize, rapeseed, sunflower, potatoes, sugar beet). 
These maps show a strong heterogeneity with most regions in the centre of the EU 
essentially stable and peripheral regions (Mediterranean, Romania and some 
Scandinavian areas) with a high risk of yield reduction.  
We have used the CGMS system that uses crop physiology models, a soil map and a 
climatic database, obtained by interpolation of daily observations in more than 2 000 
meteorological observatories since 1975. The risk maps produced with this database 
do not overturn general knowledge, but give a better tuning of geographic distribution 
of risk. The risk of drought is obviously higher in southern regions, but not in a 
homogeneous way; on the other hand a large region with a non-negligible drought 
risk can be mapped around the Baltic Sea and to a lesser extent in some regions 
along the Danube. Excess of rain at harvest time is problematic mainly in the eastern 
part of the EU. Frost risk affecting all types of crops is generally assessed by 
temperatures at ‘crown level’ (about 3 cm below the surface). It increases on 
approaching the north-east, with local risk spots.  
Coarse resolution satellite images give a good tool to map the biomass reduction risk 
of pastures. Risk levels have been mapped on the basis of images from the sensor 
vegetation. High-risk areas appear to have a scattered layout, with some 
concentration in some areas including southern Spain, the Alps, Romania and 
Bulgaria, north-western Scotland and south of the Rhine valley.   
The geographic patterns still need additional validation, but the different approaches 
followed lead to coherent layouts.  
 
9.2. The level of development of agricultural insurances  
This study shows the high diversity of agricultural insurance systems in the EU-27 
Member States. Most information comes from fact sheets collected by experts or 
consultants in the different countries. In the absence of a legal mandate to collect the 
data, the amount of information received is very heterogeneous, with generally better 
information in countries with public systems or public support in that field. 
The development of agricultural insurance schemes in each country is linked to two 
main factors:  
— risk level and typology (hail, drought, excessive rainfall at harvest or flowering 
time, frost kill, etc.); and 
— the Member State’s policy to support the system. For non-systemic risks (hail), 
the private sector offers suitable insurances. For insurance products offering a 
comprehensive cover (including systemic risks) there is a direct relationship 
between insurance development and public support.  
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9.3. Public aid 
Public aid or compensation for agricultural losses are given on an ad hoc basis in 
most countries, regardless of the policy on insurances. When insurance is not 
subsidised, it is common to provide aid through compensation schemes, or through 
calamity funds, often partially financed by the agricultural stakeholders (on a 
voluntary or compulsory basis). There is public compensation in the form of ad hoc 
aid, calamity funds or both in most Member States (in Ireland, Luxembourg and the 
UK for livestock only).  
In the EU-27, the yearly average of public aid through these forms is more than 
EUR 1 billion. However, some data on ad hoc aid for livestock are missing; therefore 
the figure is probably underestimated. In the UK, 35 % corresponds to livestock 
diseases. Significant amounts correspond to different crop (and to a minor extent 
livestock) perils in France (25 %), Italy (10 %) and Germany (10 %).  
An inverse relationship appears between the quantities spent in insurance subsidies 
and the quantities spent in public ex post compensation. This means that it is 
possible to reduce ad hoc aid through fostering insurance. This does not necessarily 
mean that in this way public expenditure becomes more or less efficient.  
 
9.4. The volume of agricultural insurances and subsidies 
The total amount of agricultural insurance premiums in the EU is around EUR 1.5 
billion per year, with a public subsidy of approximately EUR 500 million. The average 
amount of loss compensations paid by insurances to farmers is close to EUR 1.1 
billion, close to the amount of public compensation in the form of ad hoc aid and 
calamity funds. 
Agricultural insurance schemes are fostered in a number of countries, not only 
though subsidies but also through regulations. In these countries, apart from the 
existence of public subsidies to the insurance premiums, the law forbids that ad hoc 
measures or disaster funds compensate for damages that could have been insured. 
The 2006 regulation (EC, 2006a) has made a step forward in this direction. From 
2010 on, it imposes a 50 % reduction of public compensation for those farmers who 
did not take up certain insurance cover. In order to obtain the full compensation, they 
need to have insured at least 50 % of their average annual production and the 
statistically most frequent climatic risks in their Member State or region. This 
measure will partially avoid the potentially negative effect of public compensation on 
the insurance demand and the insurance market, and will also encourage farmers to 
further improve their risk management. However, the effects of public compensation 
on insurance, be it subsidised or not, should be further analysed in order to 
understand which is the best policy to follow.  
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The development of insurance schemes in the livestock sector is generally lower than 
in the crop sector. Livestock risk management relies on sanitary assistance 
programmes; major crises (diseases with high externalities) are covered by public 
aid.  
 
9.5. Technicalities and insurance market 
Some technical aspects, such as triggers and deductibles, are very important for 
actuarially sound insurance systems. The WTO agreements also impose some 
constraint on technicalities, in particular the 30 % deductible to authorise public 
compensation to damages or subsidies to insurance. Reinsurance is of great 
importance, mainly in the case of systemic risks. Reinsurance is usually done in the 
international reinsurance market. The most typical reinsurance modalities are stop-
loss and quota-share reinsurance. The development of agricultural insurance 
schemes is hindered by the high cost of reinsuring systemic risks such as drought. 
Some countries offer some kind of public reinsurance. This is the case in Spain, Italy 
and Portugal.  
The insurance market in the EU-27 is also very different from one country to another. 
However, apart from some cases of monopoly, we find the common characteristic 
that in most countries there are few market players, with one or two dominant 
companies on this very specific sector of agricultural insurance. This suggests that 
there is a need to promote competitiveness in the sector. This could result in the 
lower cost of insurance products and could facilitate access for farmers. Also mutual 
insurance companies effectively managed by farmers and with a return of the profits 
to the farmers could be promoted or protected by the regulations.  
 
9.6. Towards an EU-wide harmonised insurance?  
The existing insurance level is generally insufficient to smooth significant income 
reduction in bad years. The risk management tools available in the Member States 
could be further developed. However, given the heterogeneous situation in the 
Member States, the interest of a harmonised EU-wide system of agricultural 
insurances is debatable. Conditions for a feasible EU-wide insurance scheme are 
analysed and classified into: (a) decisions of the policymakers (political criteria); (b) 
decisions of the private sector: insurers, reinsurers and farmers (socioeconomic); and 
(c) technical conditions.  
The possible amount of costs of a hypothetical EU-supported insurance system has 
been roughly quantified for a few hypothetical scenarios, under given assumptions. 
The rough costs estimation of some of them indicates that a 50 % subsidy to the 
national premiums of all the countries, assuming an insurance demand of 40 %, 
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would be approximately of the order of magnitude of EUR 1 billion for income 
insurance, EUR 0.5 billion to EUR 0.6 billion for yield insurance on arable crops, 
EUR 0.23 billion to EUR 0.37 billion for area index insurance for cereals and EUR 0.2 
billion to EUR 0.4 billion for fruits. However, these estimations rely on strong 
hypothesis that need further analysis, such as the assumption that the average 
premium rate of an extended system would be similar to the average premium rates 
for the currently existing insurance schemes. The calculations should be improved, in 
particular by taking into account yield and income variability based on data at farm 
level that were not available for this study. 
Among the different types of insurance analysed, revenue insurance would be more 
expensive but more efficient as an income stabiliser, while indirect index insurance 
would be cheaper and easier to manage but usually less correlated with farmers’ 
income.  
Altogether, given the high diversity of risks and of socioeconomic backgrounds in the 
EU-27 Member States, it does not seem advisable to settle on a homogeneous 
common insurance system. Some alternatives can be a set of actions to encourage 
national systems:  
— facilitating/subsidising the composition of databases, preferably at the farm level; 
— providing public reinsurance; 
— partially subsidising national systems; 
— establishing a common regulatory framework for these actions and adequate 
control tools. This common framework should always set the level of public 
support within the limits established by the WTO agreements (WTO, 1994), and 
take into account the current EU legislation: Regulation (EC) No 1857/2006 (EC 
2006a) and the guidelines (EC 2006b). 
 
9.7. Further research and improvements  
The analysis and mapping of risks in the Member States could be further improved 
through more accurate maps and cross-checking their results with observed yield 
losses and farmers’ income variability.  
On the other hand, data from some countries are still missing or incomplete. It is 
especially difficult to collect the information from the private insurance companies 
when there are no public subsidies. For example, much information is missing from 
the Netherlands and from the French non-subsidised insurance products. No 
information at all could be collected for Malta.  
Lastly, the simulated insurance scenarios presented in this report are only a first step 
to assess the potential of the different insurance products. Nevertheless, more in-
depth studies are scheduled to evaluate in more detail the income risk losses and 
income risk management possibilities from FADN individual data. Another 
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challenging issue is the analysis of various possible index insurance schemes that 
could be based on meteorological and agrometeorological parameters. Moreover, it 
would be worth exploring the potential use of those indices as a control tool for 
estimating the potential public compensation for catastrophic losses.  
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Glossary 
 
Adverse climatic event which can be assimilated to a natural disaster: 
According to EC 2006a, weather conditions such as frost, hail, ice, rain or drought 
which destroy more than 30 % of the average annual production of a given farmer in 
the preceding three-year period or a three-year average based on the preceding five-
year period, excluding the highest and lowest entry. 
 
Adverse selection: A situation in which the insured has more information about his 
or her risk of loss than does the insurance provider and is better able to determine 
the soundness of premium rates. As a consequence, the level of risk in the insured 
population is higher than in the total population (Harwood et al., 1999). 
 
Agricultural production contract A contract by which a producer (sometimes called 
a ‘grower’) agrees to sell or deliver all of a designated crop raised in a manner set 
forth in the agreement to a contractor and is paid according to a formula established 
in the contract. 
 
Asymmetric information: Relates to the problem that the buyer of insurance and 
the insurance company may not have the same information as regards the probability 
of losses occurring. Asymmetric information refers to one or both of these problems: 
‘adverse selection’ and ‘moral hazard’.  
 
Basis risk: Risk associated to the differences existing between the index on which a 
risk management tool is based and the actual value experienced by the farmer.  
 
Blanket insurance: A single insurance policy that covers one or more broad classes 
of persons or property, without identifying the specific subjects of insurance in the 
contract.  
 
Bonus/malus: Premium discounts/charges when over a certain period of time no 
claims/claims are made. 
 
Calamity fund: A fund organised and managed by the government or local authority, 
in which provisions are made periodically by the government and sometimes also 
through contributions (taxes, etc.) from the private sector. The fund covers the losses 
when a calamity or disaster situation is approved by the government. 
 
Catastrophe fund: See ‘calamity fund’. 
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Co-insurance: An insurance policy provision under which the insurer and the insured 
share costs incurred after the deductible is met, according to a specific formula. More 
generally it consists in a sharing of risk between the insurer and the insured.  
It can also refer to the case where a number of different insurers subscribe to a 
single insurance policy. 
 
Common market organisation: A set of measures that, when operated together, 
enable the European Union to manage a market for a specific agricultural product. 
The purpose of such market management is to provide, on the one hand, farmers 
with an outlet for their products and a steady income and, on the other hand, to 
ensure that consumers have a secure supply of food at reasonable prices. There are 
some 17 common market organisations. Together they cover around 90 % of the 
output of farms in the European Union 
(http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/glossary/index_en.htm#cmo). 
 
Consequential losses due to an animal disease: In insurance contracts, 
consequential losses are indirect losses, a reduction in the value of property that is a 
result of a direct damage loss. They are usually associated with a time element or to 
other remote or indemnification type losses. Consequential losses are different from 
ensuing losses since consequential losses are indirect losses and not direct damage 
losses, whereas ensuing losses are further or additional direct damage losses that 
have been initiated by the original direct damage cause of loss.  
 
Co-reinsurance: A requirement that the reinsured bears, in addition to the 
deductible, a portion of the cover under the treaty un-reinsured and for its own 
account. It intends to ensure that the reinsured retains an interest in loss 
minimisation even after the deductible has been exceeded. 
 
Cumulative loss ratio: The ratio of total indemnities to total earned premiums during 
the base period, expressed as a decimal. 
 
Deductible or excess (French: franchise): The portion of an insured loss to be 
borne by the insured before he is entitled to recovery from the insurer. It may be in 
the form of an amount in euros, a percentage of the value of the insured property 
(‘straight deductible’) or a percentage of the loss (‘relative deductible’). 
In a policy providing a deductible clause, it is the amount which must first be 
subtracted from the total damage incurred before determining the insurance 
company’s liability. Several types are used. 
 
Direct losses due to animal disease: Direct financial loss due to mortality or 
morbidity of livestock or crop plants can vary from insignificant to catastrophic. In 
many cases the direct losses would be modest and would fall on a small number of 
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farms. One of the major determinants of the magnitude of the direct losses will be the 
rapidity with which the disease is noticed and diagnosed. 
 
Disappearing deductible: Establishes the insurer’s liability for an increasing 
proportion of the loss, as the total damage rises above the deductible, until the 
deductible finally ‘disappears’. Then the insurer is liable for the entire amount. 
 
Enzootic disease: the constant presence of a disease or infectious agent in an 
animal (non-human) population within a given geographic area and considered the 
usual prevalence of a disease within a focus. An enzootic disease condition in animal 
populations serving as agent reservoirs can, on occasion, explode into an epizootic 
disease that results in dramatic illness and sometimes significant death in susceptible 
populations. 
 
Epizootic disease: The occurrence of a disease in an animal population with the 
frequency of illness or mortality in clear excess of normal expectancy. 
 
European size unit (ESU): The economic size of farms is expressed in the farm 
accountancy data network in terms of European size units. The value of one ESU is 
defined as a fixed number of EUR/ECU of farm gross margin. Over time the number 
of EUR/ECU per ESU has changed to reflect inflation, from EUR 1 000/ESU in 1980 
to EUR 1 200/ESU in 2002 
(http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/methodology1_en.cfm). 
 
Franchise or franchise deductible: Deductible in which the insurer has no liability if 
the loss is under a certain amount, but once this amount is exceeded, the entire 
amount is paid in full. Deductible below which nothing is payable and beyond which 
the entire amount of the sum insured is payable. The franchise deductible 
establishes the insurer's liability for the entire amount of damage once the deductible 
amount is exceeded in a loss. 
 
Gross aid intensity: According to EC 2006a, the aid amount expressed as a 
percentage of the project’s eligible costs. All figures used shall be taken before any 
deduction for direct taxation.  
 
Insurance mutual: Company providing mutual insurance (see ‘mutual insurance’). 
 
Insurance policy: A contract of insurance describing the term, cover, premiums and 
deductibles.  
 
Loss ratio: Ratio of the annual claims paid by an insurance company to the 
premiums received expressed as a decimal.  
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Moral hazard: In the case of insurance, moral hazard refers to an individual’s 
change in behaviour after having taken out an insurance policy. The change in 
behaviour results in an increase in the potential magnitude and/or probability of a 
loss.  
Tools that insurance companies generally use to minimise moral hazard include:  
— deductibles or co-payments (the insured has to bear part of the loss: a fixed 
amount or a percentage of the total loss);  
— no-claim bonuses (see ‘bonus/malus’);  
— checks to verify whether the insured takes the precautionary measures agreed 
upon to prevent losses;  
— indemnification based on an objective index which cannot be influenced by the 
insured. 
 
Mutual fund: (1) An open-end investment company that invests money of its 
shareholders in a usually diversified group of securities of other corporations. (2) In 
agricultural insurance contexts, mutual fund is used to design a farmers’ owned 
stabilisation fund. They have no own legal personality and are based on a private 
contract or agreement. Their statute asks for monetary annual contribution but there 
is no guarantee or legal title of compensation.  
 
Mutual insurance: Insurance method in which the policyholders are the owners of 
the insuring company. So, there are no shares or shareholders but, tax related and 
legally, they are equal to share companies.  
 
Premium: A regular periodic payment for an insurance policy. 
 
Quota-share provisions: Specify what percentage of premiums and loss exposure 
the private company will retain, with the residue being passed on to the reinsurer.  
 
Reinsurance: There are two main types: excess of loss or stop-loss reinsurance and 
proportional or pro-rata reinsurance. Stop-loss reinsurance: see ‘stop-loss 
provisions’. Proportional reinsurance: there are four types of structure: quota-share 
reinsurance, variable quota-share reinsurance, surplus reinsurance and surplus 
reinsurance with a table of lines. Quota-share reinsurance is the most common: The 
reinsurer assumes a set percentage of risk for the same percentage of the premium, 
minus an allowance for the ceding company's expenses. 
 
Relative deductible (French: Franchise relative or Franchise proportionnelle): 
Deductible consisting of a percentage of the loss to be borne by the insured 
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Risk: Uncertainty (i.e. imperfect knowledge or predictability because of randomness) 
in outcome that might involve adversity or losses. Two aspects of risk can be 
distinguished: variability and downside risk, i.e. the probability of extreme low values 
(Hardaker et al., 1997). 
 
Risk aversion: Economic agents are risk averse when they have a preference for a 
certain outcome over an uncertain outcome with equal expected value (Hardaker et 
al., 1997). 
 
Standard gross margin (SGM): The standard gross margin of a crop or livestock 
item is defined as the value of output from one hectare or from one animal less the 
cost of variable inputs required to produce that output. The concept of SGM is used 
to determine the economic size of farms, which is expressed in terms of European 
size units (ESU). This concept is used by the farm accountancy data network and in 
the farm structure survey organised by Eurostat.  
Definition (http://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/rica/methodology1_en.cfm). 
 
Spot market (also cash market): A market in which commodities such as grain, 
gold or crude oil are bought and sold for cash and delivered immediately. 
 
Stop-loss provisions: specify the maximum amount of loss that the company will 
have to cover before the reinsurer covers the additional losses (Skees and Barnet, 
1999). 
 
Straight deductible or deductible (French: Franchise absolue or Franchise 
déduite): A deductible that is a constant value (as a specified amount). 
 
Systemic risk: As opposed to risks like fire and burglary, systemic risks are 
dependent risks. A lot of people suffer a loss at the same time. Systemic risks result 
in many people making a claim at the same time with the effect that the premiums 
paid into a pool are not sufficient to cover the loss incurred, which may threaten the 
solvency of the insurance pool. An example for systemic risks is price risk. All 
producers suffer from price downturns at the same time. Measures insurance 
companies can take to deal with systemic risks include reinsurance, geographic 
spreading and the use of capital markets. 
 
Transparent aid: Defined by the 2006 regulation as ‘aid measures in which it is 
possible to calculate precisely the gross grant equivalent as a percentage of eligible 
expenditure ex ante without need to undertake a risk assessment (for example 
measures which use grants, interest rate subsidies, capped fiscal measures)’. 
 
Trigger: See ‘franchise’. 
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Vertical integration: in microeconomics and strategic management, the term 
describes a style of ownership and control. Vertically integrated companies are 
united through a hierarchy and share a common owner. Usually each member of the 
hierarchy produces a different product or service, and the products combine to satisfy 
a common need. It is contrasted with horizontal integration. Vertical integration is one 
method of avoiding the hold-up problem. 
 
Zoonosis (zoonoses, plural): An infection or an infectious disease transmissible 
under natural conditions directly or indirectly between humans and other vertebrates. 
The transmission must be between animals and humans, and the direction of transfer 
is immaterial. There are four principal types of zoonoses: (1) anthropozoonosis: 
diseases acquired from other vertebrate experiencing enzootic or epizootic disease 
(e.g. plague, rabies, leptospirosis, arboviroses, trichinosis, toxoplasmosis, scrub 
typhus); (2) zooanthropozoonosis: diseases primarily of human origin that may be 
acquired by other vertebrates (e.g. amebiasis, tuberculosis); (3) amphixenosis: 
diseases common to humans and other vertebrates (e.g. influenza, salmonellosis, 
Chagas disease, schistosomiasis, leptospirosis, certain mycoses); (4) parazoonosis: 
accidental or incidental infections of humans with animal disease agents (e.g. 
cysticercosis, toxocariasis, hantaviruses, other arboviruses). 
World Health Organisation (http://www.who.org.mv/EN/Section40/Section41_94.htm). 
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List of acronyms 
 
AIDA agricultural income disaster assistance — Canada 
AGR adjusted gross revenue 
AWU annual work unit 
BSE bovine spongiform encephalopathy 
CAIS  Canadian Agricultural Income Stabilization 
CAP  common agricultural policy 
CAT catastrophic cover insurance 
CCPs counter-cyclical payments 
CCS Consorcio de Compensación de Seguros — Spain 
CEA Comité Européen des Assurances 
CES Comité Économique et Social Européen 
CMO  common market organisation 
CRC crop revenue cover 
CSF classical swine fever 
EC European Community 
ECHO European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department 
ENESA Entidad Estatal de Seguros Agrarios — Spain 
ESU European standard unit 
EU  European Union 
FADN  farm accounting data network 
FAO Food and Agriculture Organisation 
FMD  foot-and-mouth disease 
FNGCA Fonds Nationale de Garantie Contre les Calamités Agricoles — France 
FSN Fondo di Solidarietà Nazionale — Italy 
GRIP gross revenue insurance plan 
GRP group risk plan  
GRIP group risk income protection 
IP income protection 
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
JRC Joint Research Centre (European Commission) 
LGM livestock gross margin 
LFA less-favoured area 
LIFFE London International Financial Futures and Options Exchange  
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LRP  livestock risk protection 
MPCI multiple peril crop insurance — USA 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
OIE World Animal Health Organisation 
PET potential evapotranspiration 
PI production insurance — Canada 
RA revenue assurance 
RSM relative soil moisture 
SFP single farm payment 
SGM standard gross margin 
SMU soil monitoring units 
UAA utilised agricultural area 
UGB unité gros bétail  
UN/ISDR United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction 
UK United Kingdom 
US/USA United States of America 
WLSOW water limited storage organ weight 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
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Abstract 
Agricultural producers face a series of risks affecting the income and welfare of their households. 
These are mainly production risks related to weather conditions, pests and diseases, market 
conditions, liberalization policies, climate change, etc. In recent years the European Union has been 
considering a possible integration of risk management in the common agricultural policy and is 
analysing risk and crisis management strategies to provide an improved response to crises in the 
agricultural sector. 
This report reviews the agricultural risk management systems in the EU-27 (candidate countries 
Turkey and Croatia are also analysed) with a special focus on types of agricultural insurance. The 
study contains a collection of data on the realities and modalities of agricultural insurance in Europe. 
This information mainly comes from fact sheets filled in by experts or consultants from the different 
European countries and data from the European Committee of Insurers (CEA). Many of these data 
were unpublished because there is no obligation for the insurance companies to report to the EU 
institutions.  
The report quantifies and maps different types of risks, from climatic risks to yield and revenue risks. 
The role of Governments in helping farmers to face disasters is analyzed for every country: providing 
aid ex-post and offering or subsidizing insurances. The Member States definitions of crisis and 
disaster when authorising state aids are described and contrasted with the EU and international 
legislation. Aid is sometimes given on an ad-hoc basis through compensation schemes, or funds 
partially financed by the agricultural sector (on a voluntary or compulsory basis). Mutual funds, 
calamity funds and ad-hoc payments existing in European countries are summarised. The levels of 
ad-hoc payments per country are compared.  
Agricultural insurances are fostered in a number of countries. The different types of agricultural 
insurance systems and key figures in each country are analysed. Some technicalities are described, 
such as reinsurance, triggers and deductibles. The relationship between Government involvement and 
insurance development is highlighted. Usually private companies insure only hail and fire, and the 
government subsidies and public reinsurance are needed to make possible the insurance of 
agricultural systemic risks.  
One conclusion is that the risk management tools available in the Member States (MS) could be 
further developed. Conditions for a feasible EU-wide insurance scheme have been analysed. The 
possible amount of costs of an EU-supported insurance system has been roughly quantified for a few 
hypothetical scenarios. However, given the heterogeneous situation in the MS, the interest of a 
harmonised EU-wide system of agricultural insurances is debatable. 
 
 

  
 
How to obtain EU publications 
 
Our priced publications are available from EU Bookshop (http://bookshop.europa.eu), where you 
can place an order with the sales agent of your choice. 
 
The Publications Office has a worldwide network of sales agents. You can obtain their contact 
details by sending a fax to (352) 29 29-42758. 
 
 
  
The mission of the JRC is to provide customer-driven scientific and technical support 
for the conception, development, implementation and monitoring of EU policies. As a
service of the European Commission, the JRC functions as a reference centre of
science and technology for the Union. Close to the policy-making process, it serves 
the common interest of the Member States, while being independent of special
interests, whether private or national. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
